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ARTICLES

ENGINEERING THE MIDDLE CLASSES:
CLASS LINE-DRAWING IN NE W DEAL
HOURS LEGISLATION
Deborah C. Malamud*
The likely readers of this Article work for a living, or are study
ing with the hope that they will work for a living very soon. Unlike

many other workers in this .society, they do not (and will not) get

paid time-and-a-half for overtime. In this Article, I tell the story of
how upper-level white-collar workers - people like the intended
readers of this Article - came to be exempt from the Fair Labor
Standards Act's general overtime rules.1 My purpose in telling this
story is not to participate in the debate on whether the so-called
"white-collar exemptions" to the Fair Labor Standards Act make
* Professor, University of Michigan Law School. B.A. 1977, Wesleyan; J.D. 1986, Uni
versity of Chicago. - Ed. I dedicate this piece to Ted St. Antoine upon his retirement from
law teaching, with thanks for the privilege of being his colleague. I have appreciated the
opportunity to present this paper to the law school faculty workshops at Case Western
Reserve, Harvard, Iowa, and Utah (as part of my visit as Howard H. Rolapp Distinguished
Visiting Scholar), and at the 1996 annual meetings of the Law and Society Association and
the International Network on Transformative Employment and Labor Law. Thanks to the
many colleagues, at Michigan and elsewhere, who have commented on this project at its
various stages, with special thanks to Catherine Fisk, Tom Green, Don Herzog, Morton
Horwitz, Rick Lempert, Lea Vander Velde, and Jim Wooten. Thanks also to the librarians
and archivists at the University of Michigan Law School, the National Archives, the Franklin
Delano Roosevelt Presidential Archives, the Library of Congress Manuscripts Division, the
Department of Labor, and the Archives of Labor History and Urban Affairs at the Walter P.
Reuther Library at Wayne State University. Finally, my thanks to Jeannine Bell, Melissa
Plotkin, and Abigail Carter for their able research assistance.
1. Marc Linder is the scholar who has most exhaustively studied the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) and related legislation. See, e.g., MARC LINDER, MIGRANT WORKERS AND
M!NIMuM WAGES: REGULATING TiiE EXPLOITATION OF AGRICULTURAL LABOR IN THE
UNITED STATES (1992); Marc Linder, The Small-Business Exemption Under the Fair Labor
Standards Act: The "Original" Accumulation of Capital and the Inversion of Industrial Pol
icy, 6 J.L. & PoLY. 403 (1998); Marc Linder, Farm Workers and the Fair Labor Standards Act:
Racial Discrimination in the New Deal, 65 TEXAS L. REv. 1335 (1987) [hereinafter Linder,
Farm Workers and the Fair Labor Standards Act]; Marc Linder, Class Struggle at the Door:
The Origins of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 39 BUFF. L. REv. 53 (1991); Marc Linder,
Closing the Gap Between Reich and Poor: Which Side Is the Department of Labor On?, 21
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1 (1993-1994). The emphasis of Linder's work on exemp
tion from hours regulations is on lower-level exemptions, through which agricultural and do
mestic workers - many of them black - have historically been excluded from protection.
For a siniilar criticism of the FLSA for leaving many women workers without statutory pro
tection, see Suzanne B. Mettler, Federalism, Gender, & the Fair Labor Standards Act, 26
POLITY 635 (1998).
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sense, although I will close by suggesting why that question is
harder than it appears.2 Instead, my aim is to use the historical
example of New Deal wage and hour legislation to shed light on
how the law reflects and helps to shape the American concept of
class.
The legal academy has generated a rich literature on the ways in
which law and social practice interact in the creation and mainte
nance of social categories and hierarchies. Race and gender have
been the dominant subjects in this literature.3 Class has been all
but ignored.4 This should come as no surprise. We Americans do
not accept class as a core part of either our identities or our social
structure. Most of us believe that we are "middle class," and that
individuals can so easily move upwards into and within the middle
classes that it makes little sense to think of Americans as divided by
class at all.5 Just as class tends to be invisible to the American so2. The statutory exemption for "any employee employed in a bona fide executive, admin
istrative, or professional capacity" is found in § 213 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,
29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(l) (1994). The implementing regulations are found at 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.0.315 (1997). For debate on the exemption, see, e.g., Nicholas Clark, Fair Labor Standards Act
Reform - It's Not Broke, So Don't Fix It, 11 LAB. LAW. 343 (1996); Peter D. DeChiara,
Rethinking the Managerial-Professional Exemption ofthe Fair Labor Standards Act, 43 AM.
U. L. REv. 139 (1993); William J. Kilberg, Reforming the Fair Labor Standards Act: For
Congress and the Rest of Us, EMPLOYEE REL. LJ., Spring 1996, at 1; Robert D. Lipman et al.,
A Call for Bright-Lines to Fix the Fair Labor Standards Act, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 357
(1994); Lawrence Peikes, Tightening the White-Collar Exemptions: The Courts Breathe New
Life into the Fair Labor Standards Act, 10 LAB. LAW. 121 (1994). In a recent decision, the
Supreme Court held that the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor has con
siderable discretion to interpret these exemptions, and sustained its interpretation of the "sal
ary basis" test, one of the more controversial aspects of the exemption regulations. See Auer
v. Robbins, 117 S. Ct. 905 (1997).
3. For representative critical race theory anthologies, see, e.g., CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM:
A READER (Adrien Katherine Wmg ed., 1997); CRITICAL RAcE THEORY: THE CurnNG
EDGE (Richard Delgado ed., 1995); CRITICAL RAcE THEORY: THE KEY W RITINGS THAT
FoRMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995). For casebooks surveying
the state of feminist jurisprudence, see, e.g., KATHARINE T. BARTLETT & ANGELA P.
HAruus , GENDER AND LAw: THEORY, DoCTRINE, COMMENTARY (2d ed. 1998); MARY
BECKER ET AL., FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY (1994).
4. For a treatment of legal definitions of race and sexual orientation identities, see
Kenneth Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits of Race and Sexual Orien
tation, 43 UCLA L. REv. 263 (1995). This is not to say that the agenda of critical legal studies
(CLS) did not include the exploration of class as a phenomenon contested in and through
law. But Robert Gordon observed as late as 1989 - late in the history of CLS as a move
ment - that "[t]he Critics are still a long way from being able to deliver the brightest
promises of their Critical program: thickly described accounts of how law has been imbri
cated in and has helped to structure the most routine practices of social life." Robert W.
Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, in CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 79, 102 (Alan C. Hutchinson
ed., 1989). I consider work one of those routine practices, and see this article as part of that
program - for all that it issues from a scholar lacking in movement credentials.
5. Some of the vast academic debate on the .concept of class as it pertains to the middle
classes and white-collar workers is surveyed in Deborah C. Malamud, Class-Based Affirma
tive Action: Lessons and Caveats, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1847 (1996). For an extremely helpful
historical and comparative treatment, see JORGEN KocKA, WHITE COLLAR WORKERS IN
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cial eye, the American legal eye does not see the law as actively
involved in creating and maintaining class lines. When American
lawyers look for the hand of the law in the construction of social
categories, we tend to look in equal protection theory (the creation
of suspect classifications) and in antidiscrimination law (the crea
tion of protected groups).6 Class seems invisible to American law
because neither equal protection doctrine nor antidiscrimination
law has accorded it legal significance.7
While class has not been recognized as a category in American
civil rights jurisprudence, class line-drawing has long been a perva
sive activity of the Americaµ legal system. At least since the New
Deal,8 Congress and administrative agencies operating in the fields
of labor, welfare, and tax law have routinely selected categories of
people for coverage on the basis of class-like criteria - by which I
mean social or economic criteria (such as occupation) that are part
of the complex of social and economic distinctions referred to in
popular or academic discourse as "class."9 By moving from civil
AMERICA 1890-1940 (1980). Other significant historical, theoretical, and/or comparative
treatments include ILEEN A. DEVAULT , SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF LABOR! CLASS AND
CLERICAL Woruc IN TURN-OF-THE-CENTURY PrrrsBURGH (1990); RICHARD SoBEL, THE
WHITE CoLLAR WORKING CLAss: FROM STRUCTURE TO PoLmcs (1989); ERIK OLIN
WRIGHT, CLASS CmJNrs: CoMPARATIVE STUDIES IN CLASS ANALYSIS (1997); SocIAL
CHANGE AND THE MIDDLE CLASSES (T1m Butler & Mike Savage eds., 1995). For a discus
sion of the American rhetoric of class, including the treatment of white-collar and/or middle
class workers, see Margo Anderson, The Language of Class in Twentieth-Century America, 12
Soc. SCI. HIST. 349 (1988).
6. This is beginning to change in the recent critical race theory literature, as the focus of
critical race theory expands beyond what Juan Perea has termed the "black-white binary"
and into new areas of social practice. See Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of
Race: The "Normal Science" ofAmerican Racial Thought, jointly published as 10 LA RAZA
LJ. 127 (1998) and 85 CAL . L. REv. 1213 (1998). For a leading example, see IAN F. HANEY·
L6PEZ, WHITE BY LAw (1996), which focuses on statutory immigration cases.
7. The exception was the effort to treat the poor as a suspect class - which, had it not
failed, would have required courts to develop a constitutional definition of poverty. But the
effort did fail. Compare Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7 (1969) with San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). In any case, it is likely that the
result of these efforts, had they succeeded, would have been the definition of poverty as a
suspect classification. Heightened constitutional scrutiny might not have been brought to
bear on government action that defines the lines that differentiate non-poor working people
from one another.
8. I use the New Deal as a cutoff because the Depression Jed to an unprecedented broad
ening of the scope of social programs, and because of the New Deal heritage of so many
existing social programs. The New Deal may also have been the first occasion for compre
hensive governmental consideration of the economic problems of white-collar workers although that claim is in need of further historical testing at the state and federal levels.
Indeed, the Depression was a crucible for the definition of the federal government's role in a
wide range of areas. See Alan Brinkley, The New Deal and the Idea ofthe State, in THE RISE
AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER, 1930-1980, at 85 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle eds.,
1989).
9.

See Malamud, supra note 5, at 1854-56.
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rights legislation to economic legislation, and from courts to admin
istrative agencies, we can begin to see the role the law has played in
constructing and maintaining American conceptions of class.
We are perhaps accustomed to thinking that the government de
fines "the poor" as a class in the course of enacting and implement
ing social welfare legislation.10 We are less accustomed to thinking
that the law plays a role in the way we understand the middle
classes- or, to address my readers more directly, the way we un
derstand ourselves. There is, of course, a parallel here to the issue
of the social and legal construction of race and gender. Tradition
ally, scholarship on race and gender and the law has focused on the
law's involvement in giving shape to

black race

and female gender.

To use the language of linguistics for a moment, it is as if law were
seen as doing its work only on the categories "marked" as somehow
different

or problematic.

Restricting

critical

analysis

to

the

"marked" categories leaves the "unmarked" categories- those in
which power resides - seemingly as facts of nature rather than as
products of culture. Just as race scholarship has now moved in the
direction of problematizing "whiteness,"11 I wish to problematize
the American middle classes.
For scholars interested in the subject of class and the law particularly insofar as the middle classes are concerned- the New
Deal is a pivotal period.12 The Depression had sweeping effects
across the American class hierarchy, and the breadth of its effects
was recognized by government administrators. In the words of
Harry Hopkins, the director of the Federal Emergency Relief Ad
ministration

(FERA),

"the whole crowd is caught in this thing, the

finest people in America."13

"[D]octors [and] dentists," "minis-

10. See, e.g., NATIONAL REsEARCH COUNCIL, MEASURING POVERTY: A NEW APPROACH
(Constance F. Citro & Robert T. Michael eds., 1995).
11. For whiteness literature in history and the humanities, see, e.g., NoEL lGNATIEV,
How TiiE IrusH BECAME WmTE (1995); ToNI MoRRISON, PLAYING IN TiiE DARK: WHITE
NESS AND TiiE LITERARY IMAGINATION (1992); DAVID ROEDIGER, TOWARDS TiiE ABOLI
TION OF WmTENESs (1994); DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WmTENESs: RACE AND
TiiE MAKING OF TiiE AMERICAN WORKING CLASs (1991); WmTE TRAsH: RACE AND CLAss
IN AMERICA (Matt Wray & Annalee Newitz eds., 1997). As some of the titles cited reflect,
the whiteness literature is deeply concerned with the role race has played in shaping the
class-consciousness (or lack thereof) of white American workers. For critical race theory
literature on whiteness, see CRincAL WmTE STUDIES: LooKING BEHIND TiiE MmRoR
(Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1997).
12. See KocKA, supra note 5, at 203 ("Economic distress, unemployment, and public re
lief during the depression, which for the first time touched significant numbers in the middle
class, stimulated public discussion of white collar workers at the very time that their middle
class status was seriously threatened by that same crisis.").
13. Harry L. Hopkins, NBC Radio Address (Oct. 10, 1933) (Roosevelt Archives, Papers
of Harry Hopkins [hereinafter FDR, Hopkins Papers], Box 9, Speeches 1933-36).
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ters,"14 "architects, engineers,"15 and "ever increasing numbers of
people with clerical and professional training"16 found themselves
unemployed and needing relief.17 Who were the "finest people"?
Were

all

white-collar workers in this group, or only the fanciest

among them? How was the line to be drawn? Were

only

white

collar workers in this group, or did the upper tier of skilled blue
collar workers qualify? Was their status as "the finest people in
America" to be considered in determining whether and how to as
sist them? If so, the drawing of class lines - including class lines
within the broad category of the American middle classes - would
need to become a core part of the New Deal project. Would differ
ential treatment always

benefit

the "finest people," or would they

sometimes be excluded from much-needed

assistance on the

grounds that their status as the "finest people" made assistance in
appropriate? If that was the choice, would the "finest people" cling
to their high status, or would they fight their classification as too
"fine" to be helped?

FERA. Lorena
FERA investigator and

Take, for example, the field activities of
Hickok, a journalist who became a leading

14. Id.
15. Proceedings, General Meeting, Federal Civil Works Administration (Nov. 15, 1933)
(FDR, Hopkins Papers, Box 9, Speeches 1933-36); see also Harry L. Hopkins, NBC Radio
Address (June 24, 1933) (FDR, Hopkins Papers, Box 9, Speeches 1933-36). For a discussion
of Depression unemployment among engineers and scientists and their role in crystallizing
the concept of work-spreading as a solution to the problem of unemployment, see BENJAMIN
KLINE HUNNICUIT, WORK WITHOUT END: ABANDONING SHORTER HOURS FOR THE RIGHT
TO W ORK 267-88 (1988).

16. Memorandum from Jacob Baker, Director of Work Relief and Special Projects, to All
Governors and State Emergency Relief Administrations (Oct. 30, 1933) (Roosevelt Archives,
Official File 444, Federal Emergency Relief Administration [hereinafter FERA], Box 1,
Chron 1/33-4/34) [documents in the Roosevelt Archives Official File collection hereinafter
FDR/OF).
17. Hopkins noted in July 1933 that he was sure the problem of unemployment among
such groups as teachers, nurses, photographers, actors, and musicians was greater than stan
dard unemployment statistics showed. See Memorandum from Harry L. Hopkins to Presi
dent Roosevelt (July 7, 1933) (FDR/OF 264, Unemployment, Box 1, May-Sept. 1933)
(quoting William Green). He continued to express concern about unemployed professionals.
See, e.g., Memorandum from Harry L. Hopkins to President Roosevelt (Aug. 14, 1933)
(FDR/OF 264, Unemployment, Box 1, May-Sept. 1933 folder) (discussing role for unem
ployed teachers); Press Release from Harry L. Hopkins to the Governors and State Emer
gency Relief Administrators (Aug. 19, 1933) (FDR/OF 444, FERA, Box 1, Jan. 1933 Apr.
1934) (publicizing plan to provide "relief teachers" - unemployed teachers - to teach chil
dren in rural areas and adults in cities and rural areas). By June 1935, 40,000 teachers were
employed in FERA's adult education projects. See Memorandum from President Roosevelt
to Elsie Long (June 29, 1935) (FDR/OF 444, FERA, Box 3, June-July 1935). Data made
available by the American Federation of Labor (AFL) in 1934 on employment and unem
ployment levels in the United States from 1930 to 1933 showed that employment levels for
"management and professional" employees exhibited the same pattern as for other types of
employment during the period. See American Federation of Labor, Chart: Employment and
Unemployment in the U.S. (n.d.) (FDR/OF 264, Unemployment, Box 1, May-Sept. 1933).
-
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close confidant to Eleanor Roosevelt,18 filed a report for transmittal
to President Roosevelt in April of 1934 "on the white collar picture
in Alabama."19 White-collar workers (Hickok specifically men
tioned musicians, accountants, insurance managers, pharmacists,
engineers, architects, small business owners, and clerks) presented
two related problems to

FERA field workers in Birmingham:

how

much aid to give them, and how to give it to them. As to amounts,
Hickok observed:
They want to cling to some semblance at least of their normal stan
dards of living. And we can't give them enough relief to make that
possible. . . . We can provide overalls, but not tailored business suits.
We can't keep those white collars laundered.20
The problem was not merely - or even mostly - the lack of suffi
cient funds to accord higher hourly benefits for federal work relief
to these white-collar workers. The problem was how to justify us
ing the collar-color line in federal programs:
I don't see what we can do about it. We can hardly increase their

allotments. Hardly, with the unions howling bloody murder for an
increase both in hourly rate and number of hours per week for skilled
labor. BUT
mark my words - you let the unions get away with it,
-

18. Lorena Hickok was assigned by the Associated Press to cover the Roosevelt presi
dential campaign. As of October 1932 she was assigned exclusively to cover Eleanor
Roosevelt, who became her close friend. Hickok resigned from the Associated Press in June
1933 because she thought she had lost her objectivity, and in August 1933 became Chief
Investigator for FERA. See Biographical Description of Lorena Hickok, 1893-1968 (n.d.)
(Roosevelt Archives, Lorena Hickok Papers [hereinafter FDR, Hickok Papers]). Historians
have differed in their accounts of the Hickok-Eleanor Roosevelt relationship, with some side
stepping the question of its sexual nature and others affirming it. Compare, e.g., JosEPH P.
LASH, ELEANOR AND FRANKLIN 349, 353-56 (1971) and Dorus FABER, T HE LIFE O F LoRENA
HICKOK, E.R.'s FRIEND (1980) with 1 BLANCHE WIESEN Co oK , ELEANOR RoosEVELT, 18841933, 478-80 (1992). For Hopkins's decision to transmit Hickok's field memoranda directly
to Roosevelt and his serious consideration of them, see FABER, supra, at 143. See also id. at 7
("In 1935 Hopkins told the President's wife that posterity would consider these vivid Hickok
reports the best available history of the Depression, and his prediction appears to have been
not far from the mark."). Many of Hickok's reports are published in ONE THIRD OF A NA
TION: LoRENA HICKOK REPORTS ON THE GREAT DEPRESSION (Richard Lowitt & Maurine
Beasley eds., 1981).
19. Report from Lorena A. Hickok to Harry L. Hopkins (Apr. 2, 1934) [hereinafter
Hickok Birmingham Report], attached to Memorandum from Harry L. Hopkins to President
Roosevelt (Apr. 13, 1934) (FDR/OF 444, FERA, Box 1, Jan. 1933-Apr. 1934).
20. Id. at 2. But see Memorandum from Jacob Baker, Director of Work Relief and Spe
cial Projects, to All Governors and State Relief Administrators (Oct. 30, 1933) (FDR/OF
444, FERA, Box 1, Oct.-Dec. 1933) (stating that his office has always advised the states that
they "are justified in taking account of the prior standard of living [of clerical and profes
sional workers] in determining budget deficiencies"). The opposition of the term "men in
overalls" (rather than the term "blue collar") to the term "white collar" reflects the fact that
"blue-collar is a post-World War II word; white-collar dates from around 1910." MARGo
ANDERSON CONK, THE UNITED STATES CENSUS AND LABOR FORCE CHANGE: A HISTORY
OF OcCUPATION STATISTICS, 1870 TO 1940, at 162 n.21 (1980).

2218

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 96:2212

if you accede to that demand and fail to increase the allotments of the
white collar people, too, you're going to have trouble.21
Just as the white-collar workers wanted federal relief programs to
recognize their higher status, so did skilled manual workers.22 The
administration of federal relief programs was becoming a field for
contesting claims of class privilege.
Class was a battleground not only for the appropriate benefit
levels for white-collar workers, but also - or perhaps even more so
- for the appropriate methods. for delivering benefits to them.
Hickok described a state-level "Placement Bureau for Professional
People," which had been extended to "cover the whole white collar
group. "23 For these white-collar workers, every effort was made to
preserve their dignity: for example, they received their benefits
without needing· to visit relief offices, and they were subject to
fewer home visits by social workers than were ordinary relief recipi
ents. Hickok observed:
This method of introducing white collar people to relief is about as
painless as any could be . . . . But if we should adopt it as a national
policy, I can see plenty of trouble ahead. From Union Labor. Ever
let them get wind of the fact that we are granting to the white collar
group any sort of privilege that we deny their skilled labor, and listen
to the howl. And let skilled labor in, and then you'll get demands on
behalf of unskilled labor. Well - we can't take EVERYBODY out
of the intake.24
Hickok saw in Alabama in the early days of

FERA

what became

increasingly clear during the New Deal period. The government's
broad power to determine which class differences mattered for the
purposes of its programs was limited by the power of groups organ
ized to protect their own interests. The programs that emerged
from this contest delivered not only economic relief, but also pow
erful official messages about the nature of the American class
system.
No one was sure how white-collar workers would come to view
their own interests during the Depression. The early 1930s was a
period of growing union activism and left-oriented political activity
21. Hickok Birmingham Report, supra note 19, at 3.
22. On the class position of skilled craftsmen, see, e.g., GAVIN MAcKENzIE, THB Arus
TOCRACY OF LABOR: THE PosmoN OF SKILLED CRAFTSME N IN THE AMERICAN CLASS
STRUCTURE (1973). For a British study, see JoHN H. GOLDTHORPE ET AL., THE AFFLUENT
WORKER IN THE CLASS STRUCTURE (1969).

23. Hickok Birmingham Report, supra note 19, at 3.
24. Id.
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among white-collar workers.25 Several months after Hickok filed
her Alabama report, FERA commissioned a set of confidential re
ports on the situation of white-collar workers around the country.
One such report - marked by Roosevelt's staff as an item to be
placed at his bedside - examined the mood of white-collar workers
on the West Side of Manhattan for signs of potential leftist activism.
Wayne W. Parrish, the journalist who wrote the report, observed:

In this white collar neighborhood, those on relief are to� de
Pr. essed and "bowled over" by the shock of going on relief to take any
action. Only the younger ones would follow a leader. Most still feel
their problesm [sic] are individual ones and don't blame anybody in
particular. Relief checks are extremely inadequate for this white col
lar group, but [the] feeling is that if checks continue to come there will
be no outward trouble, only serious psychiatric problems.26
Few white-collar workers were sufficiently organized in the 1930s to
participate in governmental debates on their place in the American
class structure. Donald Richberg, a legal realist writer and union
labor lawyer who became one of the framers and leaders of the
National Recovery Administration (NRA), complained in 1931
about the "hordes of 'white collar men' who, lacking the vigor and
self-reliance to organize themselves for self-improvement, give sup
port to the claim that their services are nqt worth more than their
miserable wages."27 Although there were some exceptions (news
paper reporters most prominent among them), white-collar workers
generally remained unorganized throughout the Depression.28
Tuey therefore left it to government actors to represent their inter
ests in the ongoing debate on whether they were so inherently dif
ferent from ordinary workers as to require differential treatment for good or for ill - in New Deal programs.
Tue New Deal legislative innovation that occasioned the pe
riod's earliest and most sustained debate about the legal status of
white-collar workers was the adoption of comprehensive wage and
25. See MICHAEL DENNING, THE CuLTURAL FRONT: THE LABORING OF AMERICAN
CULTURE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 9 (1996).

26. Report of Wayne R. Parrish to Harry L. Hopkins 9 (Nov. 17, 1934), attached to Mem
orandum from Harry L. Hopkins to Marguerite A. LeHand (Dec. 10, 1934) (FDR/OF,
FERA, Box 2). Parrish's report was forwarded to Roosevelt by Harry Hopkins with a cover
note to Roosevelt's personal secretary stating: "The President was anxious to go over these,
and I would appreciate it very much if you could give them to him tonight." Id. at 1. There is
a notation on the top left comer of the page, in handwriting, presumably Miss LeHand's,
with the word "Bedside."
27. Donald R. Richberg, The Industrial Liberalism of Justice Brandeis, 31 CoLUM. L.
REv. 1094, 1102 (1931).
28. For a discussion of exceptions, see DENNING, supra note 25, at 15; KocKA, supra note
5, at 206-46 & tbl.4.6.
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hour legislation. In the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA),
Congress exempted "executive, administrative, [and] professional"
employees from the statute's requirement that employers pay their
employees an overtime premium for the hours they worked beyond
the statutory maximum of forty hours per week.29 The FLSA's so
called "white-collar exemptions" - which are still in effect and are
still the subject of controversy3o - arose out of a prehistory of
wage and hour regulation during the period of the National Recov
ery Administration.31 The purpose of this Article is to use the pre
history and early development of these so-called "white-collar
exemptions" to explore the importance of the state as a locus for
29. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C.§§ 201-19 (1944). The exemption for
"executive, administrative, [and] professional" employees is found in§ 13 of the statute, 29
U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). The FLSA also contains minimum-wage provisions, but there are no
upper-level exemptions to the minimum wage. The upper-level exemptions to the FLSA's
overtime provisions include an exemption for outside salesmen. That exemption originated
at least in substantial part from the difficulty employers would face in monitoring the work of
traveling employees, and thus has a different set of cultural resonances. It is for that reason
not productive to include outside salesmen in this article's discussion. A recent move to
extend the exemption to certain inside salesmen - on the grounds that they are like profes
sionals and that the work they do is no different from that of outside salesmen except for its
location - would be of interest in a parallel study looking at current debates on upper-level
exemptions. See The Sales Incentive Compensation Act, H.R. 1, 105th Cong. 1998; High
lights, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 1135, at A-8 (June 12, 1998); for analysis, see, e.g., FLSA:
House Committee Agrees to Expand FLSA Exemptions for Sales Staff, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 63, at A-6 (Apr. 2, 1998).
30. Reform proposals are discussed in the literature cited supra note 2.
31. Similar themes can be explored in other New Deal programs. The New Deal statute
whose class implications have been most thoroughly explored is the National Labor Rela
tions Act, into which an express supervisory exemption was introduced in 1947 after a
number of years of organizing efforts among supervisors. For the statutory provision, see 29
U.S.C.§ 152(3) (1994); for the history, see Virginia A. Seitz, Legal, Legislative, and Manage
rial Responses to the Organization ofSupervisory Employees in the 1940's, 28 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 199 (1984); for significant current case law, see NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement
Corp. ofAmerica, 511 U.S. 571 (1994), and for academic critiques, see, e.g., Marion Crain,

Building Solidarity Through Expansion ofNLRA Coverage: A Blueprint for Worker Empow
ennent, 74 MINN. L. REv. 953 (1990); George Feldman, Workplace Power and Collective
Activity: The Supervisory and Managerial Exclusions in Labor Law, 37 Aruz. L. REv. 525
(1995); Michael C. Harper, Reconciling Collective Bargaining with Employee Supervision of
Management, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1988). As of 1947, the statute specifies that professionals

have the choice of whether to organize in mixed units or units containing only professionals.

See 29 U.S.C.§ 159(b). For scholarly treatment, see David M. Rabban, Can American Labor
Law Accommodate Collective Bargaining by Professional Employees?, 99 YALE L.J. 689

(1990). And the Supreme Court in 1974 approved an extra-statutory "managerial" exemp
tion. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974); see also NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ.,
444 U.S. 672 (1980); David M. Rabban, Distinguishing Excluded Managers from Covered
Professionals Under the NLRA, 89 CoLUM. L. REv. 1775 (1989). I am focusing on hours
regulation rather than the regulation of unionization for four main reasons: (1) upper-level
white-collar exemptions in hours regulation predate those under the NLRA; (2) their history
and social significance are less known; (3) they arose \vithin the administrative state over a
short and well-defined period of time at the core of New Deal labor policy; and (4) class line
drawing in the field of hours regulation carries less of an implication of "class conflict" and ironically, for that very reason - comes closer to speaking about class as most Americans
understand it. See Malamud, supra note 5, at 1863-66.
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debates about the American middle class and the role of the state
as an intervenor in those debates.
Any effort to tell a story about the relationship between the
middle classes and the state, of course, raises important antecedent
questions about both parties to the relationship. Let us begin with
the middle classes. To what extent was their identity and internal
structure in question during the pre-New Deal period? How impor
tant was the collar-color line to the class system? Was the system
stable or in flux? Did the lines drawn between different types of
workers in the personnel practices of pre-New Deal industry - for
example, the distinction between "hourly" work and "salaried"
work - capture functional differences between jobs? For that mat
ter, how were cultural distinctions between types of jobs related to
observable functional distinctions between them? We shall see that
the nature and scope of the middle classes and the significance of
the collar-color line were contested and unsettled preceding the
New Deal, that business practices often set out to manipulate
worker self-conceptions rather than simply to follow them, and that
the question of where to locate the line between ordinary and elite
workers was subject to considerable controversy.
Turning from questions about the middle class to questions
about the state, the task of drawing class lines for purposes of hours
regulation was predominantly located within administrative agen
cies. How did the denizens of the New Deal administrative state
understand their role - in general and with regard to issues of
class? To what extent did many government actors' Progressive
and Legal Realist leanings influence how they saw their role and
how they performed it? Did they come to the task with relevant
expertise, and, if not, did they have the opportunity to develop ex
pertise on the job? How did political and resource constraints
shape their actions? We shall find that government actors were
often stymied in their efforts - efforts their Progressive and Realist
orientations demanded - to exercise independent judgment in the
field of hours regulation. Although the regulation of working hours
was a central part of the New Deal effort to alleviate unemploy
ment, few administrators had prior relevant experience. Little ob
jective information was available about the likely efficacy of hours
restriction for differen� categories of jobs. Because white-collar
workers were largely unorganized and unrepresented in public
hearings, agency officials often were faced with the task of advocat
ing for their interests without a clear picture of what those interests
were. We shall see that government actors did exercise independ-
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ent judgment in the face of insistent business-community pressure
to exempt all white-collar workers from hours regulation - but do
ing so was a constant struggle.
In addition, the story of the white-collar exemptions readily
serves as an occasion for asking a normative question. Is govern
ment involvement in class line-drawing a good thing? When the
government draws class lines, it puts its imprimatur on a particular
view of the social world. One would find government involvement
a bad thing if one thinks the government is likely to be swayed by
the agendas of powerful interest groups - or, alternatively, if one
thinks it is important for rival social groups to fight it out in a pri
vate marketplace of ideas. Conversely, one would find government
involvement in class line-drawing a good thing if one believes that
the government has unique expertise, or that power inequalities will
cause the business community's preferred map of the class structure
to prevail over workers' interests unless the government intervenes.
The historical narrative reveals that both scenarios are true to some
extent in New Deal hours regulation. Sometimes the government
employed expertise and used it to challenge the predominant views
and practices of the business community. But sometimes the gov
ernment capitulated to the business community, and in so doing
made it more difficult for workers' alternative conceptions of the
class structure to be heard in future years. We shall see from the
example of New Deal hours regulation that government involve
ment in class line-drawing can be either a good thing or a bad thing.

It depends on the approach the government actors take and the
skill with which they execute it.
I focus particularly, then, on the government's various ap
proaches to class line-drawing. The narrative reveals that govern
ment actors were best able to exercise independent judgment when
. they kept a clear focus on the relationship between the lines they
were drawing and the ultimate goals of hours regulation. In con
trast, they were generally less effective when they saw their man
date as the drawing of an all-purpose map, representing their
perception of the class system. The contrast between the first ap
proach (which I call "purposive") and the second (which I call "de
scriptive") is a recurrent theme of this Article. I suggest, at the end
of the Article, that we should reevaluate the Fair Labor Standards
Act and its white-collar exemptions in purposive terms.

I.
A.

2223

Class Line-Drawing

August 1998]

PRE-FLSA ANTECEDENTS

Wage and Hour Legislation and the "White-Collar Classes"
Before the Great Depression

For well over a hundred years before the New Deal, a social
movement aimed to reduce the average weekly working hours of
the American worker.32 The movement had four major goals: im
proving the health of the working classes by lessening the intensity
of their exposure to workplace hazards; diminishing unemployment
by spreading the available work among all those customarily em
ployed in a particular field; increasing the leisure time of the work
ing classes to facilitate their education and full participation as
citizens; and establishing working hours as a sphere of worker con
trol over the process of industrial production. Each justification has
enjoyed different degrees of acceptance over time. The first, health,
characterized pre-New Deal hours regulation; the second, work
spreading, was the central policy goal of the New Deal's hours pol
icy; the third and fourth, leisure and worker control, have never
been embraced by the federal government as a reason to shorten
the American working day.33
Almost all pre-New Deal legislation limiting the working hours
of male workers applied only to "laborers, workmen, and mechan
ics."34 White-collar workers were not covered.35 There were many
reasons for this restricted application of hours regulation. The most
32. For book-length studies of the history of American hours reform, see HUNNicurr,
supra note 15; TERESA ANNE MURPHY, TEN HouRS' LABOR: RELIGION, REFORM, AND
GENDER lN EARLY NEW ENGLAND (1992); DAVID R. ROEDIGER & PHILIP S. FoNER, OuR
OWN TIME: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LABOR AND THE WORKING DAY (1989); RONNIE
STEINBERG, WAGES AND HouRS: LABOR AND REFORM IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA
(1982). For a historical study published in the 1930s, see MARION CoTIER CAHILL, SHORTER
HouRS: A STUDY oF THE MOVEMENT SINCE THE CIVIL WAR (1932).
33. For a defense of the leisure justification, and a history of its early ascendancy and
later abandonment in favor of full-employment goals, see HUNNicurr, supra note 15;
MURPHY, supra note 32. On the issue of leisure as an issue in today's economy, see JULIET B.
SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN: THE UNEXPECTED DECLINE OF LEISURE (1991).
34. JoHN R. COMMONS & JOHN B. ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR LEGISLATION 265
(rev. enlarged ed. 1927) (citing the 1912 version of federal employment statute). Of course,
limiting legislative protection to "laborers, workmen, and mechanics" provided some groups
the opportunity to test the limits of the category. See KocKA, supra note 5, at 161-64 (dis
cussing successful demands by unionized draftsmen at war shipyards during World War I to
be included in the "laborers and mechanics" classification). For an analysis of the coverage
of early labor standards legislation, see STEINBERG, supra note 32, at 59-87.
35. Co=ons and Andrews note one exception: the Alaskan eight-hour law "covered all
workers, including partners and corporation officials, except in certain emergencies," and was
held unconstitutional in 1918 in federal court because
[T]he statute, applying as it did to all occupations alike, was not shown to be a health
measure, but was a "meddlesome interference" with individual rights
On similar
grounds the Solicitor-general of the United States declined to allow the case to be ap
pealed to a higher court, so that no final test was had on this, the only enforceable univer.

.

.

•
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obvious was that pre-New Deal hours legislation was health
oriented, and the working conditions of white-collar workers were
not as injurious to health as those of industrial workers. In addi
tion, the two groups represented in the shorter-hours movement of
the nineteenth and early twentieth century were skilled manual
workers, represented through their labor unions, and unskilled in
dustrial workers, represented by the middle-class reformers who
took on their cause. White-collar workers were not organized into
unions,36 and white-collar reformers apparently did not see their
own kind as overworked.
Indeed, male white-collar workers would have found working
hours regulation contrary to their own interest. They viewed them
selves as occupying entry-level positions that would lead to jobs in
the upper reaches of the business class. They took it for granted
that they needed to work long hours to gain the training that would
advance their careers. 37

Furthermore, they would have found

shorter hours - and, worse, government intervention to secure
shorter hours - inconsistent with the status they sought to main
tain in their own and their employers' eyes. White-collar workers
identified upwards with their bosses, not downwards with mere
manual workers. Even if white-collar workers in fact needed
shorter hours, their need to maintain their social status would have
deterred them from seeking reform. This distinction between the
instrumental ("what do we need? what is our problem, and what
will solve it?") and the symbolic ("what does it mean? what does it
say about us and our place in society?") permeates the discussion of
hours regulation, both in my period of study and in this Article.38
We shall have many occasions to return to it.
How accurate was the self-perception of the white-collar worker
of the 1920s and 1930s? Was the white-collar group unified, in that
the members of its lowest tier had more in common with its higher
tiers than with the most affluent members of the blue-collar class?
sal eight-hour law coveringprivate employment enacted in America up to the beginning of

1936.

JOHN R. COMMONS & JOHN B. ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR LEGISLATION 140 (4th rev.
ed. 1936) (emphasis added).
36. See KocKA, supra note 5, at 178 (noting that "(e]xcept for the large Brotherhood of
Railway Clerks and the tiny RCIPA, at the end of the 1920s there were no white collar
unions in the private sector"). For a study of white-collar unionization in the decade follow
ing the Depression, see NATIONAL INDUS. CoNF. Bo. !Ne., Srooras IN PERSONNEL POLICY,
No. 101, WHITE COLLAR UNIONIZATION {1949).
37. See DEVAULT, supra note 5; OLIVIER ZUNz, MAKING AMERICA CORPORATE, 18701920, at 125-48 (1990).
38. I thank Don Herzog for putting the distinction in these terms.
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Was the amount and pace of upward mobility from clerk to
business-owner sufficient to justify the clerk's upward identifica
tion? These questions occupied a considerable amount of attention
in the period, from a wide range of writers and scholars.39
The upward identification of lower-level white-collar workers
was, as University of Chicago economist Frank William Taussig ex
plained in 1936, crucial to the operation of the American system of
class stratification. Taussig recognized five "non-competing
groups,"40 which ultimately resolved into "the two great classes of
the soft handed and the hard handed."41 The bottom three groups,
unskilled, semiskilled, and skilled manual workers, identified with
one another. The next group up the ladder, the lower middle class,
was made up of "clerks, bookkeepers, salesmen, small tradesmen,
railway conductors, foremen, superintendents, [and] teachers in the
lower grades."42 Taussig observed that the lower middle class iden
tified with the top group (the "well-to-do"),43 and its "feeling of
contempt for the manual laborers of all sorts, whether skilled or
unskilled,"44 was both central to its identity and dangerous to its
economic health. The democratization of public secondary educa
tion meant that "[t]here [was] a plethora of persons qualified to do
[lower middle class] work and a consequent tendency for their
wages to fall rather than to rise. The earnings of a good mechanic
[were] in the United States higher than those of the average
clerk."45 But the lower middle Class failed to respond to market
39. See infra text accompanying notes 40-81.
40. 2 F.W. TAUSSIG, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS § 47-6 (3d rev. ed. 1936). The five
groups are: (1) "day laborers ...who have nothing to offer but their bodily strength ...
[including] factory employees whose work is of the simplest sort"; (2) "those who, while not
needing specialized skill, yet bear some responsibility and must have some alertness of mind"
(for example, trolley motormen and miners); (3) "the aristocracy of the manual laboring
class: the skilled workmen"; (4) "the group that approaches the well-to-do: the lower middle
class, which avoids rough and dirty work, and aims at some sort of clerical or semi
intellectual occupation. Here are clerks, bookkeepers, salesmen, small tradesmen, railway
conductors, foremen, superintendents, teachers in the lower grades"; (5) "the well-to-do those who regard themselves as the highest class and certainly are the most favored class.
Here are the professions, so called - the lawyers, physicians, clergymen; teachers of the
higher grades; salaried officials, public and private, in positions of responsibility and power;
not least, the class of business men and managers of industry, who form in democratic com
munities the backbone of the whole group." Id.
41. Id. § 47-6, at 144.
42. Id. § 47-6(4).
43.See id.
44. Id.
45. Id. § 47-7, at 147; accord KocKA, supra note 5, at 178-81 (noting that in the 1920s
many white-collar workers earned less than skilled manual workers and that widening access
to commercial and technical education increased competition for white-collar jobs); see also
DEVAULT, supra note 5, at 24-47 (discussing clerical education).
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pressures in part because it carried the false hope that routine cleri
cal work would someday lead to a professional or managerial job "the alluring tho [sic] deceptive chance of a prize."46
Leon C. Marshall, a colleague of Taussig's, also argued that the
prevalent perception of the superiority of white-collar work was an
impediment to the labor market's capacity to allocate jobs accord
ing to natural abilities. In the mid-1920s, Marshall was a professor
of political economy at Chicago; he went on to chair Chicago's busi
ness school in the late 1920s, to join the Legal Realists at the Johns
Hopkins Institute for the Study of Law, and then to play a number
of important roles in the National Recovery Administration in the
1930s. Marshall was active throughout his career in writing educa
tional materials on economics for use in secondary education. One
of his efforts,

The Story of Human Progress: An Introduction to

Social Studies,

echoed Taussig's critique of class stratification. Mar

shall observed, for example, that "[b]ecause of a foolish prejudice,
many persons go into 'white collar jobs' rather than into those re
quiring overalls."47 For Marshall, "[t]he fact that some jobs give the
holder social position makes them attractive to certain persons. "48
But as the phrase "foolish prejudice" sought to make clear,
Marshall saw the influence of prestige as an unfortunate impedi
ment to the project of "finding one's place" in the economy based
on natural abilities.49
Sociologists Robert and Helen Lynd addressed the question
whether white-collar workers in the 1920s and early 1930s were jus
tified in thinking that they were on their way up the social ladder.
Their famous "Middletown" studies,50 comparing Muncie, Indiana,
46.
47.

TAUSSIG,

supra note 40 § 47-7, at 144.

LEON C. MARsHALL, THE STORY OF
SOCIAL STUDIES 407-08 (1925).

HUMAN

PROGRESS: AN INTRODUCTION TO

48. Id. at 408.
49. See id. at 407.
50. See ROBERT S. LYND & HELEN MERRELL LYND, MIDDLETOWN: A STUDY IN
.AMERICAN CULTURE (1929) [hereinafter LYND & LYND, MIDDLETOWN] ; RoBERT S. LYND &
HELEN MERRELL LYND, MIDDLETOWN IN TRANsmoN: A STUDY m CULTURAL CONFLICTS
(1937) [hereinafter LYND & LYND, MIDDLETOWN IN TRANsmoN ] . Sociology as a field did
not take up the problem of class as a major area of research interest until after World War I.
See Howard E. Jensen, Editorial Note to MILTON M. GoRDON, SocIAL CLASS IN AMERICAN
Soc10LOGY vii (1950). Despite the fact that "[n]either of the Lynds was a sociologist or had
primary training in sociology
[Robert] Lynd became a 'sociologist' of the first order,"
HOWARD W. ODUM, AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY: THE STORY OF SOCIOLOGY IN TIIE UNITED
STATES THROUGH 1950, at 391-92 (1951), and the Lynds' work is now and was in its time
widely recognized as a major contribution to the field of sociology. The Lynds' work "was an
instantaneous success" both among popular readers and academics. See JoHN MADGE, THE
ORIGINS OF SCIENTIFIC SOCIOLOGY 128 (1962). For further discussion of the Lynds, their
background, and their influence, see GoRDoN, supra, at 63-84; MICHAEL D. GRIMES, CLASS
.

•

.

•
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in 1925 and 1935, suggest that the lower-level white-collar worker's
sense that he was on an upward occupational trajectory was becom
ing increasingly unrealistic.
When the Lynds first visited Middletown in 1925, they con
cluded that the community had only two classes, a "working class"
and a "business class," the latter of which included "an infinite
number of gradations
all the way . . . from the retail clerk and
-

cashier to the factory owner and professional man. "51 Their classifi

cation system depended first and foremost on the line between

those who "address their activities in getting their living primarily
to things" and those who "address their activities predominantly to
people in the selling or promotion of things, services, and ideas."52
This distinction was difficult to apply in practice. Is the cashier a
cash-register operator who deals with things or a salesclerk who

deals with people? How is one to deal with "users of highly-skilled
techniques - architects, surgeons, chemists, and so on" who "ad

dres[s] their activities in getting a living more to things than peo
ple,"53 but who were viewed by no one as members of the working

class? To deal with the difficult or anomalous cases, the "twilight

belt in which some members of the two groups overlap and
merge,"54 the Lynds relied considerably on criteria other than jobs'

functional characteristics. They observed that "since it is the busi
ness interests of the city that dominate and give their tone, in the

main, to the lawyer, chemist, architect, engineer, teacher, and even
to some extent preacher and doctor," and "all their other activities

would place them with the business class," placing them within the

business class "by and large accurately represents the facts."55
MEASUREMENT STRATEGIES 56-62 (1 991) (noting that "[t]heir studies of 'Middletown' repre
sent the first use of class as an organizing dimension in a holistic setting within American
sociology and served as an important stimulus for subsequent research on the subject");
CHARLES HUNT PAGE, CLASs AND AMERICAN SoCioLOGY: FROM WARD To Ross 216 n.7,
236, 252 (1964). The similar work of social anthropologist W. Lloyd Warner and his school
on "Yankee City" falls just outside the time frame of this article. See, e.g., W. LLOYD
WARNER & PAUL s. LUNT, THE SOCIAL LIFE OF A MODERN COMMUNITY (1941); w. LLOYD
WARNER & J.O. Low, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM OF THE MODERN FACTORY - THE STRIKE: A
SOCIAL ANALYSIS (1947).

51. LYND & LYND, MIDDLETOWN, supra note 50, at 22-23.
52. Id. at 22.
53. Id. at 22 n.3.
54. Id. at 23.
55. Id. at 23 n.3; cf. MADGE, supra note 50, at 136 (noting the problems, "such as where
one should place the dentist, who is obviously a professional man although he deals with
things, that is, teeth, or the sculptor or musician, who equally deals with things," and noting
with admiration that "[s]ensibly [the Lynds] decided not to be too pedantic about such cases
but put them in with the business classes").
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The Lynds returned to Middletown in 1935, during the Depres
sion, and published the results of their second study in 1937.56 They
saw two major changes. The Middletown of 1925 was a place where
the lines between the two classes were permeable. By 1935, that
had changed. "Above the foreman's rung, the ladder is ceasing to
be one ladder: there have virtually ceased to be rungs between the
foreman and a higher section of the ladder beyond his reach where
an entirely new set of personnel usually not recruited from
working-class personnel begins."57 This, they saw, interfered with
America's "exuberant boast of a classless society."58 The other sig
nifi.cant change was that the business class itself was splintering. A
small group at the top of the business class was becoming a "nas
. cent 'upper class,' " while at the same time there was "the apparently clearer demarcation of another and larger group of families at
the lower end of the business class as a Middletown 'middle
class."'59 This was a diverse group of "'small' white-collar folk struggling manufacturers with no particular future, the smaller re
tailers and tradespeople,' salesmen, officeholders, schoolteachers,
and many of the growing group of hired professional assistants"
who were hired directly by industry.6° Civil servants, clerks and
clerical workers were also part of this newly emerging class. The
Lynds' observations in 1935 no longer supported their earlier view
that a single business class reached down to include these workers,
bound together by ties of sociality and expected mobility.61
In contemplating the emergence of a new and less-privileged
middle class in Middletown, the key question for the Lynds was
how this new middle class understood itself - whether it identified
upwards (with the upper tier of the business class) or downwards
(with foremen and skilled industrial workers and, below them, with
semiskilled and unskilled workers). The Lynds noted the work of
Lewis Corey, a Marxist who argued in 1935 that only self-delusion
56. See LYND & LYND, MIDDLETOWN IN TRANsmoN, supra note 50.
57. Id. at 71.
58. Id. at 72-73 ("Should the long term trend actually prove to be toward the contracting
of working class hopes to the permanent boundaries of nineteen dollar suits, $2.50 shoes, and
a second hand Chevie, while raises, promotions - all the things associated with 'going up in
the world' - are largely confined to the three in each ten of Middletown's income earners
who fall in the business class," then there will be "a system of social organization which no
one in Middletown is today ready to call 'American."')

59. Id. at 455.
60. Id. at 455-56.
61. The Lynds saw this trend as exacerbated by the Depression but not entirely deter
mined by it. See id. at 72. This is in part because in the 10 years between the field work
underlying the two volumes, Middletown first went through a period of boom before going
through depression. See id. at xi.
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kept the new propertyless middle classes in alliance with capital and
that the Depression would fatally undermine this self-delusion.62
The Lynds rejected the notion that this process had begun. To the
Lynds, members of the new Middletown middle class still identified
with the upper classes.63 But the Lynds saw the strain in the middle
class's efforts to do so: "[They] think of themselves as part of the
business class and cling hard to their status as white-collar folk perhaps the harder because of their slowly growing sense of uneasi
ness as to their isolation . . . . "64
The many tiers of white-collar workers were also a prevailing
concern of Alba Edwards, the long-tenured director of the Census
Bureau who was publishing on the subject in the 1930s. Edwards
saw his project as no less than the drawing of a map of the Ameri
can class system, expressed as a system of occupational classifica
tions.65 Edwards argued that "[a] man's occupation . . . . indicates,
with some degree of accuracy, the kind of associates he will have,
the kinds of clothes he will wear, the kind of house he will live in,
the kind of food he will eat, and the cultural level of his family."66
The divisions he saw as most relevant to these issues were, first and
foremost, the distinction between "head workers" and "hand work
ers," and then, among hand workers, distinctions based on level of

62. See LEWIS COREY, THE Crusrs OF TIIE MIDDLE CLAss 16 (1935). Lewis Corey was
the nom de plume of Louis Fraina. See DENNING, supra note 25, at 99-100. Jurgen Kocka
identifies Corey/Fraina as a "[r]elatively orthodox Marxist[ ]" who was influenced by the
German literature on the "new middle classes" long before that literature had come to influ
ence mainstream sociologists. See KocKA, supra note 5, at 203-05. Denning refers to him as
"one of the most important Western Marxists in the United States" and "the great theorist of
the Popular Front social movement," particularly because of the attention he paid to the new
middle classes. DENNING, supra note 25, at 99. For a discussion of Corey's book The Crisis
of the Middle Class, see DENNING, supra note 25, at 101.
63. See LYND & LYND, MIDDLETOWN IN TRANSITION, supra note 50, at 460; accord Ralph
G. Hurlin & Meredith B. Givens, Shifting Occupational Patterns, in RECENT SocIAL TRENDS
IN TIIE UNITED STATES: REPORT OF TIIE PRESIDENT'S REsEARCH COMMITTEE ON SOCIAL
TRENDS, 268, 288-89 (Committee on Social Trends, Inc. ed., 1 vol. ed. 1934) [hereinafter
REsEARCH CoMMITTEE ON SoCIAL TRENDs] ("The clerical or white collar employees are
quite as dependent upon modest earnings as industrial wage earners but they are co=only
jealous of their status as a part of the middle class.").
64. LYND & LYND, MIDDLETOWN IN TRANSITION, supra note 50, at 460.
65. See JAMES G. SCOVILLE, THE JoB CONTENT OF TIIE U.S. EcoNOMY, 1940-1970, at 56, 25 (1969).
66. CoNK, supra note 20, at 26 (quoting U.S. BUREAU OF TIIE CENSUS, SIXTEENTH CEN
sus OF TIIE UNITED STATES, 1940: COMPARATIVE OCCUPATION STATISTICS FOR TIIE UNITED
STATES, at xi) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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skill.67 His classification scheme emerged in his academic writings
in the 1930s, and was adopted in the 1940 census.68
Edwards found clerical workers hard to classify because they
were not "fully group conscious" - they did not have a ready cate
gory in which they placed themselves or through which they distin
guished themselves from the "usually better-educated and better
paid professional workers and the less well-educated but better
paid skilled [industrial] workers"69 between whom they stood in the
status hierarchy. Edwards was able to account for the superiority of
clerical work to skilled industrial work only by augmenting a purely
occupational analysis with extrinsic demographic considerations:
clerical workers were more likely to be native born than the indus
trial workers, and the increasing presence of women in some classi
fications of clerical work gave to offices a middle-class gentility
lacking in industrial plants.70 Sociologists Percy Davidson and H.
Dewey Anderson complained in 1937 that Edwards had not over
come "the difficulty of discovering a reliable base for the vertical
classification of labor," and that the Edwards scale, while "ostensi
bly social-economic," was "really occupational; or rather, it is both
to an unknown degree."71 The heterogeneity of broad occupational
categories belied Edwards's seemingly clean hierarchization of oc
cupations. And the census's recourse to ranking the qualities of
jobs' occupants instead of the functional characteristics of the jobs
themselves made the data less useful for placing industrial organiza
tion on a "scientific" footing as, for example, writers in the fields of
personnel management and engineering were trying to do.72
67. Alba M. Edwards, A Social-Economic Grouping ofthe
STAT. AssN. 377 (1933).

Gainful Workers ofthe United

States, 28 J. AM.

68. For a pre-1940 publication of the scale, see id.; for its pre-1940 use, see PERCY E.
DAVIDSON & H. DEWEY ANDERSON, OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY IN AN AMERICAN COMMU·
NITY 8 (1937). For the use of the scale in the 1940 census, see CONK, supra note 20, at 62.
69. CoNK, supra note 20, at 63 (quoting Edwards).
70. For statistics on the femaleness of the clerical workforce, see Alba M. Edwards, The
"White Collar Workers," 38 MONTHLY LAB. Rav. 501 (1934). The gender-related class impli
cations are drawn from ZUNz, supra note 37, at 138-48. Feminization's alteration of the class
definition of occupations is a two-edged sword. Entry of women into an occupation in signif
icant numbers tends to downgrade the occupation's prestige and income earnings, while their
initial entry serves to render rough, traditionally male occupations genteel - with the gentil
ity of female manners being coded as middle class. The way this balanced in white-collar
work was that women entered these jobs before marriage, but left them upon marriage (often
by rule). They therefore came to dominate only the lower-level white-collar jobs, and men
did not have to compete with them for advancement. For men's occupational prestige, this
was the best of both worlds - while it lasted.
71. DAVIDSON & ANDERSON,
72.

supra note 68, at 7-8.

See CoNK, supra note 20, at 68-69.
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It should come as no surprise that social scientists as early as the
mid-1920s were questioning the status relations within the white
collar classes. Those questions were being explored in the literature
and popular culture of the period as well. A leading example is the
novel Babbitt, which Sinclair Lewis published in 1922.73 Babbitt is
the saga of the self-delusional white-collar man of modest property,
the "Good Mixer" who asserts that you "couldn't hire me to join"
the elite club in town and who then immediately joins when
asked.74 The most important person in Babbitt's life is his one male
friend, the only person to whom he can admit that he's always
"blowing" to his wife and kids "about what a whale of a realtor I
am, and yet sometimes I get a sneaking idea I'm not such a Pierpont
Morgan as I let on to be."75 Yet for all his doubts, Babbitt insists
that his son Ted be a "college man," and rejects Ted's plan to attend
the School of Engineering by saying he'd "be in with a lot of greasy
mechanics and laboring men."76 The first public sign to Babbitt's
social set that he has gone "nutty" is his willingness to view striking
workers as "decent,"77 and the sure sign of his return was when it
could safely be said that "no one . . . was more violent regarding the
. . . crimes of labor unions . . . than was George Babbitt."78 In the
very last page of the book, Babbitt marks the small wisdom he has
gained from his misadventures by admitting to Ted that "I've never
done a single thing I've wanted to in my whole life" and consenting
to Ted's desire to take a factory job in order to "get into mechan
ics."79 Babbitt was an instant success, precisely because it depicted
the man in the middle, who sees himself as "at once triumphantly
73. For earlier popular culture examples, see, e.g., STEVEN J. Ross, WoRKING-CLAss
HoLLYWooo: SILENT FILMS AND nm SHAPING OF CLAss IN AMERICA xiii, 9, 14-15, 19-20,
175-80, 198-208 (1998) (exploring silent films and their audiences in the 1910s and 1920s, and
discussing the class identity of white-collar workers as in flux during this period and as influ
enced by film images). Ross concludes on the basis of his study that "[t]he 1920s marked a
turning point . . . in the formation of modem understandings of class and class relations. The
proliferation of white-collar employees and the widespread participation of wage earners in a
flourishing consumer economy created great confusion over modem class identities." Id. at
175. The centrality of patterns of consumption in class definitioµ in the period make clear the
identity crisis that would have been suffered by white-collar workers in the Depression when, in the already-quoted words of Lorena Hickok, they could no longer afford to "keep
those white collars laundered." See supra text accompanying note 20; see also CmuSTOPHER
P. WILSON, WHITE CoLLAR FICTIONS: CLASS AND SOCIAL REPRESENTATION IN AMERICAN
LITERATURE, 1885-1925 (1992).
74. SINCLAIR LEWIS, BABBITT 55 (1922); see also id. at 155.
75. Id. at 62.
76. Id. at 309.
77. Id. at 319.
78. Id. at 390.
79. Id. at 401.
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wealthy and perilously poor, "80 and who in the end learns that to be
"one of the ruling caste of Good Fellows "81 is to rule nothing at all.
Thus, the 1920s and early 1930s were years in which the cultural
and material status of white-collar work were in flux - and in
which cultural and material criteria did not always coincide.82
Marshall and Taussig questioned the pro-white-collar ideology of
the times, finding the ideology unjustified by an economic reality in
which skilled manual labor rightly commanded higher wagers than
did clerical work. The Lynds saw the supposed long-term benefit of
lower-level white-collar work - upward mobility into business
management and ownership - being undermined both by the De
pression and by longer-term changes in job recruitment and com
munity social life. Sinclair Lewis questioned whether what counted
as white-collar success was worth having at all. Edwards's census
work reflected the difficulties inherent in any attempt to chart a
"socio-economic status" hierarchy in an environment in which
deeply held cultural distinctions between different types of workers
often failed to correspond to purely economic differences.
It comes as no surprise, in light of these observations, that
white-collar workers did not mobilize to seek government protec
tion from long working hours. The experts were only beginning to
see that economic realities were changing, and even they were not
sure where or how the lines of solidarity should be drawn. It was
entirely too soon for white-collar workers to embrace the shift in
perspectives that advocacy for government intervention would have
required.
Given this turmoil within the white collar classes, how could
government administrators effectively decide who needed govern80. Id. at 53.
81. Id. at 42. For the suggestion that Babbitt became too popular to be genuinely chal
lenging to its readers, see WILSON, supra note 73, at 249.
82. The contested status of the upper-level white-collar worker in this period is discussed
in a rich literature within the field of business history. See, e.g., REINHARD BENDIX, WORK
AND AUTHORITY IN INDUSTRY: IDEOLOGIES OF MANAGEMENT IN THE COURSE OF INDUSTRI·
ALIZATION 288-319 {1956); CHARLES PERROW, COMPLEX 0RGANIZATioNs: A CRmCAL Es.
SAY 14-58 {3d ed. 1986); Sanford Jacoby, American Exceptionalism Revisited: The
Importance of Management, in MASTERS TO MANAGERS: HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN EMPLOYERS 173, 197 (Sanford Jacoby ed., 1991) [hereinafter
MASTERS TO MANAGERS]. Taking this theme into the 1940s is HOWELL JOHN HARRIS, THE
RIGHT TO MANAGE: INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS P<;>LICIES OF AMERICAN BUSINESS IN THE
1940s (1982). The business history literature is very important because key debates "about
the changes in status, technology and the occupational structure took place
in the journals
of personnel managers and the engineering profession." CONK, supra note 20, at 69. For
examples from the personnel literature of the 1920s and 1930s, see infra text accompanying
notes 107-20. And on the general question of the self-understanding of white-collar workers,
see c. WRIGHT MILLS, WHITE COLLAR: THE AMERICAN MIDDLE CLASSES (1951).
. . •

Class Line-Drawing

August 1998]

2233

ment protection in the form of hours legislation? If the ladder from
low-level white-collar workers into the upper ranks of professionals
was disintegrating, should those lower-level workers be given - or
forced to accept - the protection of hours legislation? Administra
tors could have determined that protection was necessary but inap
propriate and inconsistent with peoples' perception of their own
status and needs. Conversely, administrators could have deter
mined that widely perceived distinctions along class lines had be
come inaccurate but that differences between upper and lower-level
white-collar workers still reflected functional differences between
jobs - differences that required separate treatment under hours
legislation. As we shall see, administrators' programs were more
successful the more directly they confronted these questions:
Should legislation reflect existing perceptions of class, functional
distinctions between categories of jobs, or some combination of the
two?
Even if white-collar workers had been prepared to recognize
that their upward mobility was rapidly diminishing, and to reassess
the appropriateness of governmental intervention in their condi
tions of work on that basis, judicial constraints would have stood in
their way. The doctrine of freedom of contract had been widely
used by the courts as a constitutional obstacle to regulating the
working hours of men outside of hazardous occupations.83 It would
have been difficult to argue that working long hours at white-collar
work was hazardous to the health of male workers. For women,
however, the picture was different: by

1923, some states had begun

to restrict the hours of women in clerical work,84 and some even
restricted the hours of women in jobs classified as professional
(largely nursing and teaching).85 But there was a long-standing tra
dition of greater protectionism toward female workers - a protec
tionism that diminished women's ability to compete with men in the
labor market. Protection of female white-collar workers was due to
their gender, not to any broader but frustrated desire to regulate
the hours of all white-collar workers.
B.

The Black Thirty-Hours Bill

In March 1933, Senator (later Justice) Hugo Black proposed leg
islation to limit the hours of certain categories of workers to thirty
83. See NATIONAL INDus. CoNF. Bo., REsEARCH REP. No. 68, LEGAL REsrrucnoNs ON
HOURS OF WORK IN THE UNITED STATES: A REFERENCE MANuAL 24 (1924).
84. See id. at 33 tbl.2 (1923 data) (9 states).
85. See id. at 38 tbl.2 (1923 data) (4 states).
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hours per week.86 In constitutional terms, Black's bill was bolder,
in two respects, than previous hours legislation. First, Black's bill
reached beyond manual workers. The bill provided that any "arti
cle or commodity" produced or manufactured in a "mine, quarry,
mill, cannery, workshop, factory or manufacturing establishment"
in which anyone was "employed or permitted to work" for more
than thirty hours a week would be barred from interstate com
merce.87 The bill was limited to individuals working in the pro
ducer's establishment or under the producer's direct employ; it did
not reach the employees of the shipper, the employees of the
wholesalers and retailers who sold the goods, and so forth. But so
long as the link to the producer of goods was present, the bill did
not limit its thirty-hours requirement on the basis of the work the
individual. performed.
Second, Black abandoned health and safety as the rationale for
hours regulation, in favor of work-spreading as a method of allevi
ating unemployment.88 Black explained in the cover letter to
Roosevelt transmitting the proposed legislation that the bill was
based on "my belief that our unemployed cannot be put to work
unless the National Government legally requires a shorter work
week and a shorter work day."89 Black reiterated this theme in his
radio address to the nation in support of the bill,90 in which he said
that "[i]t is not just to continue to exact 50, 60, and even in some
instances 70 hours work per week from men and women while
others are driven into poverty and misery from unemployment."91
Making the breadth of the statute's reach perfectly clear, Black ex
pressed concern with the conditions facing "salaried employees."92
Thus Black was prepared to go further than prior federal wage and
86. See S. 5267, 72d Cong. (1932); see also 16 CoNG. REc. 820 (1932) (referring Black's
bill to the Judiciary Committee).
87. S. 5267, 72nd Cong. (1932).
88. Black was directly influenced by the work of Arthur Dahlberg, an engineer whose
writing on the subject was well-regarded in business circles. Dahlberg's most important work
on the subject was ARTHUR DAHLBERG, JoBs, MA.CHINES, AND CAPITALISM (1932). For a
discussion of Dahlberg and his influence, see HUNNICU1T, supra note 15, at 269-78.
89. Letter from Hugo Black to President Roosevelt, (Mar. 10, 1933) (FDR/OF 372,
Hours of Labor, Box 1).
90. See Senator Hugo Black, Radio Speech Concerning S. 5267 (Jan. 9, 1933), in 76
CoNG. REc. 1443 (1933).
91. Id., in 16 CoNG. REc. 1444 (1933). Black did place special emphasis on pressures on
manual work, stressing "the increased productivity of machine America" and its failure to
"absorb [its) displaced labor." Id., in 16 CoNG. REc. 1443 (1933). But if displaced manual
work was his main concern, the rest of the address was not limited to that concern, and
neither was the text of his bill.
92. See id., in 16 CoNG. REc. 1444 (1933).
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hour regulation by covering white-collar and salaried employees
working within the covered industries. That approach still left
white-collar and salaried workers in commercial rather than extrac
tive and manufacturing fields uncovered, but it was a step toward
universal coverage.
President Roosevelt strongly opposed Black's bill, in large part
because he rejected the economic theory upon which it was predi
cated. Black believed, as did a number of economists in his day,
that the Depression.was the result of capitalist overproduction, and
that over the long term the economy would need to develop the
capacity to achieve distributive fairness without new growth.
Roosevelt would have no part of that economic philosophy.93 In
stead, Roosevelt developed the view that a sy�tem of federally
sponsored private industrial planning could reverse the effects of
the Depression without stunting economic growth. It was this plan
ning approach that Roosevelt implemented in the National Indus
trial Recovery Act (NIRA) , the linchpin of the early New Deal.94

II.

THE NATIONAL lNDusTRIAL REcoVERY Acr

(1933-1935)

Even though the Roosevelt administration opposed the Black
bill, wage and hour regulation was a core part of the administra
tion's NIRA program from the start.95 In the months between the
defeat of the Black Thirty-Hours Bill and the enactment of the
NIRA, key Roosevelt advisers began to formulate the administra
tion's approach. In March, Roosevelt convened a conference "on
93. See FRANCES PERKINS, THE ROOSEVELT I KNEw 194 (1946); see also KENNETH
FINEGOLD & THEDA SKOCPOL, STATE AND PARTY IN AMERICA'S NEW DEAL 10, 69-71
(1995).
94. For leading critiques of industrial planning under the NIRA see G. WILLIAM
DOMHOFF, STATE AUTONOMY OR Cr.Ass D oMINANCE? CASE STUDIES ON POLICY MAKING
IN AMERICA 101-16 (1996); FINEGOLD & SKOCPOL, supra note 93; ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE
NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY (1966); MICHAEL M. WEINSTEIN, RECOVERY
AND REDISTRIBUTION UNDER THE NIRA (1980). For a contemporaneous critique, see
LEVERE.TI" S. LYON ET AL., THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION: AN ANALYSIS
AND AN APPRAISAL (1935). For a study focusing on NRA labor policy, see DONALD R.
BRAND, CoRPORATION AND THE RuLE OF LAW (1988). Efforts to achieve thirty-hours legis
lation continued during the NRA period. See, e.g., Partial Redraft of H.R. 8492 by Frances
Perkins, Secretary of Labor; Donald Richberg, General Counsel of NRA; William Green,
President of AFL; and Representative William Conriery, Chairman of the House Labor
Committee, attached to Letter from Isabella Greenway to Eleanor Roosevelt (May 16, 1934)
(FDR/OF 372, Hours of Labor, Box 1) (setting thirty hours as the hours maximum for codi
fied industries, with exceptions based on shown neeq).
95. The NRA also included § 7(a), which gave labor the right to organize. That provision
was underenforced throughout the NIRA period. See, e.g., SIDNEY FINE, THE AUTOMOBILE
UNDER THE BLUE EAGLE: LABOR, MANAGEMENT, AND THE AUTOMOBILE MANuFACTUR
ING CoDE 75-95 (1963); R.W. Fleming, The Significance of the Wagner Act, in LABOR AND
THE NEW DEAL 121, 126 (Milton Derber & Edwin Young, eds., 1957).
,
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the emergency problems having to do with distress due to unem
ployment and the method of overcoming the same."96 The agenda
listed "[s]hort hours as a means of further employment" as an item
for discussion.97 Donald Richberg98 was among those invited to at
tend. By mid-April, Frances Perkins, Roosevelt's Secretary of La
bor,

endorsed

work-spreading

as

the

theory

behind

hours

regulation.99
A.

The First Proposal for a White-Collar Exemption, and an
Introduction to Government Class Line-Drawing

In late May, Alexander Sachs, then a member of the Board of
Directors of the Lehman [Brothers] Corporation who was also en
gaged in economic research for Roosevelt and who went on to be
come the first director of the NRA's Division of Research and
Planning, provided the administration with a detailed memorandum
on "Suggested Maximum Working Time and Formula for Establish
ing Minimum Wage and Salary Rates."100 Sachs's memorandum
expressly exempted "those in executive, administrative and supervi
sory positions" from regulation.101 Already before the enactment
of the NIRA, then, workspreading was recognized as the official
rationale for restricting working hours, and the precedent was in
place for excluding upper-level workers (however defined) from
hours regulation.
The Sachs memorandum is the first reference I found in the
Roosevelt administration archival record to an exemption for exec
utives, administrators, and supervisors from wage and hour regula
tion. The fact that Sachs built an upper-level exemption into his
proposed program so matter-of-factly raises a question challenging
the very thesis of this Article. How can the regulation of working
hours be viewed as a contested field for the middle classes if the
exclusion of upper-level white-collar workers was sealed from the
start?
96. Letter from Frances Perkins to Donald Richberg 1 (Mar. 22, 1933) (Papers of Donald
Richberg, Library of Congress [hereinafter LC, Richberg Papers], Container 1, Correspon
dence Feb.-May, 1933).
97. Id. at 2.
98. For an introduction to Richberg, see supra text accompanying note 27.
99. See Letter from Frances Perkins to Editor, WASH. PosT, Apr. 20, 1933, at 1 (FDR/OF
15, DOL, Box 1, 1933 folder).
100. Memorandum from Alexander Sachs to Administration 1 (May 23, 1933) (Alexan
der Sachs Papers, Roosevelt Archives [hereinafter FDR, Sachs Papers], Box 124, Labor:
Wages, Hours, Stabilization).
101. Id. at 1.
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As we shall see throughout this Article, the notion that upper
level white-collar workers ought to be exempted from hours legisla
tion had the commonsense quality that marks all uncontestable cul
tural propositions. But as is so often the case with seemingly
uncontestable social truths, on closer examination one finds little
agreement as to what had been agreed upon, or why. Who are the
upper-level white-collar workers who obviously ought to be ex
empted from hours regulation? The terms chosen to describe them
were not uniform from one assertion of this obvious point to an
other. Precisely what makes the exempted group different? Should
the exemption include all white-collar workers? Was the logic of
exclusion in fact related to collar color? Was it related to income
level so that the exclusion should also apply to well-paid skilled
blue-collar workers? Or was it something unique to the top tier of
white-collar workers that exempted them from hours regulation?
These questions were sufficiently important to reveal the concep
tually difficult and contested nature of the choices government ac
tors were required to make.
So why did Sachs find it necessary to exclude upper-level work
ers, and why did he draw the class lines in precisely this way? His
memorandum is silent on these questions: it simply takes the need
for an exemption and the location of the boundary line between
regulated and exempt workers for granted. But we ought nonethe
less to pause here and explore the unspoken reasons that might
have motivated Sachs to include this exemption.
It is useful, here and elsewhere, broadly to distinguish between
the instrumental (talk and action aimed at identifying and solving
problems) and the symbolic (talk and action aimed at describing or
representing the world). I shall refer to instrumental approaches to
class line-drawing as purposive and to symbolic approaches as de
scriptive. In exploring these approaches and their implications, let
us not speak of Sachs in particular - since we do not know what he
in particular was thinking. Let us speak instead of an ideal type of
government expert going about the task of deciding the coverage
boundaries of an administrative scheme. Call him the Reasonable
Expert, or REX for short.
If REX's orientation were descriptive, his exemptions from
hours legislation would correspond to the dividing lines that already
exist in society. If certain types of employees are generally viewed
as categorically different from ordinary employees, the descriptive
approach would counsel that these differences ought to be observed
in federal regulations. In this sense, the descriptive approach is
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government purports to be merely describing

the social hierarchy that exists independent of the government's de
cision to describe it.

If there exists a consensus view of the class system "in the cul
ture," REX's only task under the descriptive approach is to de
scribe the consensus accurately- and to fight off the political and
administrability concerns that might interfere with the achievement
of accuracy. But what if REX, using his expert knowledge or his
cultural antennae, discerns conflict in the culture about where the
lines of stratification should be drawn? What if he determines that
a previous consensus is eroding, and a new consensus is poised to
take its place?102 What if he determines, indeed, that the culture is
not even close to having a consensus view, and that different groups
have their own distinct perspectives? REX might determine, in
these circumstances, that he must add a crystal ball to his toolkit
and predict which of the contested beliefs is most likely to emerge
as the dominant one in the near future. If he did not feel comforta
ble with the business of cultural prediction, he might instead con
clude that his job must be to
empirical skills and make his

ignore beliefs and
own determination

instead to use his
of the true nature

of the class structure on the basis of observable social facts - or on
the basis of "scientific" inquiries by experts at the Census Bureau
or elsewhere.103

REX would experience his new system as

hierarchy-neutral- based on objective fact- but those in society
whose views conflicted with REX's map of the class system would
reasonably be expected to disagree.
Faced with these problems, REX might well shy away from de
veloping an objective account of the class system at all. He might
instead take the view that where no consensus exists, politics or ad
ministrability are the proper tiebreakers. If REX chooses not to
admit that he has failed to arrive at a sound descriptivist decision,
however, those observing the process will wrongfully assume that
REX's results are consistent with his descriptivist rhetoric. The
government would inadvertently be placing its seal of approval on a

102. Cf Com:, supra note 20, at 30 (attributing to Raymond Williams the distinction
between "a residual cultural form and an emergent one").
103. As we have seen, any attempt to defer to the expertise of the census would merely
build the same problems into REX's models, as the same struggle was taking place inside the
Census Bureau. See id. at 44 (arguing that the census under Alba Edwards had merely "con
found(ed] economic or technical classifications of the workforce with the general social or
cultural divisions of the American population"). For a discussion of Alba Edwards and cen
sus occupational classification, see supra text accompanying notes 65-72.
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classification scheme the descriptivist accuracy of which it could not
defend.
The second broad approach to class line-drawing is the purpo
REX need not decide that his job is to discover pre
existing classification schemes "in the culture," or even to find the
most "accurate" description of the social world through an empiri
cal analysis of the hard facts. Instead, he could decide that the gov
ernment's job is to adopt whatever classification scheme most
closely fits the government's substantive goals. Under this ap
proach, REX would first conduct a careful analysis of the goals of
the program he is administering. He would then determine
whether there exist certain social groups that for some reason ought
to be excluded from the program - for example, because they do
not need what the program provides. In making this determination,
REX might pay attention to culturally-salient distinctions between
groups. But if he is doing his purposive job right, he would do so
only if the culturally-salient distinctions happen to closely corre
spond to factors that are relevant to the government's program. In
the absence of a close correspondence, REX would recognize the
need to identify program-salient distinctions on his own, through an
independent empirical analysis of the social world. Once such dis
tinctions were adopted, REX would have no reason to present
them as anything but the product of the government's own goal
oriented activity. The purposive expert would have good reason to
hope that the government's purposive classification scheme would
be hierarchy-neutral - albeit in a different sense than a descrip
tivist classification scheme purports to be. Here, the hope would be
that since the government's classification scheme derives from the
government's purposive goals and makes no claim to be an all-pur
pose accurate map of the class system, it would have little effect on
existing social hierarchies or cultural debates about them.

sive approach.

The purposive approach is not without its own predictable blind
alleys, however. Determining the precise goals of a government
program is not always easy, and goals often change even as the pro
grams themselves remain the same. Purposive classification
schemes can ossify and thus be rendered goal-inappropriate by the
mere passage of time. Purposive classification schemes need to be
tailor-made to particular government programs and thus are likely
to be slow and expensive to develop. In the interim, sometimes the
only way to get a program moving is to choose a classification
scheme off the shelf, as it were, and hope that it can be improved
over time. But since whatever off-the-shelf scheme is selected will
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have its adherents within the regulated community, change for the
sake of purposive accuracy may prove difficult to implement even
after all the data are in.
Problems both of administrability and public acceptability might
stand in the way of the government implementing a purposive clas
sifi.cation scheme that is sufficiently complex to meet the govern
ment's goals. Indeed, if the scheme is complex, it will be less
administrable and less acceptable to the public precisely to the de
gree that it deviates from culturally-based descriptive norms. Regu
lated groups never like seemingly arbitrary government action, but
the incentive to protest is all the greater when the government's
regulatory scheme is complex and compliance is therefore adminis
tratively burdensome. Furthermore, a purposive analysis may not
in practice be able to stand aloof from public debates on class. The
results of a purposive analysis may not in fact be all that different
from the results reached by a process of description. For example,
even if REX selected his class-ranking criterion purely for its pur
posive relevance, it might well prove to be the case that his selected
criterion also plays a role as a marker of status within the culture.
REX is, after all, a product of his culture; he knows intuitively that
his results will have greater legitimacy if they do correspond to
culturally-based understandings of the social world.
Why, then, was Sachs proposing to exempt certain white-collar
workers from hours regulation? From a purposive standpoint,
Sachs might have believed that executives, administrators, and su
pervisors were not suffering significant enough levels of unemploy
ment to make it worth regulating their hours, but lower-level white
collar workers were. If so, his view would not have been the uni
form view of Roosevelt's close advisers. Paul H. Douglas, a leading
Progressive economist (and later U.S. Senator) who was a key poli
cymaker on the issue of unemployment insurance,1°4 had recom
mended as early as January 1933 that "[t]he present depression has
thrown so many of the white-collared group out of their jobs and
they have found their own resources so inadequate that there is jus
tifi.cation for extending the upper limits" of unemployment insur
ance coverage to include some high-salaried white-collar
workers.105 Douglas noted that the coverage limit he advocated,
104. See PAUL H. DouGLAs, IN THE FULLNESS OF TIME: THE MEMOIRS OF PAUL H.
DouGLAS 70-77 (1972) (discussing his role and his policy conflicts with John Commons). For
earlier comparative work by Douglas on the subject of unemployment, see PAUL H.
DOUGLAS & .AARON DIRECTOR, THE PROBLEM OF UNEMPLOYMENT {1931), which does not
discuss issues of unemployment among white-collar workers.
105. PAUL H. DOUGLAS, STANDARDS OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 51 (1932).
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"those salaried workers who receive less than $60 a week," would
"not only protect the clerks, stenographers, etc., but also the lower
group of executives." 106
Sachs might also have thought that the work of upper-level em
ployees could not be spread. This view - that the work of upper
level workers is different from ordinary work in ways directly rele
vant to the possibility of work-spreading - would have resonated
with significant traditions within the field of personnel manage
ment. After all, the tradition of paying white-collar workers on a
salaried basis fostered the view that white-collar work could not be
broken down into hourly units. By traditionally being paid on a
"salary basis," however, upper-level white-collar workers were no
different from routine white-collar workers - a group Sachs did
not propose excluding from hours regulation.
Furthermore, both for routine and supervisory white-collar
work, tradition was changing in the 1920s and 1930s. The personnel
literature of the 1920s and 1930s was replete with calls for subject
ing routine white-collar work to the tools of personnel manage
ment. Examples include calls for the rationalization of white-collar
pay scales,1°7 the proper measurement of clerical production and
the development of production standards and incentive pay
schemes for clerical workers,1°8 and the reversal of the "fallacious
and misleading" tendency to rank clerical workers higher than man
ual workers based on the failure to recognize that "[t]here is no
106. Id. Douglas is here making recommendations for state and federal legislation. His
$60-a-week salary cutoff is quite high for his times: in his appendix, he includes the Ohio
unemployment compensation statute, which excludes from the definition of "employee" (the
covered group) "any person employed at other than manual labor at a rate of remuneration
of two thousand dollars a year or more," id. app. C, at 240, or $38 dollars a week. Other
unemployment insurance proposals expressly excluded upper-leve� workers. See, e.g., Report
of Unemployment Insurance Committee to Industrial Advisory Board (June 18, 1934) (FDR/
OF 121a, Unemployment Insurance, Box 1, 1933-34) (proposing an exclusion for "profes
sional people, such as physicians, lawyers, engineers," id. at 8, and describing a proposed plan
by the American Association of Social Security to exempt "non-manual workers with salaries
of $3,000 per year or more," id. at 27). For a discussion of the problem of the economic
situation of white-collar workers in the Depression, see KocKA, supra note 5, at 194-95
("American white collar workers were hit hard by the economic crisis, though somewhat
later and on the whole a little less hard than manual workers. . . . On the other hand, blue
collar workers gained more than white collar employees from the recovery of 1933/34 which
was supported by the minimum wage and maximum worktime provisions of New Deal
legislation.").
107. See Charles J. McGuirk, Am I Underpaying or Overpaying My Men?, 57 PRINTER'S
INK, Mar. 31, 1927, at 5, excerpted in 26 MGMT. REv. 159 (1927).
108. See George Filipetti, Instal[l]ment Buying and Business Depressions, 20 MGMT. REv.
15, 15 (1931); see also F.W. Pierce, Basic Principles of Wage and Salary Administration, 11
PERSONNEL 111, 112 (1935) (noting that one of the reasons traditionally "salaried" work was
compensated on that basis was that "the companies have been slow to set up standards for
this kind of work").
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more brain activity" in routine clerical work than in routine manual
work.109 Applying the tools of personnel management to routine
white-collar work eroded the distinction between such white-collar
workers and the blue-collar workers whose labor had long been
grist for the mill of personnel science.
The nature of supervisory work was also being reassessed in this
period, and it, too, was being brought under increasingly close man
agement measurement and control. "Job analysis" was one of the
central tools of Taylorite scientific management. By breaking jobs
down into their component parts, management could assign and
monitor each part to secure maximum effort and output,110 and
could create scientifically based wage systems.111 As one personnel
author correctly noted in 1934, the use of scientific management
techniques to manage the supervisory workforce was nothing new:
"Of course, job analysis of executive positions really started in the
factory with Taylor's work in functional foremanship. From there it
spread to certain office and supervisory positions, and is today
under serious consideration for all executive positions. "112 Articles
in the 1930s described job analysis as useful for "not only routine
positions, but those of assistant executives up to department
heads."113
The leading example of the trend toward scientific control of
supervisory workers was the famous industrial research program
known as the Hawthorne Experiments, which began in 1927 at the
Hawthorne Works of Western Electric Company in Chicago.114
109. See J.0. Hopwood, Administration of Wages and Salaries, 11 PERSONNEL 99, 105
(1935).
110. See RICHARD GILLESPIE, MANuFAcruRING KNoWLEDGE: A HISTORY OF THE HAw.
THORNE EXPERIMENTS 11 (1991).
111. See, e.g., NATIONAL lNDus. CoNF. Bo., lNc., SUPPLEMENTAL BONUSES FOR \VAGE
EARNERS, SUPERVISORS AND EXECUTIVES (1927).
112. Pearce C. Kelley, Selecting Executives, 10 PERSONNEL 8, 14 (1934).
113. C R. Dooley, The Philosophy and Procedure ofa Job Analysis, 10 PERSONNEL 67, 67
(1934). See A.F. Kindall, Job Description and Rating, 14 PERSONNEL 122, 129 (1938) (finding
its job analysis and rating program "adaptable to practically all jobs valued at $4,000 a year or
less"). "This includes factory, office, sales, clerical, salaried, and supervisory jobs held by
men and women in all sections of the country." Id. With "[c]ertain adjustments,'' readers
were assured, the system would work for higher-valued salaried jobs as well. See id.
114. The final report of the Hawthorne experiments is F.J. ROETHLISBERGER & WILLIAM
J. DICKSON, MANAGEMENT AND THE WORKER! AN AccoUNT OF A RESEARCH PROGRAM
CoNDUCTED BY THE WESTERN ELECTRIC COMPANY, HAWTHORNE WORKS, CHICAGO (1939).
The results of the study were known in the literature long before the book was published.
See GILLESPIE, supra note 110, at 196. The heavily psychological emphasis of the Hawthorne
project contributed to the creation of a movement called "human relations." See PERROW,
supra note 82, at 97 (discussing "Hawthorne and All That" in a chapter on "The Human
Relations Model"). As Gillespie's study of the Hawthorne Experiments stresses, the basic
thrust of the movement was that "workers . . . could be satisfied only if managers extended
.
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The purpose of the project was to use the methods of experimental
social science to determine the effects on productivity of such vari
ables as shop lighting, hours of work, work schedules, and so forth.
What the Hawthorne investigators found, instead, was that differ
ences in methods of supervision, rather than differences in the ma
terial conditions of the test room, in fact caused the observed
increases in output and improvements in attitude among the stud
ied workers.115 The investigators turned their attention to methods
for subjecting

supervisors

to the techniques of personnel science.

What did it say about the status of lower-level supervisors when
social scientific methods started being used to transform them into
"natives" to be observed and measured?116 Indeed, in a classic ex
ample of a profession creating the need for its own services,117 one
of the major uses of the new human relations technology was to
address the supervisors' very concern that their superior status was
being undermined by changes in the industrial process.118 Thus, su
pervisory work was hardly immune from management control, and
was not categorically different in that regard from lower-level
white-collar work.
their control over the social organization of the workplace." GILLESPIE, supra note 110, at
197. Thus the "scientific management" label, in the sense of the use of best-practice social
and organizational techniques to impose bureaucratic control over workers and their work, is
appropriate to the Hawthorne study.
115. See ROETHLISBERGER & DICKSON, supra note 114, at 88.
116. See GILLESPIE, supra note 110, at 200 ("They argued that the attitudes and com
plaints of workers and supervisors had to be analyzed in the same way that Radcliffe-Brown
had studied the beliefs and sentiments of the Andaman Islanders." (emphasis added)). Just
as being subjected to the ministrations of personnel experts was a sign of diminished status, it
was a sign of the superior status of foremen at Ford in the heyday of its experiments in
welfare capitalism that "[they] won virtual exemption from the sociology department's inves
tigations." ZUNz, supra note 37, at 135.
117. This phenomenon is noted in that icon of the representation of work in 1990s Ameri
can popular culture: the Dilbert corpus. See Scorr AnAMs, THE DILBERT PRINCIPLE: A
CUBICLE'S-EYE VIEW OF BossES, MEETINGS, MANAGEMENT FADs & OTHER WORKPLACE
AFFLICTIONS 1 (1996) ("A major technology company simultaneously rolled out two new
programs: (1) a random drug testing program, and (2) an 'Individual Dignity Enhancement'
program.").
118. Another factor tending to lower the self-perceived status of managers was the union
ization of their plants. See Jacoby, supra note 82, at 197. For similar conclusions drawn from
1934-35 fieldwork focusing on a 1933 strike, see WARNER & Low, supra note 50, at 187 (for
dates of fieldwork, see id. at 5 n.3). In part due to unionization - or its avoidance - but
also in part due to ideological trends within the field of personnel management itself, some
personnel managers aimed to reorganize blue-collar work by adopting some of what had
previously been the definitive markers of white-collar work: for example stable employment
and well-established lines of promotion. See SANFORD JACOBY, EMPLOYING BuREAUCRACY:
MANAGERS, UNIONS, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF Woruc IN .AMERICAN INDUSTRY, 19001945, at 82 (1985) (noting the early work of the vocational guidance movement); id. at 255
("The continuing irony in personnel management was that it best served the purpose of
thwarting unionism by introducing the same reforms the unions sought.").
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Perhaps Sachs was motivated by a belief that upper-level white
collar work could not be spread among workers.

Upper-level

white-collar work was, after all, traditionally compensated on a sal
aried basis - suggesting that it cannot be broken into hourly incre
ments and divided between two workers. If work-spreading can't
work, no government purpose is served by requiring it.
Two factors weigh against using the wage/salary distinction as
the basis for a purposive upper-level exemption. First, as already
noted, lower-level white-collar workers were also traditionally paid
salaries rather than hourly wages - rendering Sachs's exemption
underinclusive if salary payment was taken as a sign that work can
not be spread. Second, there was no reason to assume that salaried
jobs were functionally different from hourly jobs. The preservation
of the wage/salary distinction throughout the 1920s and 1930s and into the present - in the face of the increasing Taylorization of
white-collar work did not necessarily reflect a belief in the indivisi
bility of white-collar work in general. The wage/salary distinction
was in best practice119 largely a tool in a symbolic process. The
business community wanted to rationalize white-collar work with
out undermining the Taylorized white-collar workers' upward class
identification. Doing so required maintaining the distinction be
tween salary work and wage work despite the erosion of the func
tional justification for the distinction.120
Perhaps, though, Sachs was engaged in a descriptive rather than
a purposive task when he decided that upper-level white-collar
workers should be exempt from hours regulation. From a descrip
tive standpoint, Sachs might have operated on the assumption that
it would be culturally inappropriate to subject upper-level employ
ees to hours regulation, even if they could benefit from it in a nar
row economic sense. Such an assumption was borne out by the
experience of lower-level supervisors at the Hawthorne Works, who
reportedly suffered a severe status loss in 1931 when their hours
119. For the underutilization of "best practice" techniques, see Daniel Nelson, Scientific
Management and the Workplace, 1920-1935, in MASTERS To MANAGERS, supra note 82, at 8689; See also BENDIX, supra note 82, at 319; JACOBY, EMPLOYING BUREAUCRACY, supra note
118, at 154, 157; GERALD E. KAHLER & ALTON C. JOHNSON, THE DEVELOPMENT OF PER·
soNNEL ADMINISTRATION, 1923-1945, at 22-23 (1971) (noting the "elaborately organized per
sonnel department described in the textbooks existed only in some of the large firms" in the
1920s).
120. See Pierce, supra note 108, at 112 (noting that the company is "working toward the
definition of certain intermediate jobs in both the supervisory and clerical forces on fixed
rate schedules without classifying them as wage-earners"). Similarly, the payment of salaries
rather than hourly wages to foremen - whose status as white-collar workers has always been
subject to question - was used as an indicator of their heightened status. See ZuNz, supra
note 37, at 136.
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were cut (like the oper ators' but unlike the upp er-level
supervisors').
[They] could not understand why they were asked to take a . . . cut in
hours when they, of all supervisors, could least afford it. They wished
to know, "Where the hell does this company get this two-class system
anyway?" Group chiefs argued against the "two-class system" on the
ground that they were put on the same level as the operators. Some
felt their social prestige had been injured. Friends and neighbors to
whom they had proudly boasted of being supervisors at the Western
Electric Co. would no longer believe them and taunted them by say
ing "Oh, I thought you were a supervisor, but I see your hours were
cut like the operators' ."121

It might have been obvious to Sachs that subjecting upper-level
white-collar workers to hours regulation would have so undermined
their claim to high status that they would have objected to it even in the face of the economic need of the group as a whole.
It is impossible to know from Sachs's bare mention of an upper
level exclusion whether he was taking a purposive or descriptive
approach to the problem. Even where the administrative record is
clearer, it is not always easy to identify a predominant approach.
But where the predominant approach

can

be identified, it will be

come possible to ask whether the difference between the purposive
and descriptive approaches to class line-drawing carries any norma

tive

significance: whether one approach is in some sense (symbolic,

instrumental, or both) better than the other. But that discussion
must await the emergence of the issue of upper-level exemptions in
a richer historical context.
B.

The Creation of the NRA (and a Brief Note o n the Role of
the Realists)

The NIRA became law on June 16, 1933122 and called for the
creation of the NRA. Roosevelt appointed General Hugh Johnson
as NRA Administrator. Johnson was an industrial engineer by
training, was widely acclaimed for his work on the World War I
draft, and was a close associate of influential Progressive financier
Bernard Baruch.123 The NRA's staff included many prominent aca121. RoETiiLISBERGER & DICKSON, supra note 114, at 340.
122. For the drafting of the statute, see, e.g., BERNARD BELLUSH, THE FAILURE OF THE
NRA 9-13 (1975); COLIN GORDON, NEW DEALS: BUSINESS, LABOR, AND POLITICS IN
AMERICA, 1920-1935, at 171 (1994).
123. See FINEGOLD & SKOCPOL, supra note 93, at 92. Baruch was not flattering in his
evaluation of Johnson. Baruch is described by Perkins as warning her: "He's been my
number-three man for years. I think he's a good number-three man, maybe a number-two
man, but he's not a number-one man. He's dangerous and unstable . . . . I'm fond of him, but
do tell the President to be careful." PERKINS, supra note 93, at 200-01.
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demics and lawyers with Progressive and Legal Realist leanings.
Most prominent among them in the spheres of decisionmaking at
issue in this Article were Donald Richberg, the NRA's first General
Counsel and later head,124 and Leon C. Marshall, the Director of
the Review Division of the NRA who later became a member of
the National Industrial Review Board, the body which took over
the direction of the NRA upon Johnson's resignation in January
1934.125 Thus, trends in Progressive and Legal Realist thought sig
nificantly influenced the New Deal class line-drawing enterprise.126
One of the central aims of thirty years of Progressive and Legal
Realist thought was to bring independent technical and scientific
knowledge to bear on social problems.127 These movements did
124. On the appointment of Richberg and the true nature of his role - far broader than
the title General Counsel would suggest - see HuGH S. JoHNSON, THE BLUE EAGLE FROM
EGG TO EARTH 201 (1935); see also HAWLEY, supra note 94; THOMAS E. VADNEY, THE WAY,
WARD LIBERAL: A PoLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF DONALD RICHBERG (1970). Richberg was a
union-side labor lawyer, and Johnson's unfamiliarity with labor issues and lack of a base of
support within the labor movement was one of the reasons he appointed Richberg. See
BELLUSH, supra note 122, at 32-33; VADNEY, supra, at 121. But in the end, Richberg turned
"away from labor influences in a gesture of fair-mindedness to all interests . . . (but] suc
cumb[ed] to business influences - which, after all, were the stronger of the two in the
NRA. . . . [a] point that Richberg failed to take adequate account of." VADNEY, supra, at
123.
125. See VADNEY, supra note 124, at 144. Marshall was one of two academics on this
Board; the other was institutional economist and Yale Law School professor Walton
Hamilton. See id. In addition, Paul Douglas was a member of the NRA's Consumer Advi
sory Board and also served briefly as a member of the code authority for the consumer
finance industry. Both are described by Douglas as disheartening experiences. See DouG
LAS, supra note 104, at 64-65.
126. Of course, not all law schools and government agencies participated in Progressive
and Realist trends to equal degrees. Yale and Columbia were the institutional "seedbed" of
legal realism in law teaching, and progressive tendencies were strong at Harvard. See PETER
H. !RoNs, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 7 (1982). FINEGOLD & SKOCPOL, supra note 93, at 97,
observe that "NRA lawyers were older, less frequently educated at Ivy League law schools,
and more experienced in business and politics" than were the lawyers in more liberal agen
cies. See also IRONS, supra, at 30 (noting that although Blackwell Smith, who administered
the NRA legal division, was a young Columbia law graduate, he "leaned toward older, exper
ienced lawyers for responsible NRA posts . . . with prior business and political experience").
The leading studies of New Deal lawyers focus on lawyers in the private sector, see IRoNs,
supra, or on litigators within government, see RoNEN SHAMIR, MANAGING LEGAL UNCER
TAINTY: ELITE LAWYERS IN THE NEW DEAL (1995). They have less to offer with regard to
government lawyers as negotiators and policymakers. On that issue, for a helpful insider
account from a Yale-trained NRA lawyer who later joined the Yale faculty, see THOMAS I.
EMERSON, YoUNG LAWYER FOR THE NEw DEAL 18-22 (1991). His experience suggests that
the aspirations and frustrations of REX, my ideal typical New Deal expert, were alive and
well in the NRA.
127. Also central was the Progressive/Realist view that in so doing, they were acting in
the public interest rather than in the narrow self-interest of any one particular social group.
An example is Donald R. Richberg's presentation of himself to Congress in testimony on the
causes of the Depression. Richberg, by then a noted representative of union interests in the
railroad industry, described himself as having no authority "save that of a life long advocate
of public interests." See Testimony of Donald R. Richberg before the Committee on Finance,
United States Senate, Depression Causes and Remedies 7 (Feb. 23, 1933) (LC, Richberg
Papers, Container 43, Relief for Unemployment). For a fine account of the complexity of
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not, of course, share internally or with each other precise concep
tions of what "science" was or how it was to be integrated into the
political process. But some form of faith in science characterized
the critique both of corrupt democratic politics and of the abstrac
tion and formalism of traditional legal thought.12s
In the Wilson and Hoover eras, the type of social knowledge
most drawn upon by government was the knowledge of and from
the world of business and industry. In the Wilson era, it was busi

nessmen themselves who became involved in organizational reform
as volunteers in the war effort. For Hoover, it was not the captains
of industry but their engineer lieutenants who were the most useful
- not a surprising assessment given the fact that Hoover was him
self an engineer.129 Precisely because the engineer drew his exper
tise from intimate involvement in the world of business and was

dependent for his future insights and reputation on employment by
or consultation with the business community, the independence of
the engineer as social policymaker was never free from doubt. For
this reason, Thorstein Veblen stressed the development of "moral

responsibility on the part of the nation's new technological elite, its
'engineers,' "130 to foster their own independence of judgment. A

new emphasis on "professionalism," including the formation of na

tional organizations whose uniform standards were imposed upon
the employers of professionals, helped to foster the belief that pro
fessionals could maintain their stance of being in industry but not
progressive lawyers' claim that lawyering for clients can be in the public interest, see Clyde
Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis as People's Lawyer, 105 YALE LJ.
1445 (1996).
128. There is a huge literature on these issues. See, e.g., NEIL DUXBURY, PATrERNs OF
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1995); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMER
ICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL 0R1HODOXY (1992); LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL
REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960 (1986); BARRY DEAN KARL, THE UNEASY STATE: THE
UNITED STATES FROM 1915-1945, at 60-62 (1983) [hereinafter KARL, UNEASY STATE];
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM
AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (1973); JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, 'AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM
AND EMPIRICAL SocIAL SCIENCE (1995); SHAMIR, supra note 126, at 131-57; WILLIAM
TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973).
129. See BARRY DEAN KARL, EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION AND REFORM IN THE NEW
DEAL: THE GENESIS OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, 1900-1939, at 22 (1963) [hereinaf
ter KARL, EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION] (Hoover era); KARL, UNEASY STATE, supra note
128, at 39 (Wtlson era). Hoover's confidence in engineers continued long past the end of his
administration. See, e.g., Calls Lag in Work Job for Engineers, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1939, at 4
("Former President Herbert Hoover suggested today that the engineers of the nation might
succeed where economists, politicians and sociologists had failed in finding a solution to the
unemployment problem . . He called engineers the world's 'troubleshooters,' 'the diagnos
ticians of industry,' and 'the third party between capital and labor.' 'Your profession is to
make things work,' he said.").
. •

130. KARL, UNEASY STATE, supra note 128, at 23 (quoting Veblen).
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entirely of it.131 But in the end, it was the nature of scientific in
quiry itself that was counted on as the check against bias. The very
measurability of social phenomena meant that the scientific results
derived from them could be verified and therefore trusted.
Engineering, with its ties to natural science, was not the only
discipline conscripted into advancing social knowledge. The ideol
ogy of objective science that justified involving engineers in poli
cymaking and implementation was readily carried over from
engineering to economics and the other, even softer, social sci
ences.132 Advocates of social scientific approaches to law and gov
ernment went so far as to assert that social scientists could be more
objective than the engineers who had shaped economic policy in the
Hoover era. One such advocate was Donald Richberg, whose legal
writings and speeches placed him squarely in the Realist mode in
the years prior to the NRA.133 For Richberg, the institutional inde
pendence of social scientists - their location in universities rather
than in the world of business - gave them the edge in their ability
to claim intellectual independence.134 He conceded that social sci
entific knowledge was not at an advanced state, but he had every
confidence that with increased reliance on social scientific data
would come convergence within the social sciences on the right an
swers to social problems. " [O]ut of a thousand [data] fragments can
be built a fact - a thing that will work always exactly in the same
131. See id. at 53.
132. See id. at 72 ("It is possible to view Hoover's faith in academic economics as naive,
but the faith came naturally to a professional engineer, accustomed to calculating stresses
and temperatures, and the social scientists shared his faith and aspired to make their new
science as accurate and objective as his."). For a full account of realism and the social sci
ences, see SCHLEGEL, supra note 128.
133. See, e.g., Donald Richberg, Speech to the California Conference on Social Work 21
(May 15, 1930) (transcript available in the Library of Congress Manuscripts Division, LC,
Richberg Papers, Box 43, Speeches 1930-Feb. 1933) ("It is essentially the task of those who
seek social progress to destroy th[e] ruling fiction [of private property] , and all the fictions,
the illusions, the superstitions that have been so sedulously implanted in the minds of men
and women that they are blind to their own needs, uncertain of their own aspirations, unable
to distinguish between the leadership that would enslave them and the leadership that would
set them free."); Donald Richberg, Economic Illusions Underlying Law, 1 U. CHI. L. Rev.
96, 96 (1933) ("The ultimate sanction of law making rests upon the establishment of facts
In the higher realms of legislative and judicial law making, it becomes a matter of grave
importance that legislators and judges shall not declare that to be a fact which is not a fact, or
declare that to be fixed and established which is uncertain and unpredictable. These prelimi
nary observations may serve to introduce a brief criticism of the efforts of legislators and
courts to write economic illusions into law.").
134. See DONALD R . RICHBERG, TENTS OF THE MIGHTY 214 (1930). Richberg was not
himself an academic but was enamored of the academics with whom he socialized in the
University Club at the University of Chicago. He wrote, "It was enlightening to a man who
worked in 'the City' to contrast the discussion of social problems in the down town lunch
clubs with the analysis of similar issues at a professor's dinnertable." Id. at 216.
. • . .
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way under the same conditions - something which can be made
and used."135 Richberg's demand that "[t]he men who know must
run the show" testified to his deep confidence in "the rising author
ity of scientific leadership."136
Social science's mantle of objectivity was so capacious that legal
thinkers of the period became strong advocates of interdisciplinary
legal work.137 At the Institute for Human Relations at Yale and the
Johns Hopkins Institute for the Study of Law,138 scientifically ori
ented legal realists sought institutional independence from law
schools in research institutes dedicated to empirical social science
research relating to the legal system.139 The social science they
sought out was, Morton Horwitz has argued, "the narrowest and
most naively behavioralist versions of positivist social science."140
Believers in science had great confidence that the expert's scien
tific contribution to policymaking could be independent of politics.
Charles Merriam, a professor of political science at the University
of Chicago and a leading Progressive era theorist of the relationship
between science and government, for example, stressed that while
science could serve politics, it could only do so if science was in
dependent of politics.141 This meant, to Merriam, that social scien
tists' investigations needed to be independent of any particular
government program, lest the search for truth be unduly con
strained.142 Most social scientists of the period thought that this
independence from political taint was possible, that, as Purcell has
observed, "they could remain scientifically neutral while developing
workable techniques of social control."143
But this ideology of social science's value-neutrality had intel
lectually powerful and influential critics. Robert Maynard
Hutchins, who had embraced the social-scientific approach to law,
became disillusioned with it when he started doing empirical work
and realized that data were constrained by the data collectors' as
sumptions, which were not themselves subject to scientific test135. Id. at 247.
136. Id. at 226, 252.
137. See PuRCELL, supra note 128, at 78.
138. See KALMAN, supra note 128; SCHLEGEL, supra note 128 (chapters on Yale and Hop
kins); TWINING, supra note 128, at 60-65. For a discussion of the Hopkins Institute, including
Marshall's role, see SCHLEGEL, supra note 128, at 147-210.
139. See SCHLEGEL, supra note 128, at 66.
140. HORWITZ, supra note 128, at 181.
141. See KARL, EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION, supra note 129, at 71.
142. See id. at 262.
143. PURCELL, supra note 128, at 26.
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ing.144 Lon Fuller perceptively argued in 1934 that the Realists
were so afraid of value choices that they believed that social reality,
accurately analyzed, would provide its own values. As Horwitz puts
it, Fuller saw that "in attempting to have law simply mirror society,
Realism ended up endowing the Is with normative content" - or,
even more specifically, "endow[ing]

economically dominant

. .

.

practices with undeserved normativity."145
Progressive and Legal Realist thinkers considered not only why
social

science

should

problems, but also

how

be

brought to

bear

on

contemporary

it might best be brought to bear. They

viewed the administrative agency as the institutional locus within
government most likely to put social science research to optimal
social use. James Landis, who championed the administrative state
in his 1938 Storrs Lectures, claimed that in the administrative
agency, unlike in the courts, "the calm of scientific inquiry" would
reign.146 This made the administrative agency the proper forum for
developing the law away from the common law's abstraction and
formalism and towards the "completely adult" jurisprudence the
Realists sought.147 In Landis's vision of the administrative agency,
it would matter little whether Congress had given the agency clear
guidelines within which to work. The mature administrator would
see himself as having a set of real-world problems to solve, and
would take his guidance from empirical knowledge of the world,
not from the prior commands of Congress.14s
144. See id. at 142.
145. HoRwnz, supra note 128, at 211 (emphasis added); see also Lon Fuller, American
Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 429, 458, 461 (1934). Sometimes the constraints were as
much institutional as intellectual; to get funding for the Hopkins institute, Walter Wheeler
Cook had to promise that the Institute would not be seeking to change the existing social
order, but would instead "accept the existing social and economic organization as a basic
fact." SCHLEGEL, supra note 128, at 155 (quoting Walter Wheeler Cook).
146. JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938), discussed in HoRwnz, supra
note 128, at 220, and reprinted in part in AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 159-63 (William W.
Fisher III et al. eds., 1993).
147. The phrase is Jerome Frank's. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND TIIE MODERN MIND
253 (1936).
148. James Landis wrote:
One of the ablest administrators that it was my good fortune to know, I believe, never
read, at least more than casually, the statues [sic] that he translated into reality. He
assumed that they gave him power to deal with the broad problems of an industry and,
upon that understanding, he sought his own solutions. Limitations upon his powers that
counsel brought to his attention, naturally, he respected; but there is an enormous differ
ence between the legalistic form of approach that from the negative vantage of statutory
limitations looks to see what it must do, and the approach that considers a problem from
the standpoint of finding out what it can do.
LANDIS, supra note 146, reprinted in part in AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 161 (William W.
Fisher III et al. eds., 1993).
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Pound's caustic response was that "the postulate of a scientific body
of experts pursuing objective scientific inquiries is as far as possible
from what the facts are or are likely to be."149 His counterexample
was the National Labor Relations Board - an agency that, already
by 1938, was viewed as so political that it spoke for itself as a cau
tion against undue confidence in agency "expertise."150 If expertise
was not the basis for agency action, then politics was, and there
could be no justification for designing an administrative state that
was not subject to strong legal checks and constraints.151
In sum, it was the deep faith of Progressive and Realist thinkers
that social science, in proper alliance with the administrative state,
could arrive at objectively correct answers to important questions
of public policy - answers that drew their legitimacy from agency
expertise rather than from the political process. But the calls for
caution from Hutchins, Fuller, and Pound carried an important
message. If the results of social science brought to the fore by ad
ministrative agencies were not in fact objective, if instead they were
significantly colored by the political perspectives of the analysts,
then the capacity of the administrative state to serve as a progres
sive force depended solely upon the political perspectives and per
sonal experiences of key government actors. Perhaps this was the
reason for the great public interest in the background of New Deal
administrators - which, in the case of the NRA, took the unflatter
ing form of reassurances from within the administration that
Richberg was not a Jew.152 The possibility was recognized that for
all its claimed expertise and objectivity, social science and Realist
149. Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, Reco=endations
[known widely as "The Pound Report"], 63rd Annual Report of the American Bar Associa
tion 331, 344 (1938); see also id. at 345 (noting that "in many fields of administration there is
no particular expertness").
150. See HoRwnz, supra note 128, at 220.
151. The Taft-Hartley Act and the Administrative Procedure Act were both instantia
tions of this view, and were both enacted in 1947.
152. Johnson noted that:
It was . . . asserted that I had appointed too many Jews to important posts and Mr.
Richberg was cited against me on that score . . . . Just for the sake of the record, I must
say that Mr. Richberg is not a Jew . . . . I had several able Jews but they were the scant
minority [of his staff] and every single one did an outstanding job. Not one was disloyal
or self seeking.
JOHNSON, supra note 124, at 212-13. Johnson's suggestion, of course, is that the reader would
have instinctively assumed otherwise. On the attractiveness of government service to Jewish
lawyers in the New Deal period, see G. EDWARD WHITE, Felix Frankfurter, the Old Boy
Network, and the New Deal: The Placement ofElite Lawyers in Public Service in the 1930s, in
!NraRVENTION AND DETACHMENT: EsSAYS IN LEGAL HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE 149
(1994).
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lawyering might merely cloak the hegemonic worldview of the
dominant class - or, worse, the worldview of a still-mistrusted mi
nority - in the garments of scientific legitimacy.
What significance can one attach to the Realist/Progressive
background of NRA officials? Richberg certainly brought his back
ground into his conceptualization of the NRA's work. He lauded
the NRA's "utilization of scientifically gathered and organized in
formation as the basis for business policies, this intrusion of trained
and impartial economists into the councils of business" - despite
the business community's discomfort with giving a prominent role
to "book learning. "153

Does that background suggest anything

about the approach the NRA officials might have taken to the task
of class line-drawing? After all, decisions about which classes of
workers to subject to which New Deal labor policies were minor
decisions when viewed against the complex backdrop of NRA in
dustrial policy. It is safe to say that very few NRA administrators
were appointed to their positions on the basis of past expertise in
class line-drawing.154 How would REX, our reasonable expert, re
spond to this situation?
One might expect to see several strands of principle and prac
tice, at times harmonious and at times conflicting, woven together
in REX's class line-drawing work. First and foremost, if he lacked
prior experience or training on issues of class, he would have be
lieved that it was his job to

develop

expertise on the subject by be

coming intensely involved in factfinding. Furthermore, at least as a
matter of preference, his orientation would be purposive. His man153. Donald R. Richberg, Address at Luncheon of Merchants' Association of New York
7 (July 6, 1933) (transcript available in LC, Richberg Papers, Container 43, Speeches 1930Feb. 1933). Richberg's support of "scientific" policies seemed to end at the door to his own
department. He strongly objected, for example, to being required to conform the wages of
his own professional and clerical employees to those mandated by the government's system
of job classification. See Memorandum from Donald R. Richberg to Hugh Johnson 2 (Oct.
24, 1933) (LC, Richberg Papers, Container 45, Subject Fiie: NRA, Memoranda Sept.-Nov.
1933) (complaining that "the classification attempted simmers down to a demand that [staff]
be paid according to the judgment of someone by whom they are not employed and who is
not held responsible for their work").
154. Although Marshall had written on the subject of class as an economist, see infra note
289, few NRA administrators had expertise even in the core NRA field of industrial plan
ning. For the view that the NRA failed because of a failure of state autonomy and capacity
- i.e., the NRA's failure to set independent goals and to muster the expertise necessary to
carry them out - see FINEGOLD & SKOCPOL, supra note 93, at 10, 51-53, 64, 92-103. This
critique may not apply with equal force to NRA labor policy in general. See BRAND, supra
note 94, at 288 ("The most revealing characteristic of early New Deal labor policy is . . . that
progressive political elites were actively shaping policy to fulfill their own ideologically de
fined purposes rather than passively responding to interest group demands."). In the area of
the present study, it is more accurate to say that officials aspired to autonomy than to say
they achieved it.
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date, he would have assumed, was to identify and solve real-world
problems. REX would become frustrated by politics - both by
political interference in the factfinding process and by political
pressure to resolve questions before the data were in. Whether
REX could be an effective actor in the fast-moving world of the
New Deal would depend upon how well he could function once it
became clear that the environment of the administrative agency was
hardly that of the pure scientific laboratory. Thus, when Frances
Perkins recommended to Roosevelt in 1935 that he hire a political
scientist, someone with expertise in the workings of the political
system, the particular person she recommended was not lauded for
his academic credentials or his methodological purity. She de
scribed him instead, as "a real New Dealer but hard-headed and
realistic. No 'dreams of things to come' for him Just do it today
stuff."155
Finally, at least if the critics of Legal Realism were correct, we
can expect that REX would have significant cultural blind spots
that would interfere with his class line-drawing work. REX would
likely have a bit too much faith in his own objectivity, and would
likely underestimate the level of vigilance he would need to exert to
prevent the desires of the dominant classes from becoming law. His
rhetoric would emphasize government independence. His reality
would often fall short of the mark.
,

.

C.

Upper-Level Exemptions Under the NRA

We now tum to the "do it today" stuff of class line-drawing
under the NRA. The NIRA called for the formation of codes of
fair competition in all industries, and required that all codes of fair
competition comply with agreed-upon maximum hours and mini
mum wages. Although the NIRA did not itself specify the permis
sible wages and hours of labor, NIRA codes were to do so.
"[S]preading work" was understood to be the major goal of NIRA
hours regulation - rather than protecting "special types of work
ers" or eliminating "sweatshop conditions."156
155. Memorandum from Frances Perkins to President Roosevelt 2 (Mar. 12, 1935)
(Roosevelt Archives, President's Secretary's Ftle [hereinafter FDRIPSF], Box 57, Depart
mental Ftle, Labor).
156. LYON ET AL., supra note 94, at 389-90. Work-spreading preceded the NIRA as the
focus of administration hours policy. See, e.g., Letter from Frances Perkins to Donald R.
Richberg (Mar. 22, 1933) (LC, Richberg Papers, Container 1, Correspondence Feb.-May
1933) (conveying President's invitation to attend a conference on "[t]he emergency problems
having to do with distress due to unemployment and the method of overcoming the same,"
and listing "short hours as a means of further employment" on the agenda). Arthur
Dahlberg, the engineer whose work on the concept of work-spreading as a solution to the
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On the day the NIRA became law, President Roosevelt made a
speech in which he outlined the statute's intended coverage: it
would reach all business, and "[b]y 'business' I mean the whole of
commerce as well as the whole of industry; by workers I mean all
workers
the white-collar class as well as the men in overalls. "157
Roosevelt's announced desire to protect "all workers" including the
"white-collar class" raises the obvious question of how Roosevelt
defined the "white-collar class," and whether Roosevelt used the
term to include the "executive, administrative, and supervisory"
workers Sachs's memo excluded. In an article the following year,
census superintendent Alba Edwards excluded "managers, officials,
and professional persons" from his definition of the "white-collar"
classification.1 58 Roosevelt might have meant the same, but we can
not be sure. Indeed, all that remains of Roosevelt's file labeled
"white collar" is a designation on a list - the contents of the file
were not preserved by the Roosevelt Archives.1 59 It seems, how
ever, that Roosevelt's own administrative staff had its doubts about
the meaning of the term: an item cross-referenced to the white
collar file refers to it as the file on "the so-called 'white-collar'
class. "'160 The existence and scope of a "white-collar class" was,
-

unemployment problem influenced Hugo Black, see supra note 88, was by January 1934 on
Sachs's staff at the NRA's Research and Planning section. See Note from Jacob Baker, Fed
eral Emergency Relief Administration, to Col. Howe (Jan. 16, 1934) (FDR/OF 372, Hours of
Labor, Box 1, 1934 folder) (referring to Dahlberg as a member of the NRA staff and as "one
of the best nien on the theory of shorter hours in the country").

157. National Recovery Administration Bulletin No. 1, Statement by the President of the
United States of America Outlining Policies of the National Recovery Administration, in
LEWIS MAYERS, A HANDBOOK OF NRA LAws, REGULATIONS, CooES 27 (1933) , and in
JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 439. I found no preliminary drafts of or background materials on
this speech in the Roosevelt Archives. The speech itself is found in Roosevelt Archives,
President's Personal Ftles (hereinafter FDR/PPF], Speech Ftles, Box 15, No. 637, at 2-3.
Alba Edwards, The "White-Collar Workers," 38 MoNTIILY LAB. REV. 501, 501
The term "white collar," as used here, "excludes, on the one hand, proprietors, man
agers, officials, and professional persons; and it excludes, on the other hand, the 'overalls and
apron' workers - the skilled, the semiskilled, and the unskilled manual workers." Id.

158.

(1934).

159. Per Roosevelt Archives archivists, Dec. 1996. The listing for a "white-collar" file
places it in Roosevelt's alphabetical files; not all materials in the alphabetical files were pre
served. This brings to mind the following, in a letter from Roosevelt to Donald Richberg
when the latter was ill:
I always remember President Wtlson saying to me once - "Ninety-nine out of every one
hundred matters which appear to you and me today as of vital Administration policy will
be completely overlooked by history, and many other little things which you and I pay
but scant heed to will begin to be talked about one hundred years from now."

Letter from President Roosevelt to Donald Richberg (Dec. 28, 1934) (FDR/PPF 2418,
Donald Richberg). Pity the poor archivist with space constraints in light of this too-true
observation.

160. See Memorandum from President Roosevelt to Harry Hopkins (Apr. 15, 1935)
(FDR/OF 444, FERA, Box 2, Mar.-May 1935) (cross-referencing in handwriting to the file on
"the so-called 'white-collar' class").
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apparently, up for grabs - despite the fact that Roosevelt was
making speeches promising to protect it.
1.

Outline of the Spheres of NRA Activity

The core of administration policy under the NRA was the nego
tiation, approval, and enforcement of industrial codes.161 The first
industrial code, the Cotton Textile Code, was approved on July 20,
1933.162 As we shall see, the status of white-collar and upper-level
workers was debated during the cotton textile hearings, and the is
sue triggered Presidential intervention on behalf of the "white
collar classes." It was not until later in 1933 that the NRA began
work on the industrial code that would cause the greatest battles
over the status of white-collar workers: the code for the Daily
Newspaper Publishing Industry. There, we shall see, the impending
code-making process triggered the formation of the Newspaper
Guild, a union of newspaper editorial employees that organized to
resist the treatment of its members as upper-level employees ex
empt from hours regulation.
Because not all industries were sufficiently well-organized or
compliant to participate or succeed in rapid code-drafting, the ad
ministration quickly recognized that the industrial-code process
could not stand alone. In the earliest days of the NRA, the admin
istration developed a second, alternative strategy: the Blue Eagle.
The idea was that President Roosevelt would promulgate a boiler
plate agreement - called the President's Reemployment Agree
ment (the PRA) - which would specify minimum wages and
maximum hours.163 Any employer in a noncodified industry was
eligible to sign the PRA. Employer participation was voluntary,
161. The code negotiation process was as follows:
The draft of a code was submitted to the N.R.A. by the trade association or associations
within a particular industry. Public hearings were held before a deputy administrator, at
which all parties concerned were privileged to appear and make suggestions for changes.
The Labor Advisory Board, the Industrial Advisory Board, and the Consumer's Advi
sory Board were also consulted. Thereupon, a final draft of a code was framed by the
deputy administrator and submitted to the Administrator. If approved by him, it was
then submitted to the President, and if, in tum, approved by the President, with or with
out modifications, was promulgated as a code applicable to the entire coverage of that
industry.
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LAB., National Recovery Administration: La
bor Aspects, in BULLETIN No. 616, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 489, 505 (1936) [here
inafter NRA: Labor Aspects].
162. See Exec. Order Approving Code of Fair Competition for the Cotton Textile Indus
try, Approved Code No. 1 (July 9, 1933), microformed on Presidential Executive Orders and
Proclamations, CIS No. 1933-51-1 (Congressional Info. Serv.) [hereinafter CIS] .
163. According to Johnson, not more than 20% of industries and 10% of establishments
were organized into trade associations, and the non-PRA code process presumed the exist
ence of such associations to take the initiative in code drafting and to broker the appointment
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but strongly encouraged through techniques of both persuasion and
coercion. From the start, Roosevelt proposed "getting a list of the
big companies who will sign up the voluntary agreements and re
lease it for [the] morning papers and follow each day with a number
of big companies[.] I think the little fellows will follow the
leader." 164 Signatories would be authorized to advertise their com
pliance by displaying the new Blue Eagle insignia in their shops and
on their products. The NRA would then run an advertising cam
paign to encourage consumers to support the NRA by boycotting
nonsignatory businesses. The Blue Eagle program got underway
with the PRA's promulgation eleven days after the President's ap
proval of the Cotton Textile Code.16s
In addition to their work drafting and administering industrial
codes and the PRA, NRA officials were also involved in broader
research and policymaking on labor issues.

Independent poli

cymaking had a slow start. From the very beginning of the NRA,
the organization was criticized for the absence of a coherent strat
egy for policymaking on a centralized level. As early as one week
after the enactment of the NIRA, officials elsewhere in the
Roosevelt administration expressed concern that the NRA lacked a
coherent economic policy. Top officials in the Commerce Depart
ment noted that there was a "need for settling at once at least the
major questions of economic policy, both as to labor and industrial
questions, which will have to be applied as soon as the administra
tor and his deputies begin to pass upon codes. "166 There proved to
be good reason for concern that "if some consideration is not given
to these questions in advance and a body of principles adopted, one
administrator may decide one basic question in one way and an
other in another way and there will be the danger of a good deal of
confusion and appearance of disorder in the administration."167
of industry representatives to the code-enforcement authority. See JoHNSON, supra note 124,
at 254.
164. Letter from President Roosevelt to General Hugh S. Johnson (July 25, 1933) (FDR/
OF 466, NRA, Box 1, July 1933).
165. See A Plan to Raise Wages, Create Employment, and Thus Restore Business - The
President's Reemployment Agreement (July 27, 1933), microformed on CIS No. 1933-21-1
[hereinafter A Plan to Raise Wages].
166. Memorandum from John Dickinson, Assistant Secretary of Commerce, to President
Roosevelt, prepared on request of Daniel C. Roper, Secretary of Commerce 3 (June 23,
1933) {FDR/OF 466, NRA, Box 1, June 1933 folder). Sour grapes may have played a part in
Commerce's pessimistic appraisal of the NRA's competence. See FINEGOLD & SKOCPOL,
supra note 93, at 56 {discussing Roosevelt's decision not to place enforcement of the NIRA
in the hands of the Department of Commerce).
167. Memorandum from John Dickinson, supra note 166, at 3-4.

In
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all of their labor-related activities,

NRA

officials were in

volved in formulating official representations of the class system.
In the discussion that follows,

I present the treatment of upper-level

exemptions roughly chronologically - as reflected in the Cotton
Textile Code, the PRA, the Daily Newspaper Code, and the labor
policymaking activities of the Division of Review's policy office
under the leadership of Leon C. Marshall.

2.

The Cotton Textile Code

General Johnson approached the codemaking process by choos
ing one industry - the cotton textile industry - to focus on first,
with the expectation that other industries would follow suit "and
work out methods [for] . . . creating a shorter week and having the
work shared."168 Three days after Roosevelt's "white collar
classes" speech, Johnson had worked out the basic terms of the
code with the industry (with some labor representation). Although
he was "not completely satisfied with the code," he declared it
ready for public hearing and expedited action.169 Johnson expected
that "the first hearing was going to set the entire atmosphere of the
administration of the act, and emphasized the fact that it should be
very carefully conducted."170
A four-day public hearing on the proposed Cotton Textile Code
was convened on June 28, 1933.171 As presented at the hearing, the
draft Code provided for a maximum forty-hour workweek and ex
empted several types of employees: office and supervisory staff, re
p air shop crews, engineers, 172 watchmen, electricians, and
firemen.173

I shall refer to all but the office and supervisory exemp

tion as the exemption for "special crews." There is a marked con
trast between

the

hearing's

approach

to

special

crews

and

supervisory workers: the approach to special crews was purposive,
while the approach to supervisory workers was descriptive. As we
shall see, the purposive approach gave the ·officials presiding over
168. Discussion of Johnson's co=ents at meeting no. 1 of the Special Industrial Recovery Board 5 (June 19, 1933) (FDR/OF 466, NRA, Box 1, July 1933).
169. See id. at 6.
170. Id. at 10.
171. For the transcript, see National Archives, Record Group 9, National Recovery Ad
ministration [hereinafter NA/NRA], Records Maintained by the Library Unit, Transcripts of
Hearings 1933-35, Entry 44 Box 73.
172. See id. at V-8 (June 27, 1933) (testimony of Robert Amory). From context, it ap
pears that these engineers were shop-trained rather than college-trained.
173. It was the job of the "firemen" to maintain boiler and furnace fires - not, as in
co=on parlance, to put them out. See id. at V-8 (June 27, 1933) (testimony of Robert
Amory).
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the hearing (Johnson and W.L. Allen, the NRA deputy administra
tor for the cotton textile industry) a far better basis for resisting the
demands of the industry than did the descriptive approach.
Industry witness Robert Amory defended the special crews' ex
emption by pointing to the sporadic nature of demand and the
skilled nature of the work - in particular, the employer-specific
knowledge the work required.

The unpredictability of demand

made it obvious, at least to the industry, that it would be a waste of
money to hire multiple crews, since most of the day was spent wait
ing for something to go wrong and being prepared to handle emer
gencies.174 And, Amory argued, the need for knowledge of the
particular shop's equipment meant that you couldn't expect a
"green man" to be able to step in and do the work.175 Johnson and
Allen both resisted the notion that work-spreading could not suc
ceed among these kinds of workers. Johnson demanded to know,
for example, whether watchmen (who watch the machines to make
sure they are functioning properly) are under a foreman, with the
implication being that supervised work can be divided among a
number of workers.176 Amory insisted that although there is a fore
man, each watchman is responsible for the whole of the job177 - an
organization that Johnson and Allen correctly sensed is inconsistent
with normal workplace hierarchies.

Amory further argued that

these jobs are "supervisory"178 - in the sense that these workers
supervise mechanical processes and intervene only when they are in
need of correction, rather than being "processed" as labor by those
processes.179 Johnson seemed to agree, characterizing the work as
"an administrative, executive job," one that would take additional
training.180 But Johnson failed to see why the extra effort could not
be made to train more workers to do special-crews' work. In pur
posive terms, Johnson failed to see why there was anything about
174. See id. at V-8 (June 27, 1933) (testimony of Robert Amory).
175. See id.
176. See id. at X-9 (June 27, 1933) (questioning of Robert Amory by Gen. Johnson).
177. See id. at X-9 (June 27, 1933) (testimony of Robert Amory).
178. "I know, I have been an engineer and firemen under automatic stokers, and the job
is purely a supervisory job. It is hard work when something goes wrong; when anything does
not go wrong it is a question of staying awake to watch the thing. We used to stay on the job
72 hours." Id. at V-10 (JU'ne 27, 1933) (testimony of Robert Amory) (emphasis added).
179. The "supervisory" concept was not infinitely malleable even for Amory. He sug
gested earlier in the hearing that the most skilled hands in charge of the warp tying machine
- again, the skilled aristocracy of the mill
might be viewed as "supervisory," though he
backed down from that usage as soon as he suggested it. See id. at H-8 (June 27, 1933)
(testimony of Robert Amory).
180. Id. at X-10 (June 27, 1933) (testimony of Robert Amory).
-
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the nature of special crews' work that made it ill-suited to work
spreading.
Amory's answer was that the extra training would put too much
of a burden on "our supervisory men, who now work almost to the
breaking point, [and] would have to work that many more hours
and . . . be down at the mill at night."181 Tue most logical answer to
that problem, over the long term, would of course be to hire more
such "supervisory men." But Amory asserted that this was not pos
sible: "Supervisory staff I am passing over; I assume we will have to
use our regular men."182 Through his answer, Amory shifted the
debate from the flexible nature of repair work and the scarcity of
qualified repair men to the indivisibility of supervisory work. That
move seemed to satisfy Johnson and Allen - or, at the very least,
to silence them.
But why? There was an obvious response to Amory's assertion
that it would not be possible to increase the size of the supervisory
staff. After all, if a shop ran around the clock, the argument would
never have been made that the same supervisor needed to be on the
shop floor for twenty-four hours. Why, then, could the hours of
supervisors not track the shift hours of the workers they supervised,
with a short overlap for information-sharing? A purposive analyst
would have asked that question - but it was not asked. Tue fact
that Johnson and Allen failed to pursue this line of inquiry suggests
that, where supervisors were concerned, they were prepared to
abandon the purposive style of analysis motivating their
independent-minded response to the proposed special crews' ex
emption. Perhaps they simply thought, on a descriptive level, that
regulating the hours of supervisors would be in some sense inappro
priate - for reasons too obvious to require discussion.
"Office workers" were also exempted from hours regulation by
the Code as originally drafted, and no labor representatives came
forward at the hearing to argue on their behalf. To the contrary.
Tue most articulate labor representative at the hearing, William
Batty of the New Bedford Textile Council, argued that "[s]ince the
purpose of the Act is to spread employment it is clear that the op
portunity here afforded to absorb unemployed mechanics, engi
neers, electricians, firemen, etcetera, should not be lost."183 But he
was prepared to make no such argument for office workers - nor
181. Id. at X-10 (June 27, 1933) (testimony of Robert Amory).
182. Id. at X-10; V-11 (June 27, 1933) (testimony of Robert Amory).
183. Id. at 0-7 (June 28, 1933) (testimony of William E.G. Batty).
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did he take the position that office workers were not facing unem
ployment. He simply stated that the exemption for office workers,
like that for supervisors, was "legitimate"184 - without explaining
why work-spreading would not aid office workers.
Johnson spoke up - as did consumer advocates at the hearing
- and demanded an explanation for the exclusion of office work
ers. Amory argued to Johnson that office clerks are "working 80
hours a week" and that doubling them up was not an option.185
Johnson was not prepared to accept a broad exemption for office
workers: "I think we have to undertake a little inconvenience. If
officerworkers [sic] and the white collar class generally are ex
empted on account of the way they fit into the particular job we are
going to very, very seriously impair the operations" of the NRA.1 86
Here, Johnson was signaling that he was not prepared to entertain
even well-founded purposive arguments about the indivisibility of
white-collar work. Consumers' advocate Lucy Mason invoked the
President's "white collared classes" speech, saying that "I think the
President meant what he said when he said 'including white collar
workers.' " 1 87
In the end, the President did insist on extending maximum
hours protection to office workers as a condition of approving the
Cotton Textile Code.1 88 He did not, however, insist on coverage for
supervisors. As reflected in the final negotiations over the Cotton
Textile Code, including white-collar classes came to mean including
clerical workers but excluding supervisory workers.189
The seemingly easy decision to exclude supervisory workers
from hours restrictions did not end the controversy of supervisory
184. See id. at 0-7 (June 28, 1933) (testimony of William E.G. Batty).
185. See id. at V-10 (June 27, 1933) (testimony of Robert Amory).
186. Id. at X-8 (June 27, 1933) (statement by Gen. Johnson).
187. Id. at 40 (June 29, 1933) (testimony of Lucy Mason).
188. He accepted unlimited hours for special crews, but insisted that they be paid time
and a half for their overtime. See NAJNRA, Consolidated Approved Code Industries File
[hereinafter NA/NRA/CACI], B ox 1802, Code of Fair Competition for the Cotton Textile
Industry as Approved by Executive Order, July 9, 1933, NRA Release No. 331, at 2(4) and
2(6).
189. See the negotiations between Johnson and George A. Sloan, the head of the Cotton
Textile industry board, reflected in Transcript of Hearing 33 (June 30, 1933) (NA/NRA/CACI
Entry 44 Box 73). Johnson, for the record, summed up their negotiations by saying that "on
the question of exemptions of hours of labor which formerly applied to the white collared
man, there is some provision to be worked out." Sloan responded, "Yes sir. We state it
should be worked out by July 30th as to office employees, with a view to bringing them within
the provisions of the Code." Id.; see also NRA Press Release No. 25 (June 30, 1933) (FDR/
OF 466, NRA Box 1, June 1933 folder) (describing two days of posthearing consultations
between Sloan and NRA officials resulting in bringing office workers' hours within the 40
hour provision).
,

August 1998]

Class Line-Drawing

2261

workers under the Cotton Textile Code. Experience under the
Code revealed that the exemption for supervisory workers was dif
ficult to administer, because "supervisory" status was difficult to de
fine.190 In the course of enforcing the Code, the cotton textile
industry code authority defined "supervisory staff" to include "all
who direct the activity of others, such as executives, department
heads, superintendents, paymasters, foremen, overseers and second
hands."191 Leon C. Marshall and his assistant, fellow economist
Harry Weiss, took issue with this provision. Marshall reported to
the Labor Advisory Board that "the definition of the supervisory
staff seems to me to be not justifiable. It amounts to leaving the
matter in the discretion of the mill management."192 He objected,
in this regard, to the open-endedness of the phrase "all who direct
the activities of others" - an approach later codes had avoided.
He was prepared to concede that the code authority was under no
obligation to make changes to conform to other, later-enacted
codes. But, Marshall argued, "in any event insistence upon the
non-applicability of the provisions found in other codes does not
relieve [the cotton textile industry code authority] from the obliga
tion of defining 'supervisory staff' in such fashion that it will pro
mote a cooperative spirit between management and workers."193
The difficulty of defining "supervisory" work was (and remains)
a major problem for federal hours regulation. Indeed, the terms
"supervisory" and "executive" have been subject to what now seem
strange usages. Johnson, for example, was prepared to use the term
to describe the fireman's "supervision" of a furnace. It was often
the case that government actors, like Marshall here, rejected an in
dustry's definition of "supervisory" status without stating their own
view of what the correct definition should be. Marshall was not
generally shy about drawing the line between right and wrong. But,
as he noted, the NRA lacked the power to promulgate official defi
nitions of supervisory status and to insist that already-promulgated
190. The definition of office workers was also a problem. Regarding "office" workers, an
"explanation" tendered by the code authority in June 1934 categorized supply clerks and
attendants in supply rooms as "office" employees. NRA officials objected to this interpreta
tion, and it was rescinded. See Memorandum from C.W. Metcalf to R.I. Henry, President,
Duncan Mills, Inc. (July 19, 1934) (NA/NRA/CACI, Entry 25, Box 1807, Litigation Memos,
No. A-17).
191. Explanation of Cotton Textile Code provisions relative to wages and hours, com
piled and revised by direction of Code Authority 21 (May 15, 1934) (NA/NRA/CACI, Entry
25, Box 1807, Cotton Textile Code).
192. Memorandum from Marshall to Ruth Reticker and Clarence Blaue 2 (Aug. 16, 1934)
(NAINRA/CAF Entry 265, Leon C. Marshall Papers, Box 3).
193. Id.
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industry codes be amended to include them.194 Marshall did have a
measure of power in his policymaking role; he could shape the posi
tion that NRA officials would take in subsequent code develop
ment and enforcement. But in order to exercise that power,
Marshall thought it was necessary for the NRA to develop in
dependent knowledge.195 As we shall see, the agency never suc
ceeded in doing so. Thus, for lack of both power and information,
Marshall could not use the NRA's expertise to formulate any spe
cific definition that would more accurately state what it meant to be
a "supervisor" in the cotton textile industry.
With neither power nor expert knowledge, the best Marshall
thought he could do was to defer to the judgment of the industry's
own experts. At least he would then be able to keep the decisions
out of the hands of the non-experts in the mills, who could never
produce uniformity or the perception of fairness - both necessary
for maintaining a "cooperative spirit" between workers and man
agement. Marshall made no effort, -however, to shape the industry
experts' approach to the problem of defining supervisory work something he might well have been able to use his position to do.
He did not recommend to the industry that it take a hard purposive
look at which types of upper-level workers fell beyond the reason
able reach of work-spreading. Nor did he refer the industry to po
tential status-based distinctions that could form the basis of a
descriptive line-drawing approach (for example, distinctions be
tween those who routinely perform manual tasks in the course of
their working day and those who do not). Marshall was not suffi
ciently self-reflective about the fact that the experts' answers would
depend upon their questions - whether the experts were inside or
outside of government.
Turning to office workers, if Roosevelt and Johnson expected
that the inclusion of office workers in the Cotton Textile Code's
system of hours regulation would set the precedent for all codified
industry, they were wrong. As late as March 1934, the NRA Con
ference of Code Authorities and Trade Association Code Commit
tees included on its agenda a discussion about the "Possibilities of
Increasing Employment by including under labor provisions of
codes excepted classes of employees such as . . . Office Workers . " 1 96
194. See id.
195. See infra text accompanying notes 263-68.
196. Agenda for the conference of the National Recovery Administration 3 (Mar. 5,
1934) (FDR/OF 466, NRA, Box 2, Jan.-Mar. 1933).
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Without constant vigilance on the part of the administration, indus
tries continued to exempt office workers from hours regulation.
Why was it so difficult to enforce the administration's stated
policy of including office workers in the NRA's industry codes? In
strumental reasons certainly played a role. In many industries, of
fice workers faced peak seasons - inventory periods, for example
- and industries resisted being required to increase their perma
nent workforce to deal with temporary needs. Johnson provided a
clear answer to that objection: industry would have to find a way to
deal with the admitted inconvenience of NRA policy. Perhaps an
other reason for NRA underenforcement was administrability.
Given the difficulty of defining (excluded) supervisory workers, it
might have been easier for NRA administrators if the codes treated
all white-collar workers as excluded. Administrators might have
found it easier to determine white-collar as opposed to supervisory
status from job titles or rudimentary job descriptions. Politics also
likely played a part. Although consumer advocates were defending
the rights of white-collar workers, the workers themselves were not
organized - making their interests easier to ignore. But would
NRA staffers ignore Roosevelt's announced policies merely be
cause white-collar workers were not organized? The lack of unions
to defend the interests of white-collar workers might, instead, have
caused the NRA staff to see the defense of white-collar interests as
part of their

own

job - as Johnson did at the cotton textile hear

ings. It might well be that the best explanation for why office work
ers were so often excluded from the hours regulation provisions of
industry codes lies in the symbolic sphere. Despite Roosevelt's
stated policies, NRA staffers may have subscribed to the view that
office work carries too high a status to be subjected to hours limita
tions. One can hardly expect government actors to become advo
cates for a position they do not believe - especially in the absence
of effective central policy oversight or interest-group pressure.
3.

Upper-Level Exemptions in the PRA

Three major groups of employees were recognized in the PRA.
One group, composed of factory workers, mechanical workers, and
artisans, was assigned a maximum workweek of thirty-five hours
and a maximum work day of eight hours, but could be required to
work a maximum week of forty hours, without overtime, for up to
six weeks in every year.197 This gave employers the flexibility to
197. See A Plan to Raise Wages, supra note 165.

2264

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 96:2212

work their employees longer hours during seasonal peak periods.
"Accounting, clerical, banking, office, service, or sales employees
(except outside salesmen)" had a longer maximum work week forty hours - but with no provision for seasonal peaks . 1 98 Their
daily work hours were unrestricted.199 The third group of employM
ees - "registered pharmacists or other professional persons emM
ployed in their profession" (regardless of pay) and "employees in a
managerial or executive capacity, who now receive more than $35 a
week" - was exempted from any maximum hours provision.200
Almost as soon as the PRA was promulgated, it became the
subject of revision and interpretation by NRA officials, either
across-the-board or in negotiations with particular businesses.201
NRA interpretations of "other professional persons employed in
their profession" reflected the difficulties of the line-drawing reM
quired by the PRA. For example, hospital technicians were
grouped with nurses and doctors (including interns) as profession
als, but engineers in radio and "other highly technical professions"
were only presumed to be professionals, subject to employee disM
proof.202 Newspaper reporters were deemed professionals, as were
newspaper photographers, along with "rewrite men and other
members of editorial staffs"203 - characterizations that were em
battled from the start and became more so once the Daily Newspa
p er Code was developed. Embalmers were held to be
professionals, while funeral directors were declared exempt without
deciding whether they were professionals (who were exempt with
out regard to salary) or executives (who were exempt only if their
198. See id.
199. Note that the minimum wage under the PRA for these white-collar workers was
lower than the minimum wage for the manual worker group 371h cents an hour as opposed
to 40 cents an hour.
200. See NRA Bulletin No. 3, President's Reemployment Agreement 7 (July 20, 1933)
{NA/NRA Consolidated Administrative File [hereinafter NAINRA/CAF], Entry 27, Box
6860).
201. The PRA was amended, for example, to eliminate the "tolerance" for six yearly
forty hour weeks for factory/mechanical employees, to permit instead two weeks of extended
hours for year-end inventories at a time-and-a-half rate, and to alter the wage differentials for
small communities. See id. at 7-8. At the same time, employers were securing individually
tailored alterations of the PRA's core wage and hour requirements, often with little scrutiny
from the agency. Some of these changes entirely excluded office workers or subjected them
to peak hours provisions. See NRA Press Release No. 180 (Aug. 4, 1933) (NAINRA/CAF
Box 6860, Entry 27). I found no PRA interpretations in the files on "executive" or "manage
rial" in the interpretations files.
202. See General Interpretations and Explanations of the President's Reemployment
Agreement, made by the Policy Board and Authorized Councils and Officials 24-25 (n.d.)
(NAlNRA/CAF, Entry 27, Box 6860) (citing NRA Bulletin No. 4, Interpretation No. 6).
203. See id. (citing NRA Bulletin No. 4, Interpretation No. 19).
-
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salaries were $35 a week or more).204 Nowhere did the NRA offi
cials engaged in this line drawing articulate a set of overarching
principles that could operate as a definition of "professional."
The PRA was not promulgated as a set of mandatory minimum
terms for industrial codes. Nonetheless, Johnson took the position
that the minimum-salary approach to the definition of executives
and managers was binding on all industry (including codified indus
tries), an approach he deemed necessary "in order to prevent eva
sions and the giving of meaningless titles to minor employees to
exempt them from the hours provisions":205
There are provisions in various codes excepting from the limita
tion upon hours of those described as "managers" or "executives" and
complaint has been received that in many instances employees are
classified as "managers" or "executives" either for the purpose, or
with the result, of exempting them from limitations upon hours. It
has not been the intention of the Administration in approving such
exceptions to provide for the exemption of any persons other than
those who exercise real managerial or executive authority, which per
sons are invested with responsibilities entirely different from those of
the wage earners and come within the class of the higher salaried
employees.
It will be presumed that no employee receiving less than $35 per
week will be classified as a "manager" or "executive" .
206
.

.

.

Industry groups immediately complained, and, as was so often the
case, the NRA capitulated. For example, when the secretary of the
Cotton Textile Institute simply pointed out that "in cotton mills
there are a good many overseers and second hands that direct the
activity of others who are not paid as much as $35 per week,"207 an
NRA official told him that the new interpretation "is not meant to
upset any present interpretation of the Cotton Textile Code."2os
The failure of the codes to adhere to the $35 per week rule for
exempt managers was criticized by the National Consumers'
League, which also saw the issue as one of "code evasion":

In order to evade restrictions on working hours, many employers
raise the wages of a worker a few dollars, give him a title of "execu
tive," and make him work unlimited hours. A South Carolina print
ing company has a number of operatives called "executives" paid
between $16 and $18 a week, who work up to 70 hours a week, while
204. See id. (citing Card No. 1341).
205. NRA: Labor Aspects, supra note 161, at 502.
206. Id.
207. Letter from Paul B. Halstead to W.S. Nicholson (Nov. 1, 1933) (NA/NRA/CACI
Entry 25, Box 1807, Cotton Textile).
208. Letter from W.S. Nicholson to Paul B. Halstead (Nov. 2, 1933) (NA/NRA/CACI
Entry 25, Box 1807, Cotton Textile).
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a department store in Ohio has "promoted" all the men in one de
partment to executive rank in order to avoid the limited work
week.209

The League's proposal was that "[e]very class or group of employ
ees should be covered by the hours provisions of codes, except ex
e,cutives and supervisors who receive $35.00 or more per week ."210
This wage minimum for upper-level status was thought to be suffi
cient to solve the problem of "evasion of the intent of codes
through misleading classification of employees. "21 1
The opinion among those protective of labor interests, then, was
that fraud and evasion could not be avoided without two elements
that eventually became central to the FLSA approach to upper
level exemptions: a "duties" test - that is, a commitment on the
part of the government to scrutinize the actual duties performed by
someone whose job is labeled exempt - and a minimum-salary test
- used to make sure that the employer's representations that a job
is highly valued is matched by its compensation. The political
weakness of the NRA, resulting from the centrality of business vol
untarism under the statutory scheme, meant that NRA officials did
not have the power to insist on the duties and salary-minimum ap
proach. But their desire to use those approaches reflected the view
that government should be acting independent of the business com
munity, by refusing to take employers' labeling of their employees'
jobs as dispositive of their true nature. This independence was al
most impossible to achieve in the political climate of the NRA code
process.
In any event, wage-minimum requirements are imperfect mech
anisms for restricting employers' unilateral power to classify their
employees. All a wage-minimum requires is that an employer pay
an employee consistent with the employer's desired categorization.
The employer can be expected to take this opportunity when, and
only when, its economic self-interest so dictates - meaning that the
employer's self-interest is still in control. If the NRA were aiming
only to protect the economic interests of the employed, a demand
for consistency would satisfy statutory aims: it would mean that
employers would be free to call people executives as long as they
paid them executive-level salaries. But the goal of hours regulation
209. Statement of Mary W. Dawson, National Consumer's League, at the NRA Confer
ence in Washington 2 (Feb. 28, 1934) (FDR/OF 466, NRA Box 6, Codes Misc 1934, March 2,
1934).
210. National Consumer's League's Proposed Principles for Labor Provisions of NRA
Codes 2 (Dec. 7, 1933) (FDR/OF 466, NRA Box 6, Codes Misc 1934).
211. Id. at 3.
,

,
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Allowing an employer to

avoid hiring and training additional workers merely by raising the
salaries of those workers it already employed would stand in the
way of alleviating unemployment.
Duties requirements are better tailored than are minimum sal
ary requirements to the goal of achieving government control over
the job-classification process. But duties requirements are difficult
to administer. While routine payroll records reflect weekly salaries,
official job descriptions - if they exist - often fail to reflect the
mix of tasks an employee in fact performs. A true check on em
ployer power would require a duties test that was built on enforce
ment through on-site inspection or vigorous litigation, neither of
which the NRA contemplated.
Throughout the PRA-triggered discussion of fraud, evasion, and
the need to limit the exemption to "true" executives, NRA officials
were never clear about

why

executives should be exempt. Was it

because executive work was not amenable to work-spreading? Be
cause executive unemployment was not enough of a problem to
bother with? Because it would be inconsistent with the high status
of executives to force them to punch a time clock? Or because ex
ecutives were unrepresented in the political process? In other
words, was the NRA's approach here purposive, descriptive, or
purely political? The lack of a clear focus likely would have under
mined NRA enforcement efforts even if the agency had been given
the power to have its way.
4.

Daily Newspaper Industry Code

Newspaper reporters and photographers were active in shaping
the legal treatment of white-collar workers, both under the NRA
and, as we shall see later, under the FLSA. When the NRA began,
editorial workers in daily newspapers (writers, editors, reporters,
photographers) were not unionized - in sharp contrast to the suc
cessful unionization of the skilled blue-collar workers in the indus
try.

On August 7, 1933, Heywood Broun, an influential and

politically active leftist columnist,212 published a letter from a dis
gruntled newspaper reporter that put the status and economic fu
ture of editorial newspaper workers in the Depression directly at
issue:

25,

212. For a discussion of Braun's radical activism and influence, see DENNING, supra note
at 14-15.
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The men who make up the papers of this country would never look
upon themselves as what they really are - hacks and white-collar
slaves. Any attempt to unionize leg, rewrite, desk or makeup men
would be laughed to death by these editorial hacks themselves.
Union? Why, that's all right for 'dopes' like printers, not for smart
guys like newspapermen.213

In response to this letter, Broun committed himself to forming a
union of newspaper editorial workers.214 The NRA was an impor
tant part of his motivation as well. The agency scheduled hearings
on a proposed industry code for the Daily Newspaper Industry for
September 22, 1933, and Broun held the mass meeting that
culminated in the founding of the Newspaper Guild on September
17
in time for the Guild to participate in the planned hearing.21s
-

And participate the Guild did. The Guild's position was that
editorial workers were in grave need of work-spreading, and that a
forty-hour maximum week should apply to them as well as to pro
duction workers.216 The proposed code said nothing specific about
the hours of editorial workers. Instead, its Paragraph 8 exempted
"professionals" and "executives" earning $35 a week or more from
hours regulation. Little was said at the hearing by industry wit
nesses about how far down the editorial ranks this exemption would
go. Representations had been made that reporters would be sub
ject to hours regulation, but as counsel for the Guild in New York
pointed out, "a careful scrutiny of the code will reveal that that as
sumption is unwarranted by anything that is contained in the code
itself."217 The Guild had good reason to worry. The PRA's official
interpretation had classified "newspaper reporters, editorial writers,
rewrite men and other members of editorial staffs" as profession213. Script and Program for the Heywood Broun Memorial Meeting, Manhattan Center
5 (Feb. 12, 1940) (Roosevelt Archives, Gardner Jackson Papers, Box 12, Folder, Heywood
Broun) (quoting letter).
214. For a discussion of the activity of other white-collar unions in the period, see
DENNING, supra note 25, at 15; KocKA, supra note 5, at 206-34. The Newspaper Guild was
unique in its level of participation in the NRA process. In contrast, for example, the Retail
Clerks' International Protective Association (RCIPA), a union of retail clerks that affiliated
with the AFL in 1888, was not strong enough to play more than a "minor role" in the forma
tion of the NRA Retail Code in 1933. See id. at 55 (formation); id. at 211 (NRA role).
215. On Braun's motivation, see Heywood Broun, NRA Set Up a Spring Board and it
Worked, GUILD REP., Nov. 23, 1933, at 1 (on file in Wayne State University Archives of
Labor and Urban Affairs, Newspaper Guild Papers [hereinafter WSU/Guild]) ("The Na
tional Recovery Act was the direct inspiration for the organization of the Newspaper Guild
of New York.").
216. For discussions of work-spreading, see, e.g., Hearing on Code of Fair Practices and
Competition for the Newspaper Publishing Industry (Code 507-1-05) 1392 (Sept. 22, 1933)
[hereinafter Sept. 1933 Newspaper Hearing] (NA/NRA/CAF Entry 44, Records Maintained
by Library Unit, Transcripts of Hearings, Box 95) (testimony of Lloyd White).
217. Id. at 1362 (testimony of Alexander Lindsey).
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als.218 It would have been foolish to trust that the Code would be
different.
Guild witnesses objected on clearly purposive grounds to any
provision that would exclude editorial workers from hours
regulation.
Since the publishers have admitted the principle of the forty hour
week in their proposed Code, any exemption of a particular group of
their employees should be supported by a clear showing by these pub
lishers of insurmountable technological or economic difficulties which
would dictate such an exemption.

In the case of editorial workers this cannot be demonstrated from
the facts of daily newspaper editorial operation.
Granting that the production of an editorial worker cannot be me
tered, we submit that the production of news and other editorial con
tent does not differ from the production of any other commodity in its
essentials or in the meaning of the Recovery Act.219

To the Guild, the mere fact that editorial employees could not, "like
mechanical and factory employees . . . start and stop with the whis
tle,"220 was not a sufficient functional justification for exempting
them from hours regulation. In the view of Guild witnesses, if re
porters (particularly on afternoon papers) were "working 70 hours
a week when no emergency existed," "[t]he simple solution . . . is to
hire reporters to absorb this excess work."221
Guild witnesses conceded to the industry that some editorial
workers ought not be subject to hours regulation. The question was
drawing the line. Here again, the Guild's orientation was purpo
sive. Guild witnesses harshly criticized the notion that some report
ers were "professionals," and that they could be identified by high
salary or by the possession of a by-line or by status as a colum
nist.222 As to the boundaries of "executive" status, the Guild was
willing to "except editors in chief and managing editors . . . because
they are executives in fact," but found it inappropriate to exempt
"sub-editors" because "[t]heir work can well be spread over a
greater number of men."223
Guild witnesses also signaled that even if the classification
scheme in the proposed code were understood in descriptive terms
218.
PRA).
219.
White).
220.
221.
222.
223.

NRA Press Release No. 147 (July 28, 1933) (NAJNRA/CAF Entry 27 Box 6860,
Sept. 1933 Newspaper Hearing, supra note 216, at 1393-94 (testimony of Lloyd
Id. at 1421 (testimony of Andrew Parker).
Id. at 1411 (testimony of Lloyd White).
See id. at 1419-21 (testimony of Andrew Parker).
Id. at 1395 (testimony of Lloyd White).
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as embodying a set of status distinctions, the Guild was willing to
make the status sacrifice necessary to come within NRA hours reg
ulation. That stance transgressed cultural norms - so much so that
the hearing transcript notes that many of the Guild's witnesses'
comments were met with laughter.

Among them were the

following:
We object to being classified as professional men and women for the
purpose of depriving us of the NRA.224
[Designating reporters who earn more than $35 a week as profession
als] is the highest compliment that has been paid to us since Edmund
Burke looked above the clock in the House of Commons one day and
dubbed us the Fourth Estate.225
We feel that we are members of a craft.
Professionals, as we understand it, are persons engaged in a life
work which has some minimum requirements for enterance [sic] into
it, some test for competency, and some examination, and perhaps
even a code of ethics. Of these we have none. We have none except
as the decency of the individual might dictate. . . .
. . . . My own proposition is that we would like to be brought in as
simple craftsmen and taken up on the heights of the Blue Eagle in
stead of being let down in the valley of ragged [sic] individualism.226

Why laughter? Part of the reason must have been that the very
eloquence of the testimony belied the claim that the witnesses were
simply "members of a craft." But not all of the statements that trig
gered laughter had the self-aware and ironical turns of phrase that
so often marked the Guild's testimony. I suspect, then, that part of
the laughter was

nervous

laughter - laughter at the awkwardness

of white-collar workers violating the norins of social hierarchy by
committing status hara-kiri on the witness stand. Their message
was clear: false consciousness on the part of newspaper reporters
was standing in the way of their economic interests. Witnesses
commented that "newspaper men . . . have lived in an atmosphere
of quixotism . . . . Their idealism has been their weakness to be
exploited by the publishers,"227 and they have been "lulled to sleep
by

publishers
exalted. "228

who

make

them believe

that

their jobs

are

The NRA response to the forceful participation of the Guild
was to express frustration that so little information was available on
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1366 (testimony of Doris Fleeson, New York Daily News).
at 1367 (testimony of Edward Angly).
at 1367-68.
at 1402-03 (testimony of Lloyd White).
at 1419-20 (testimony of Andrew Parker).
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editorial employees. The NRA's Division of Economic Research
and Planning noted in a November report that salaried workers
made up close to half of the newspaper workforce and that it was
important to pay close attention to them. But the Division ac
knowledged that "there are no figures available reflecting employ
ment conditions pertaining to office and editorial workers in the
newspaper industry" and that "lacking any definite statistical basis
it is impossible to make any estimate of the probable increase in
employment that the adoption of the code provisions will entail."229
Furthermore, the proposed code would set not only maximum
hours, but also minimum wages for different categories of employ
ees in the industry. Little was known about existing and historic
compensation levels for editorial workers. Absent better data,
NRA officials felt helpless.
By December, the Newspaper Guild had succeeded in getting
President Roosevelt's attention. Roosevelt was aware of the
Guild's complaints that the proposed code as written did not sub
stantiate Johnson's assurances that reporters would not be treated
as "professionals."230 Roosevelt met with Guild leaders on Decem
ber 11, 1933,231 and with Broun on February 1, 1934.232 Although
Roosevelt approved the industry's proposed code on February 17,
his executive order provided that additional work would be done to
pin down the status of editorial employees: "[t]he determination of
hours and wages for news department workers shall be made not
later than 60 days hence."233 And in his public announcement,
Roosevelt added the following:
The publishers of newspapers having a circulation of seventy-five
thousand or more in cities of seven-hundred and fifty thousand popu
lation or more are requested to install a five day, forty hour week for
their staff of reporters and writers with the purpose of giving employ
ment to additional men and women in this field. A report on this will
be made at the end of sixty days.234
229. Saul Nelson, The Newspaper Industry {1st ed. Nov. 11, 1933) (NAINRA/CAF Entry .
26, Box 6410, NRA Division of Economic Research and Planning).
230. See Memorandum from S.T.E. to Mr. Mcintyre (Dec. 8, 1933) (FDR/OF 466, NRA,
Box 5, Codes N) (noting upcoming meeting with the Guild).
231. See WSU/Guild, What the Guild Told Roosevelt at a Tea Party, GUILD REP., Jan. 12,
1934.
232. See Note Appended to Telegram from Heywood Broun to President Roosevelt (Feb.
1, 1934) (FDR/OF 466, NRA Box 5, Codes N).
233. Executive Order, Code of Fair Competition for the Daily Newspaper Publishing
Business, Feb. 17, 1934, CIS 1934-E0-6606-G.
234. Letter from President Roosevelt to General Hugh S. Johnson (Feb. 17, 1934) (FDR/
OF 466, NRA, Box 5, Codes N).
,
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In response to Roosevelt's request, the Guild and the Industry
both went about the task of gathering data on the occupational and
wage structure of editorial work. The Guild worked in cooperation
with the NRA Division of Planning and Research in developing its
data.235 In December and January - well off the sixty-day mark a hearing was held at which conflicting data sets submitted by the
Guild, the industry, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics236 were dis
cussed and the proposals of the industry and the Guild were ad
dressed.237

Thereafter,

the

Research

and

Planning

Division

continued to study the issue, and the proposed amendments were
considered by NRA officials from February through April of 1935 .

The Guild was relatively late in coming forward with its pro
posed amendments, submitting them on January 17.

What the

Guild proposed was a five-day, forty-hour week for editorial work
ers throughout the country, with exceptions for emergencies, and
with premium pay for overtime. The Guild's hours proposal did
not come as a surprise, given the tenor of its earlier testimony. The
Guild's minimum wage recommendation was $45 per week,238
which was in excess of what Guild witnesses had recommended in
the initial hearings,239 in excess of the industry's proposal of a mini
mum wage ranging from $12 to $25 per week depending on city
size,240 and was later characterized by the NRA's Research and
235. See Transcript of Public Hearing Called by the Code Authority of the Daily Newspa·
per Publishing Business 51 (Apr. 30, 1934) (NA/NRA/CAF Entry 44, Records Maintained by
the Library Unit, Transcripts of Hearing, Box 96, Code 507-1-05) (testimony of Jonathan
Eddy at the Waldorf Astoria in New York); see also Letter from Jack Tate to Jonathan Eddy
(Dec. 20, 1934) (NA/NRA, Amendments, Box 1923) (referring to "the survey conducted by
the Division of Research and Planning of the National Recovery Administration in coopera
tion with the Guild").
236. See Transcript of Hearing on Code of Fair Competition for the Daily Newspaper
Publishing Industry (Dec. 5, 1934) (NA/NRA/CAF Entry 44, Records Maintained by the
Library Unit, Box 95). The Bureau of Labor Statistics of the Department of Labor got in·
volved in data-collection and analysis at the request of the Guild. See Letter from Jack Tate
to Jonathan Eddy (Dec. 20, 1934), supra note 235, at 1.
237. See Transcript of Hearing on Code of Fair Competition for the Daily Newspaper
Publishing Industry (Dec. 5, 1934), supra note 236.
238. For the proposal, see Guild Seeks $45 Minimum for News Men; Asks National Five
Day Week in Code Plan, GUILD REP., Jan. 15, 1935 (NA/NRA/CACI, Amendments, Box
1923).
239. See Sept. 1933 Newspaper Hearing, supra note 216, at 1363 (testimony of Alexander
Lindsey) (urging "a minimum scale for all newspaper writers, as follows: $20 [per week] for
all newspaper men of less than one year's experience; $30 for all newspaper men having
between one and two years of experience; and a minimum of $40 for all newspaper men of
over two years experience" on all papers).
240. See NRA Press Release No. 9685, Press Memo No. 1 (Jan. 17, 1935) (NA/NRA
Consolidated Approved Industry Ftles, Amendments, Box 1923).
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Planning Division as "far in excess of anything the publishers would
agree to, if not in excess of a fair proposal."241
The Guild's position on the minimum wage for editorial workers
is of relevance to the hours-regulation inquiry because the Guild's
insistence on a high salary minimum may well have undercut its
argument that editorial workers were ordinary workers with no spe
cial status.242 Why might this have been the case? After all, there
need not have been any contradiction between resisting profes
sional status and insisting on high wages. At the 1933 hearings,
Frank Morrison, the Secretary of the American Federation of La
bor, had complained that editorial workers "on the average receive
weekly salaries far below the wages paid to the skilled workers em
ployed in the production of the same publications. "243 Seeking par
ity with skilled blue-collar workers would not undercut the Guild
witnesses' notion that "[n]ewspaper editorial knowledge is . . . the
same type of knowledge as that possessed by the bricklayer who has
learned by practice to build a wall to plumb."244 But the reason
Morrison gave for his demand for higher wages did not rest on par
ity with equivalent skills across the collar-color line. Instead, he
drew on the perceived class superiority of the editorial workers. He
noted the "higher degree of education required and the higher stan
dard of living expected" of editorial workers when he said:
There is no more influential or more important body in our country
than those who gather, write, or edit the news. The public look to
them for unbiased reports of the doings of our everyday life. We ex
pect them to be capable and fair. In order that these men and women
may be able to live in decency and comfort it is essential that they
receive a minimum weekly salary which will permit of their maintain
ing such a standard of living.245

Here the story is one of status, pure and simple, and is redolent of
the Lynds' argument that engineers, teachers, preachers, and so
forth should be considered part of the business class because the
"business interests of the city . . . dominate and give their tone to"
241. Letter from Spencer Reed, Chief, Unit 9, Research and Planning Division, to Gustav
Peck, Assistant Administrative Officer, and Jack Tate, Administrator, Division VII (Mar. 22,
1935) (NA/NRA Consolidated Approved Industry Ftle, Amendments, Box 1923).
242. To keep the scope of this article clear, I am not exploring the issue of maintaining
appropriate "wage differentials," particularly regarding "wages in the higher brackets." But
this was a question of pervasive concern throughout the NRA period and is an important
part of the broader story of class line-drawing through New Deal programs. I hope to tum to
it in subsequent writing.
243. Sept. 1933 Newspaper Hearing, supra note 216, at 1451 (testimony of Frank
Morrison). Tue AFL represented five locals of newspaper writers.
244. Id. at 1402 (testimony of Lloyd White).
245. Id. at 1451-52 (testimony of Frank Morrison).
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them.246 If the newsreading public - the middle-class public - is
to trust newspaper reporting, it has to be able to see news reporters
as members of their own class, and for this reason news reporters
must be paid well enough to keep them middle class.
Indeed, testimony at the hearings on behalf of the Guild by Dr.
Willard Bleyer, a journalism professor at the University of Wiscon
sin and a spokesman for the Council on Education for Journalism,
underscored the status-based arguments in favor of a high wage for
journalists.
It has been shown that representative newspaper editors of both
large and small daily newspapers have gone on record, as favoring the
recruiting of their news and editorial staffs from college graduates.
Any scale of minimum wages for news and editorial workers on
daily papers must be sufficiently high to encourage young men and
young women to obtain a college education . . . .
The newspaper reading public is entitled to have the day's news,
as 'the food of opinion,' gathered, written, and edited by mature,
competent, well-educated reporters, correspondents, and copy read
ers, and to be protected against unsatisfactory reporting and editing
by immature, half-educated youngsters.247
This testimony was far from the tone of the Guild's 1933 testimony,
and made clear that the view of "newspapermen" as members of
the working class was contested from within the academy by the
contrary view of "journalism" as a budding profession.

It would have been

possible

for the NRA both to accept this

justification for high wages and to accept the argument, where
hours are concerned, that editorial workers are merely skilled
craftsmen whose tool of choice is the pen rather than the trowel .
The NRA could have done so by taking a descriptivist approach to
wages and a purposive approach to hours. The NRA could have
concluded that editorial work is just as susceptible to work
spreading as is skilled manual work, even though editorial work is
higher in social status and thus ought to command a higher wage.248
246. See discussion of LYND & LYND, MIDDLETOWN supra text accompanying notes 5055.
247. NRA Press Release No. 9685, Press Memo No. 4, at 3 (Jan. 17, 1935) (NA/NRA
Consolidated Approved Industry Files, Amendments, Box 1923); see also NRA Press Re
lease No. 9685, Press Memo No. 5, at 3 (Jan. 17, 1935) (NA/NRA Consolidated Approved
Industry Files, Amendments, Box 1923) (discussing statement by Mrs. Gladys Whitley
Henderson, national president of Theta Sigma Phi, professional fraternity for women in jour
nalism: "the proposed minimum wage is not even a decent living wage, much less an incen
tive for spending four years or more obtaining the academic and professional training that
editors now demand").
248. Of course, it was not always clear that higher status meant that a job should receive
higher pay. See NRA Press Release No. 9685, Press Memo No. 3, at 2 (Jan. 17, 1935) (NN
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But this would have required a degree of self-reflection about the
different approaches to class line-drawing that was never achieved
by the NRA. For this reason, the Guild's insistence on a high mini
mum wage undercut its position on the susceptibility of editorial
workers to hours regulation.
In February, the Research and Planning Division wrote to the
officials in charge of formulating the NRA's position on the amend
ments (Jack Tate, the Divisional Administrator in charge of the
Graphic Arts Division of the NRA,249 and Gustav Peck, Assistant
to the Administrative Officer), objecting to the industry's proposed
hours provisions. The industry insisted on a maximum work week
of forty-eight hours for small cities on the grounds that otherwise a
reporter might have to be pulled from an assignment in midstream.
This argument was deemed "specious," in that "many competent
editorial men now out of work could be had when necessary," and
that exceptions "could be granted to avoid proven hardship."250
The NRA's Labor Advisory Board also objected to the proposed
amendment because of its failure to adopt a clear definition of cov
ered "news department employees" and its failure to adopt a forty
hour limit on weekly work for news department employees in all
markets.251 Nonetheless, Tate recommended to the National Indus
trial Recovery Board in April that the amendments be approved
without change - despite the contrary recommendation by his Re
view Officer that "[t]his amendment is not believed to be consistent
with policy."252
Tate opened with the following comment - taking an official
stand on the long-fought question of the craft versus professional
nature of reporting:
NRA Consolidated Approved Industry Files, Amendments, Box 1923) (testimony of Guild
Counsel Morris Ernst) {"We have heard that one of the reasons for a low wage scale is that
there is romance in the business . . . . The man who owns the newspaper is not a competent
judge of the romance. The workers would prefer a decent wage to romance - they can get
the romance outside the office."). Alternatively, minimum wages could have been set solely
on the basis of the ability of the industry to pay. See id.
249. Tate was a lawyer; he was identified as Division Counsel in May of 1934. Letter
from Jack Tate to Solomon Barkin (May 2, 1934) (NAINRA/CACI, Amendments, Box 1923).
250. Memorandum from Spencer H. Reed (Feb. 13, 1935) (NAINRA/CACI, Code Histo
ries, Box 1937).
251. See Memorandum from Clyde Mills to Jack Tate, Division Administrator (Mar. 2,
1935) {NAINRA/CACI, Amendments, Box 1923).
252. Memorandum from Jack B. Tate to National Industrial Recovery Board 1 {Apr. 27,
1935) (NAINRA/CACI, Amendments, Box 1923). For the Review Officer's memo, see
Memorandum from Review Officer to Division Administrator, Graphic Arts Division (n.d.)
{NAINRA/CACI, Amendments, Box 1923, Serial No. 9190).
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I think it is open to question whether a policy applicable to a manu
facturing industry . . . should be considered as necessarily applicable
to such an industry as that of newspaper publishing. . . . [T]he nature
of the work done by News Department Employees is such that it may
be considered as falling within an unchartered [sic] area between
craftsmanship and a profession.253

For this reason, Tate rejected the Review Officer's insistence on the
forty-hour week:
The Review Officer, in his first exception, recommends that any
deviation from the strict policy of a 40 hour week . . . cannot be sup
ported. I believe that no specific answer is possible to this exception,
but the general arguments listed above do apply, in particular that
argument having to do with the nature of the work done by these
employees and the fact that such work is closer to a profession than a
craft.254

The Review Officer also objected to the scope of the amendments'
exemption of upper-level editorial workers. The amendment pro
vided an exemption from hours regulation to "persons employed in
a managerial, executive or personal capacity, to editorial writers, to
employees on out-of-town assignments," and to certain correspon
dents.255 These exemptions were in fact broader than those listed in
the original code. The Review Officer took the position that
"[p]olicy demands that the employees enumerated in this section
receive not less than $35 per week before allowed exemption from
the maximum hours provision."256 Tate's response was that "[i]t is
my opinion that while such a minimum may be desirable for the
majority of coded industries, it is not necessarily sound policy for
this industry."257 The memorandum to Leon Marshall recom
mending approval made no mention whatsoever of the conflict over
hours limits and hours exemptions.258 The amendment was ap
proved by the National Industrial Recovery Board on May 2.259
Thus after two years of work, the Newspaper Guild failed to
secure its desired combination of high status for purposes of the
253. Memorandum from Jack B. Tate to National Industrial Recovery Board, supra note
252, at 1.
254. Id. at 2.
255. Id..
256. Memorandum from Review Officer to Division Administrator, Graphic Arts Divi
sion, supra note 252, at 2.
257. Memorandum from Jack B. Tate to National Industrial Recovery Board, supra note
252, at 2.
258. See Memorandum from Gustav Peck to Leon C. Marshall 2 {Apr. 29, 1935) (NA/
NRA/CACI, Amendments, Box 1923).
259. See Amendment to Code for the Daily Newspaper Publishing Business 1 {May 2,
1935) {NAINRAICACI, Amendments, Box 1923).
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minimum wage and "ordinary worker" status for the purpose of
hours regulation. The Guild did, however, provide a valuable coun
terweight to industry power. The Guild forced the industry and the
NRA to take its claims seriously, as the length of the proceedings
and the division of opinion among NRA officials attests.
D.

Upper-Level Exemptions in NRA Policymaking

Johnson thought he had the process of policy development
firmly in hand through his involvement in the promulgation of what
he hoped would be a "model" code - the Cotton Textile Code.
But his expectation that all industries would follow the template of
the Cotton Textile Code proved to be wrong. Great variability de
veloped in code approaches to wage and hour regulation.
Another reason for concern about too heavy reliance on the in
dustry code process was the inadequate representation of labor in
terests in code making and code administration. The NRA was
often criticized for failing to ensure that labor interests were repre
sented.260 Indeed, the Department of Labor occasionally stepped
in to ask the President directly to reject NRA codes that went too
far in exempting categories of workers from hours regulations.261
Secretary of Labor Perkins fought hard against the NRA's bid to be
given the power to approve, end, and modify codes without review
by the President. She told Roosevelt in June 1934:
New problems are constantly arising, often intimately affecting labor
. . . and, if past experience is any criterion, those new problems would
be disposed of by rules promulgated by General Johnson with a mini
mum of study, thought, and discussion. The parties most vitally con
cerned might not even hear about it until after the regulation had
come into effect.262

The NRA's top officials were not inclined to see their job as one of
facilitating adequate interest group representation. Instead, they
continued to believe that independent governmental action was the
way to assure the fairness of the NRA.
260. See, e.g., Su=ary of Telegram from William Connery, Representative from Boston
and Chairman of the House Committee on Labor, to President Roosevelt (Nov. 26, 1933)
(FDR/OF 466, NRA Box 2, Nov.-Dec. 1933) (insisting that FDR "instruct Johnson to ap
point a true representative of the organized industrial workers as co-administrator on each
approved code").
261. See, e.g., Memorandum from M.H.M. to President Roosevelt (Nov. 16, 1933) (FDR/
OF 15, Department of Labor [hereinafter DOL], Box 1, 1933 folder) (noting that Frances
Perkins called, asking Roosevelt to reject the Hotel Men's code as allowing overly long hours
and exempting certain classes of employees).
262. Memorandum from Frances Perkins to President Roosevelt (June 18, 1934) (FDR/
OF, OF 466, NRA Box 2, June-July 1934).
,

,
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Leon C. Marshall, as a labor policymaker in the NRA's Review
Office, made it his task to find a way to break through the barriers
of NRA voluntarism using independent government fact-finding.
When Marshall first came to the NRA's policy office, he believed it
was essential that the government spearhead the development of a
system of definition and classification of occupations through the
use of job analysis. Without a thorough job analysis, Marshall ar
gued, the NRA would be unable to maintain wage differentials be
tween skilled and unskilled workers, stop evasions of wage and
hour agreements, or institute collective bargaining. He called for
the formation of an "impartial agency . . . . under the jurisdiction of
the United States Department of Labor," which would encourage
and supervise industries in the job classification process.263
Marshall called for choosing a director of this job-classification
agency "who has performed such work in industrial plants or at the
very least has supervised such work."264 Staff working with Mar
shall contended that the process should include "definition and
classification of all positions, even supervisory ones" not covered by
wage provisions.26s
There was certainly precedent for governmental use of job anal
ysis. The Bureau of Labor Statistics had developed a job analysis
for the Federal Employment Service as a method for the standardi
zation and classification of occupations and pay rates in federal em
ployment. 266 Indeed, the Department of Labor eventually
compiled a Dictionary of Occupational Titles, the first edition of
which was published in 1939,267 that served - and continues to
serve through later editions - as a comprehensive classification of
all jobs in the American economy. But Marshall was not given au
thorization to initiate the work or exercise control over it. The re
sponse from higher levels of NRA management was that the issue

263. Definition and Classification of Occupations in Industries, attached to Memorandum
from Stanley I. Posner to Leon C. Marshall § 11-2 (Aug. 6, 1934) (NA/NRA/CAF Entry 265,
Box 3, Ftles of Leon C. Marshall, Folder 62, Definitions, Classification, Explanation). I attri
bute this to Marshall from context.
264. Id.
265. Memorandum from C.R. Dooley to Leon C. Marshall (June 4, 1934) (NA/NRA/
CAF Entry 265, Box 1, Ftles of Leon C. Marshall).
266. See DANIEL NELSON, MANAGERS AND WORKERS: ORIGINS OF THE NEW FACTORY
SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES, 1880-1920, at 151 (1975); see also JACOBY, supra note 118, at
150.
267. DIVISION oF STANDARDS & REs., U.S. DEPT. oF LAB., DICTIONARY OF OccuPA·
TIONAL TITLES (1939) [hereinafter OCCUPATIONAL DICTIONARY].
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was "very large" and that the Department of Labor rather than the
should head up any such effort.268

NRA

Even absent comprehensive government-generated data on oc
cupational classification, however, Marshall was committed to cen
tralizing

NRA

labor policy in his office.

initiatives was the drafting by

NRA

One of Marshall's

officials of a "Basic Code," a

"best practice" code that could be recommended to newly codifying
industries. Although Marshall had argued that the

NRA

should

permit exemptions and exceptions only when they "fit[ ] into a co
herent policy,"269 he never succeeded in stating a coherent policy
on exemptions. Indeed, Marshall never articulated the policy un
derlying the exemptions he took for granted - in particular, the
exemption for "the executive classes" that he invariably sup
ported.210 He seemed supremely confident that such an exemption
would not be unduly complex, despite all of the concerns with
"fraud" and "evasion" that had followed "executive" exemptions
from the earliest

NRA experience.

Marshall's initial draft of an hours provision - which left blank
the number of hours in the maximum work week - called for ex
empting (without defining) "persons employed in a managerial or
executive capacity who earn regularly $35 per week or more," cer
tain emergency maintenance and repair crews, as well as "any other
class of employees which the Administrator shall find" appropriate
to exempt on the application of industry representatives.271 He
gave no guidance about when it would be "appropriate" to exempt
other classes of employees. At times he relied on precedent from
past codes and

PRA

substitutions, despite the fact that past code

268. See Note from Blackwell Smith to Leon C. Marshall (n.d.) attached to Memorandum
(Aug. 8, 1934) (NAINRA/CAF Entry 265, Box 3, File No. 62, Definition, Classification, Ex
planation). Blackwell Smith was second to Richberg in the office of General Counsel and, at
this stage, was the person Marshall reported to on matters of labor policy. Thomas Emerson
describes him as "an extremely able lawyer, keen, acute, skilled at negotiation and compro
mise, resourceful in thinking up ideas. He was not a torch-bearer and not adept in initiating
policy. But in terms of carrying out policy and adjusting differences he showed unusual abil
ity." EMERSON, supra note 126, at 17.
269. Note from Leon C. Marshall, Some Notes on Labor Policy 2 (n.d.), attached to Note
from Leon C. Marshall to Blackwell Smith {Aug. 6, 1934) {NAINRA/CAF Entry 265, Papers
of Leon C. Marshall, Box 2).
270. See Memorandum from Leon C. Marshall, Comments on NRA Operations with Par
ticular Reference to Labor Situations 1 (n.d.) (NAINRA/CAF Entry 265, Leon C. Marshall
Papers, Box 2, Comments, No. 53) (including this as the only exemption in the simplest pro
posal he came forward with: "A simple statement of forty {40) hours per week, eight (8)
hours per day, six (6) days in seven (7), with time and one-half for overtime, and with execu
tive classes excepted").
271. Draft of Basic Code, attached to Memorandum from Blackwell Smith to Leon C.
Marshall et al. (June 12, 1934) (NAINRA/CAF Entry 265, Leon C. Marshall Papers, Box 2).
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practice was hardly the product of coherent policymaking. As one
observer cautioned, substitutions to the PRA had been "forced
through under pressure with a very small amount of time for con
sideration. "272 The experience of the NRA under the Cotton Tex
tile code reveals that the NRA was not able to force what it saw as
optimal provisions into the industry codes. Why, then, should ex
isting practice be the guide when determining current policy? In
deed, Marshall did not view precedent as the outer limit for the
exemptions he was prepared to propose. One of his drafts of a
maximum hours provision exempted "executives and supervisory
employees and their secretarial assistants, foremen, and profes
sional and scientific employees who receive regularly not less than
$35 a week." This led the Labor Advisory Board to urge him to
"[d]elete secretarial assistants, foremen and 'scientific employees'
for which there are few precedents."273
The tendency of Marshall's classification decisions was to em
phasize collar-color over the functional requirements of jobs or
scarcity of qualified workers in deciding whether to allow employ
ers greater flexibility in hours of work. For example, Marshall's
draft Basic Code permitted "office, clerical, or accounting employ
ees" to work one forty-four-hour week per month because of the
needs of the billing and inventory cycles, but allowed no similar
exemption for factory employees on emergency maintenance or re
pair work.274 The Labor Policy Board criticized Marshall's pro
posed one-week-per-month "tolerance" for clerical workers,
272. Memorandum from A. Heath Onthank, Assistant Review Officer, to Leon C.
Marshall 4 (Oct. 22, 1934) (NAINRA/CAF Entry 265, Leon C. Marshall Papers, Box 3)
[hereinafter Onthank Memo].
273. Memorandum from Solomon Barkin, Labor Advisory Board, to Leon C. Marshall 7
(Oct. 1, 1934) (NAINRA/CAF Entry 265, Leon C. Marshall Papers, Box 3) [hereinafter
Barkin Memo]. It is hard to tell from the syntax here whether the $35 per week requirement
applied to all or just to the professional and scientific employees (which I suspect is the case).
Barkin's objection makes more sense if the exemption for foremen was not subject to the
dollar minimum, since previous rulings under the PRA had placed foremen in the supervi
sory/executive category if their salaries were high enough. Similarly, A. Heath Onthank ob
jected that this exemption
goes further than any past policy of which I am aware. Heretofore, it has been possible
to exempt from hour restrictions executives and supervisory employees who receive reg
ularly not less than $35 per week. The present inclusion of the secretarial assistants of
executives and supervisory employees and, in addition, foremen and professional and
scientific employees broadens former exemptions.
Onthank Memo, supra note 272, at 2. Onthank added, however, that he would not object so
long as the newly excluded employees earned $35 or more per week.
274. See Draft of Codification of Labor Policy 2-3, attached to Memorandum from Leon
C. Marshall to Walton H. Hamilton (Aug. 24, 1934) (NA/NRA/CAF Entry 265, Leon C.
Marshall Papers, Box 3). The PRA had also used the collar-color line in setting maximum
hours, but it had in fact given employers greater flexibility in hours for blue-collar than for
white-collar workers.
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observing that it saw "no reason for an exemption to this class
which has bene:fitted least from N.R.A."275
Had the NIRA survived, there was a good chance that the
collar-color approach would have carried the day. Leon C.
Marshall was appointed by Roosevelt to serve on the National In
dustrial Recovery Board which took over running the NRA after
Johnson's resignation. Late in the life of the NIRA, the NIRB con
sidered a proposed position statement that declared, inter alia, that
there is "no generally accepted conclusion as to the wisdom or pos
sibility of . . . limitation of hours of work for 'white-collar' work
ers."276 That was a far cry from Roosevelt's original insistence that
the protections of the NRA were to be extended to the "white col
lar classes."
In sum, the NRA's consideration of upper-level exemptions
shows that the agency never reached internal convergence on the
proper approach to class line-drawing.

In the end, the agency

would likely not have had the power to impose the approach of its
choosing on the industrial codes, where problems of capture by in
dustry were so pervasive. But where those constraints were not
present, in the PRA and in the agency's policy planning, the agency
never articulated a single clear policy on upper-level exemptions.
Marshall's greatest desire was to use "objective" data to draw up
his own map of the class system. But when the data were unavaila
ble, he embraced the business community's contested beliefs as the
government's own and thus relied on the very line Roosevelt ex
pressly rejected in his :first speech on hours regulation.
E.

Lessons from the NIRA

By the NIRA's judicially mandated end, two years of experience
under the statute had generated great variability in practice, but
also a measure of consistency in excluding certain upper-level em
ployees from statutory protection. There remained important dis
agreements as to who the "upper" workers were and whether it was
in the end appropriate to protect any of them - including ordinary
white-collar workers - through maximum hours legislation. Even
Leon C. Marshall, who had some prior expertise on class issues and
who was in the best position to make global labor policy judgments
for the NRA, was never able to articulate where the lines should be
275. See Barkin Memo, supra note 273, at 7.
276. Draft of "Open letter addressed to a number of representative groups by the Na
tional Industrial Recovery Board," 1, attached to Memorandum from Blackwell Smith to
Williams (Nov. 24, 1934) (NA/NRA, Donald Richberg Subject Ftle, Entry 3, Box 2).
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drawn between different groups of employees, and, even more so,
why they should be drawn.
Perhaps the NRA's failure to attain a coherent vision of which
employees ought to be exempt from hours regulation was a result
of its failure to secure the independent knowledge base Marshall
strove for and never obtained. After all, the entire point of scientif
ically oriented Legal Realism was that correct policymaking would
flow from the facts. That orientation left administrators without
guidance if, as proved to be the case, they were required to act
before the facts were in.
But suppose it had been otherwise. Suppose that Marshall had
completed his job analysis in time to make "scientifically" grounded
decisions across the range of NRA labor policy issues he faced .
What might he have learned, and how might his approach to class
line-drawing have changed as a result? The answer, I suspect, is
that the job analysis of the American economy Marshall sought
would not have answered any of the specific questions posed by a
purposive approach to hours regulation.
Two major analyses of the structure of American occupations
were undertaken in the 1930s: Alba Edwards's census and the De
partment of Labor's Dictionary of Occupational Titles. We have al
ready seen that Edwards wrapped functional and status-related
attributes of occupations into a single classification scheme, and
that its utility to social scientists was consequently impaired. The
Dictionary of Occupational Titles fared no better. The Dictionary
was developed within the Department of Labor, as part of the Oc
cupational Research Program of the Division of Standards and Re
search of the U.S. Employment Service, in order to aid in the
appropriate job placement of workers left unemployed during the
Depression.277 The Dictionary grew out of the "vocational gui
dance" movement that had the schools as its original locus, and
aimed to render scientific the process of matching unemployed (or
underemployed) workers with appropriate jobs.278 Like the census,
the Dictionary claimed that it was evaluating occupations based on
their required "skills and abilities." But within the vocational gui
dance movement, the appropriateness of jobs turned as much on
their social status as on their functional characteristics. Recall that
this was a tendency that Marshall criticized in his writings, precisely
277. The Dictionary was published after the enactment of the FLSA but before the pro
mulgation of the 1940 amended upper-level exemption regulations discussed infra, notes 363405.
278. On the vocational guidance movement, see, e.g., JACOBY, supra note 118, at 65-97.
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because it made it impossible to match people to jobs based on ob
jective factors.279 Thus, the Dictionary explained that "[n]o single
criterion [was] followed in determining what constitutes a job classi
fication. For some, it is the duties of the jobs; for others, the indus
trial surroundings or circumstances in which the jobs exist."280 In
that sense, the Dictionary was like the census in being unable to
define "jobs" solely in relation to their functional characteristics.281
In light of the 1930s census and Dictionary experiences, it seems
exceedingly likely that an NRA-driven "job analysis" would also
have intermixed functional and status considerations. For if it did
not do so, too many "anomalies" would emerge - just as the Lynds
found when trying to evaluate high-status workers like engineers
and architects whose orientation is toward "things" rather than
"people." A governmental job analysis of the sort Marshall con
templated and that the census and Dictionary projects achieved
purports to be a stand-alone, all-purpose snapshot of the occupa
tional structure of the American economy. Although it is grounded
in "expert" analysis of the skills and functions of different jobs, it
aims to reflect intuitive understandings of the existing status hierar
chy. It is thus a poor tool for answering the particular question
raised by purposive hours regulation: how amenable are different
tiers of white-collar work to work-spreading?
The purposive approach would ultimately have depended on the
government's capacity to distinguish between jobs that legitimately
cannot be divided and jobs that are commonly deemed nondivisible
- because of either the economic desires of employers or the sta
tus needs of employees - but are not so in fact. It might have been
possible for NRA administrators. to do_ independent factfinding on
this question, but Marshall never proposed doing so. Instead, the
closest the NRA came to securing the information required by a
purposive approach was through tlie give-and-take of hearings for example, in NRA cross-examination of industry witnesses at the
Cotton Textile hearings about the divisibility of the work of special
crews. But the purposive approach was all too rarely at the fore in
279. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
280. OCCUPATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 267, at xxi.
281. Later editions of the Dictionary have also been controversial. For a critique of the
1965 third edition of the Dictionary, which was based on a "functional job analysis" that turns
on the degree to which people work with data, people, and things, see ScoVILLE, supra note
65, at 7-8; see also COMMITTEE ON OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION & ANALYSIS, NATIONAL
REsEARCH CoUNcu., WoRK, JoBs, AND OcCUPATIONs: A CruucAL REvmw OF THE
DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES 188 (Ann R. Miller et al. eds., 1980) (critiquing third
edition and noting sex bias in job ratings).
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the NRA period. Within the code-making process, industry was in
almost complete control of the factual record. Any real spirit of
adversarialism in fact-gathering - which would have been neces
sary if NRA officials were to use the hearing process as its source of
empirical evidence - was stymied by the lack of meaningful repre
sentation of workers in general, and of white-collar and upper-level
workers in particular. Thus, it is no surprise that NRA labor policy
combined an "I know it when I see it" quality with heartfelt calls
for scientific analysis. Pound was right that administrative agencies
were not necessarily places where the calm of scientific inquiry pre
vailed. Thus it was possible for a critic of the NRA to complain that
the agency had failed to concern itself "with questions such as
these: Is employment increasing? Are the unemployed being ab
sorbed? Is purchasing power expanding?"282 Events moved too
quickly for genuinely purposive policymaking.
The NIRA materials suggest that, for the most part, NRA offi
cials were engaged in a descriptivist project. At times, officials
seemed to think that a pre-existing consensus existed and could
safely guide their deliberations. For example, in the Cotton Textile
hearings, Johnson seemed to think that the elevated status of super
visors was widely accepted and that the boundaries of the category
were easy to draw. But only a few months later, Johnson made the
aggressive attempt to impose the PRA's definition of "executives,"
with its duties and salary-minimum tests, on all industrial codes.
That move acknowledged that there were disagreements between
the administration and some industries regarding the category's
proper boundaries, and therefore that no easy consensus existed af
ter all. Similarly, officials seemed to realize that whatever the tradi
tional cultural saliency of the collar-color line, it was losing its
descriptive accuracy.

In the early 1930s, a period in which there was growing aware
ness of flux in the class system in the United States, a careful
descriptivist would have seen how anachronistic the traditional sta
tus lines between blue- and white-collar, supervised and supervisor,
or hourly and salaried had become. But for some very good and
persistent reasons, the circumstances of the NRA made it difficult
for administrators to exercise the independence needed to engage
in a

sensitive

descriptivist analysis.

In

part, the problem was that

the business community spoke loudly, and only rarely did anyone
282. Press Release No. 3513, Press Memo No. 10, at 1 {Mar. 1, 1934) (LC, Richberg
Container 47, Press Releases 2-3/1934) {describing testimony of Francis J. Gorman, United
Textile Workers of America).
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speak for the white-collar workers. When the only way a group can
obtain a statutory benefit is to embrace the view that it has slipped
in the status hierarchy, the decision to come forward is a difficult
one - even once the group has surmounted the ordinary obstacles
to political participation. The Newspaper Guild did so, but it was
the exception. Thus, NRA officials bore on their own shoulders
most of the burden of understanding the white-collar workforce.
Furthermore, resisting the business community's view of the
world also carried with it a significant burden of administrability. A
class system in flux tends to generate class lines that are fuzzy and
therefore difficult to administer - hence the overriding concern
with the possibility of "fraud" and "evasion" with regard to the "ex
ecutive" exemption. But if the government could adopt a classifica
tion scheme that the business community supported, the very fact
of that support would point toward a higher level of voluntary
·

compliance.

Within the political constraints facing the NRA, then, it should
not come as a surprise that it failed to achieve true independence of
judgment on the question of exemptions from hours regulation.
What seems remarkable in retrospect is that independent descrip
tivist judgment was

ever exercised, and that the purposive approach

was present at all. The question is thus whether the Department of
Labor was able to improve on this situation in the formulation and
enforcement of the Fair Labor Standards Act. We shall see that it
was not. We shall see that the same constraints on independent
factfinding and the same oscillation between purposive and descrip
tive approaches to class line-drawing continued to plague govern
mental class line-drawing in the sphere of hours-regulation under
the FLSA.
III.

THE EARLY YEARS

OF THE

FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Acr

The demise of the NRA left the federal government without a
comprehensive program of wage and hour legislation. There were
widespread calls for the introduction of new legislation, not least of
all from businesses for which "the threat of the NRA paled beside
the threat of no regulation at all," and which saw in federal labor
law "some means of compelling their market rivals (and them
selves) to observe fair standards of competition."283

For the

Roosevelt administration, "the primary purpose was to make it pos
sible for more workers to be added to the pay roll. It was thus
283. GORDON, supra note 122, at 201-02.
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designed in part as a compulsory 'share-the-work' program. "284
This continuity of goals made the FLSA the true heir to the NRA's
program of hours regulation.
A. Statutory Drafting and Passage (1937-1938)
In preparation for the seventy-fifth Congress, which met in Jan
uary 1937, intense activity took place behind the scenes in the
Roosevelt administration (centering on Secretary of Labor Frances
Perkins) and between Roosevelt and the chairmen of the House
and Senate labor committees.285 By the end of April, a confidential
draft had been produced. As drafted, the bill provided that em
ployers would be "exempt" from the hours provisions of the act if
they paid their workers time and one-half for overtime, but this
"exemption" could be withdrawn administratively on an industry
by-industry basis.286 Unlike the PRA, the draft made no distinction
between office and factory workers. The draft excluded from the
definition of "employee" - and therefore from any protection
under the statute - "any person employed in an executive or su
pervisory capacity."287 By May 12, the upper-level exclusion in
cluded "any person employed in an executive, administrative, [or]
supervisory . . . capacity."288 The term "administrative" had not
been common in the NRA industrial codes,289 although Alexander
Sachs had used it in his pre-NRA memorandum, and the meaning
284. Paul H. Douglas & Joseph Hackman, The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (pt. 1),
53 PoL. Ser. Q. 491, 491 (1938); accord Linder, Farm Workers and the Fair Labor Standards
Act, supra note 1, at 1381.
285. See John S. Forsythe, Legislative History of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 6 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 463, 464 (1939).
286. See id. at 483.
287. Fair Labor Standards Bill, Confidential Revised Draft § 2(a)(7) (April 30, 1937)
(National Archives, Record Group 174, Department of Labor, Records of Secretaries, Fran
ces Perkins [hereinafter NA/DOUPerkins], Box 12).
288. Fair Labor Standards Bill, Confidential Revised Draft § 2(a)(7) (May 12, 1937) (NA/
DOUPerkins, Box 12, FLS Bill, 1937) (emphasis added).
289. When Leon C. Marshall proposed conducting a comparative analysis of labor provi
sions in the industrial codes, his spreadsheet listed the most co=on exemptions. "Adminis
trative" was not one of them. Exemption categories for hours were "executive and
supervisors," "professional and technical," "all employees receiving more than stated salary,"
"office and clerical,'' "outside salesmen," "scarce, skilled or key worker," "continuous pro
cess operators," "repair and maintenance," "watchmen,'' "firemen," "electricians," "engi
neers," "cleaners and janitors,'' delivery, shipping and stock, child labor, auxiliary and
general. My search of the records did not show completion of Marshall's study. His corre
spondence relating to the study is found in Office Frles of Leon C. Marshall, Frle NA/NRA/
CAF Entry 265, Box 3, Analysis (Various), No. 71, July 18, 1934. Another notation states
that "[a]ll ofthis is turned over to [Harry] Weiss to push thru." Letter from Leon C. Marshall
to Harry Weiss et al. 2 (Aug. 30, 1934) (NA/NRA/CAF, Entry 265, Office Frles of Leon C.
Marshall, Box 3, Misc. Letters, No. 72).
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of the term was not immediately clear. But it did have precedent in
post-NRA federal wage and hour policy: it appeared as a basis for
exemption in an Executive Order under the Emergency Relief Ap
propriation Act.290 By May 20, the word "professional" had been
added into the upper-level exclusion list.291 It was in this form that
the bill was introduced on May 24 as S. 2475 in the Senate by
Senator Black, and by Rep.

William P.

Connery as H.R. 7200.

Almost immediately, the introduced bill began to provoke criti
cism within the Labor Department and in the labor movement.
Katherine Lenroot, Director of the Children's Bureau and a close
adviser to Perkins, was opposed to the "supervisory" category that
had been part of the original administration draft. She argued to
Perkins that "it would be very undesirable to specify 'supervisory'
as outside the definition of 'employee.' These exclusions should be
very carefully limited to bona fide executives."292 The problem was
exacerbated by the fact that the Black-Connery bill, unlike the
PRA, contained no minimum salary required before a supervisor
could be deemed an "executive" - although, of course, there was
no guarantee that a salary line would serve to identify the "bona
fide executive" as Lenroot meant the term. The "supervisory" lan
guage was eventually dropped from the bill.
The 1937 legislation died in the House Rules Committee.
Perkins declined the invitation of her staff to take the lead in ap290. Exec. Order No. 7046 {1935) {"Proscribing Rules and Regulations . . . Under the
Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935"). The Executive Order is interesting for other
reasons as well. The Order called for all work under the order to be on a monthly salary
basis - an innovative step possibly aimed at fostering reliability of improved purchasing
power - with differentials by region, size of community, and kind of work. Separate mini
mum wages were set for different categories of work: unskilled, intermediate work, skilled
work, professional and technical work. Supervisory and administrative employees were not
covered by the wages provision. The maximum hours provision set an eight-hour day and a
forty-hour week, but exempted "supervisory and administrative employees." Certain types
of projects permitted a longer workweek "for manual labor" but not for "clerical and other
non-manual employees." This Executive Order combined a number of themes that had been
debated during the NRA period: skill differentials, community-size differentials, distinctions
between office and manual work. Not all of these distinctions found their way into the
FLSA, although the "administrative" category did find its way in. Note that this was a pro
gram that had the relief of unemployment among technical and professional workers as one
of its specific goals, which might be why their traditional mode of pay - salaried as opposed
to hourly - was adopted under the Executive Order. It is not clear why "administrative and
supervisory" workers were not seen as needing similar protection.
291. See Fair Labor Standards Bill, Confidential Revised Draft § 2{a)(7) {May 20, 1937)
(NA/DOUPerkins, Box 12, FLS Bill, 1937). At this point, a lower-level exclusion for agricul
tural workers had been introduced. The NRA codes had used lower-level exclusions as well
- e.g., for "outside" workers in the cotton textile code. For more on lower level exclusions,
see the many articles of Marc Linder on the subject, supra note 1.
292. Memorandum of Katherine Lenroot to Frances Perkins 1 (June 1, 1937) (NA/DOU
Perkins Box 12) {"Notes Regarding the Black-Connery Bill").
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pointing an internal committee within the department to draft a
new bill.293 Instead, she waited while Representative Norton, the
new House Labor chair after the death of Representative Connery,
had the original House bill discharged from the Rules Commit
tee.294 Subsequently a number of significant changes were made.
One was the move from a true maximum hours bill to a bill that
permitted unlimited overtime hours so long as a time-and-one-half
wage premium was paid for overtime hours. One might have ex
pected, from a purposive standpoint, that the addition of flexibility
to permit employers to work their employees extra hours would
have alleviated the need for upper-level exemptions. But the ex
emptions remained. As amended, the House passed the bill on
May 24, 1938.29s
None of the different FLSA drafts included special provisions
for "white-collar workers" or "salaried workers." While the legisla
tion was being considered in the Senate, Perkins received an in
quiry from Senator Sheppard, seeking to understand why, "[i]f a bill
of this sort must be passed," it could not "exempt from its provi
sions those who are employed on the basis of monthly wages and
have it apply exclusively to those working on an hourly basis. "296
Her response was strangely literal:
If it were possible to avoid the wage and hour bill by employing on
a monthly basis . . . many employers would no doubt hire on such a
basis. In addition to affording protection to the flow of goods in inter
state commerce, one of the purposes of wage and hour legislation is to
spread employment and increase purchasing power. It is difficult to
see why employees working on an hourly, daily, weekly or monthly
basis should not be given the same protection against oppressive
wages and oppressive hours of employment.297

Perkins, an experienced labor hand, must have understood that the
division between "hourly" versus "salaried" workers was not
merely random - that there was a tradition of paying factory
workers of all skill levels on an hourly rate and office, supervisory,
and professional staff regardless of duties on a salaried basis. What
the Senator was in effect asking was whether it was necessary to
adopt the same wage and hour provisions across the collar-color
293. See Memorandum from Mary La Dame to Frances Perkins (Nov. 8, 1937) (NA/
DOIJPerkins Box 118).
294. See PERKINS, supra note 93, at 260.
295. See 83 CoNG. REc. 7181, 7449-50 {1938).
296. Letter from Frances Perkins to Senator Sheppard 1 {May 17, 1938) (NA/DOU
Perkins, Box 10, Special Ftle: Wage & Hour Bill, 1937-38) (quoting unnamed constituent)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
297. Id. The question was forwarded by Sheppard, but asked by a constituent.
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line. Perkins's answer, assuming that she must have understood the
true nature of the question, was that the Roosevelt administration
had strengthened its resolve that there was to be no collar-color
distinction in the wage and hour laws.29s
As signed by Roosevelt on June 25, 1938, the Fair Labor Stan
dards Act contained a broad definition of "employee," but ex
empted from the statute's maximum-hour provisions "executive,
administrative, and professional" employees. These terms were not
defined. Instead, the statute expressly authorized the Department
of Labor to issue regulations interpreting these terms - making the
choice to locate the decision in the agency rather than in the courts.
Responsibility for interpretation and enforcement of the FLSA was
placed in the hands of the Department's new Wage and Hour
Division.
B.

Model State Legislation (1938)

The creation of the Wage and Hour Division did not mean that
Perkins and her core advisors ceased their involvement in class line
drawing issues. During the period in which the Wage and Hour
Division was preparing to promulgate its interpretive regulations, a
related issue came to the fore in the upper levels of the Labor De
partment. The FLSA, due to constitutional constraints, could not
reach purely intrastate activities.

Interstate business, however,

faced competition from intrastate enterprises that were not subject
to the FLSA. The Labor Department thus hoped that states would
follow Congress's lead and enact "little FLSA's,"299 modeled on the
federal statute. By September 1938, a month before the FLSA's
effective date, the Department of Labor had formed a committee to
draft language for model state legislation supplementing the FLSA.
The committee proceeded by reviewing each provision of the FLSA
and proposing revisions that seemed appropriate for the states.
This became an occasion for rethinking controversial provisions of
the FLSA itself.
One participant, on the staff of the Bureau of Labor Standards,
said of the FLSA's "executives" exemption: "I don't much like [it];
they would all be holding executive or supervisory positions and we
would have to all the time determine whether they were or not, and
298. This strengthened resolve may have related to the fact that the economic situation of
upper-level white collar workers was worsening through the Depression as they exhausted
their savings.
299. The phrase is mine, parallel to "little Norris LaGuardia's."
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there would be no workers."300 This comment echoed Lenroot's
concern in the early stages of drafting the FLSA that only "bona
fide executives" be exempted.301 The problem was whether small
scale changes in the language of the exemption could meaningfully
reduce the opportunities for fraud and evasion. Even if the term
"supervisor" was eliminated, the term "executive" would remain
problematic. As was the case under the NRA, the lack of a stable
consensus on the boundaries of supervisory or executive work
made it difficult for the government to draw clear and politically
acceptable lines.
These criticisms reflected the view that the executive exemption
was too broad. But the harshest criticism came from the other di
rection, once the model legislation was approved by the Depart
ment of Labor's Fifth Annual National Conference of Labor
Legislation. The approved draft had upper-level exemptions for
employees "engaged in [an] executive or professional capacity"302
- language more limited than the FLSA, which also had the less
precedented term "administrative" on the list. On a confidential
basis, Perkins's special assistant, Mary La Dame, asked Charles
Wyzanski, Perkins's former Solicitor of Labor who had returned to
private practice (and later became an esteemed federal judge), to
engage in a "critical review" of the model state statute.303 At a
meeting, Wyzanski issued a sweeping critique that, while aimed at
the state statute, would in some respects apply to the FLSA itself.
Wyzanski stated that the state laws "should exempt employees in
the higher wage brackets who are not in executive or administrative
posts. "304 He thought it wrong that the proposal statute would not
exempt "a purchaser of steel getting about $8,000 whose only assis
tant may be a secretary, authority for whose employment and dis
charge rests with the personnel office. "305 Similarly, he contended
300. Transcript of Committee to Prepare Suggested Language for State Legislation Sup·
plementing the Federal FLSA {Sept. 12, 1938) {NA/DOLJPerkins Box 103) (testimony of Pat
Murphy).
301. See supra text accompanying note 292.
302. Reports of Committees and Resolutions Adopted by Filth National Conference on
Labor Legislation, Bulletin 25-a, at 7 {Nov. 14-16, 1938) {NA/DOLJPerkins, Box 45) (summa
rizing proposed bill).
303. See Letter from Mary La Dame to Charles Wyzanski (Dec. 13, 1938) (NA/DOU
Perkins Box 118).
304. Summary of Conference re: Draft of State FLS Bill 1 (Dec. 30, 1938) {NA/DOU
Perkins Box 118). Wyzanski apparently read the "executive or professional" language in the
model state statute to include "administrative" employees.
305. Wyzanski didn't seem to see the capacity of interpreting the term "administrative"
to include such a worker - which is odd, since he went to the trouble of interpolating that
term into the model state statute.
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that "[t]he time and a half provisions should apply only to lower
paid employees."306 Wyzanski's views met with considerable sym
pathy from inside the Department and led to suggestions that the
approved model state statute ought to be revised at the next
conference.307
Wyzanski and his supporters were not in the least motivated by
the statutory goal of work-spreading. Why should the salary paid to
a purchasing agent, to use Wyzanski's example, bear any relation
ship to the question whether the work of purchasing could be done
by more people working fewer hours? By recommending that the
line be drawn solely on the basis of income, perhaps Wyzanski was
adopting a purposive focus that emphasized increasing the purchas
ing power of the already-employed.

Or perhaps Wyzanski was

adopting a descriptive approach, based on the cultural instinct that
a high-paid employee is a high-status employee, regardless of what
he does for a living. One cannot be sure.
Exempting a broader range of employees on the basis of income
alone, however, was not politically acceptable. Unlike during the
NRA period, labor advocates showed signs of caring how upper
level exemptions were drawn. The AFL had promulgated a model
state statute that included exemptions for "executives" and "profes
sionals," although not for "administrative" employees; the CIO's
promulgated version exempted only "executives." The fact that the
labor unions could not agree on language suggests that they, too,
were perplexed by the line-drawing task. Indeed, the Labor Legis
lation conference was moving away from the use of exemptions al
together. It had a standing committee charged with expanding the
application of the wage and hours laws to all employees.308 Absent
a sound descriptivist or purposive basis for drawing lines, the "no
upper-level exemptions" approach may have been the most sensible
of all. But it never gathered support within the federal government.

306. Su=ary of Conference re: Draft of State FLS Bill, supra note 304, at 1.
307. See id. at 2.
308. See Report of Committee on State Wage and Hour Legislation, Adopted by Filth
National Conference on Labor Legislation 7 (Nov. 14-16, 1938) (NA/DOUPerkins, Box 45).
The following year, the Sixth National Conference on Labor Legislation proposed that seri
ous consideration be given to removing "professionals" from the exempt category, as the
CIO was proposing. Report of Committee on State Wage and Hour Legislation, Adopted by
Sixth National Conference on Labor Legislation 1 (Nov. 13-15, 1939) (NA/DOUPerkins,
Box 45).

2292

Michigan Law Review

C.

[Vol. 96:2212

Initial Interpretive Regulations (1938)

Elmer Andrews, an engineer who was head of the New York
Industrial Commission (the state's department of labor), was ap
pointed administrator of the new Wage and Hour Division of the
Department of Labor on July

15, 1938.

New York labor interests

approved of Andrews. The regional director of the American Fed
eration of State, County, and Municipal Employees (the AFSCME)
said he "found Commissioner Andrews a Progressive administrator
interested in the problems of employees and sympathetic to the
needs of trade unions inside and outside of his department."309
One of the most pressing items on his agenda was promulgating
regulations to implement the upper-level exemptions.
Until a final draft of regulations issued from Andrews's office
on October 19, 1938, there was much speculation and concern
about the meaning of the upper-level exemptions - more so, per
haps, than their language warranted. For example,

Times

The New York

reported on August 14 that, according to trade association

representatives,
the chief problem as to procedure under the Wage and Hour Act . . .
is whether or not the law applies to such employees as office and cler
ical workers, watchmen, firemen, outside workers, research workers,
electricians, engineers, repair shop workers, maintenance men, etc.
The law does not specifically answer this question, which, therefore,
will depend on interpretation of the administrator and ultimately on
court decisions.310

All of the listed categories of workers had figured prominently in
debates over exclusions from various NRA codes. Thus the issue
for the business community was whether the Fair Labor Standards
Act would be interpreted as continuing the NRA's approach to oc
cupational classification. That end could have been accomplished
in one of two ways - either by the Administrator through his inter
pretive regulations, or by the courts through a commerce-clause
based restriction of the scope of the statute to "processed labor."311
Both seemed at least plausible.
309. Letter from Daniel Allen to President Roosevelt (July 19, 1938) (FDR/OF 3295,
Wage & Hour Division, DOL Box 1, 1938 folder).
310. Wage Law Evasion Seen in New Deal Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1938, at III 8:8.
311. For the use of the term "processed labor" in the cotton textile hearings, see Tran
script of NIRA Hearing No. 1 U-8 (June 27, 1933) (NA/NRA, Records Maintained By the
Library Unit, Transcripts of Hearings 1933-35, Entry 44, Box 73). For the distinction between
"direct" and "indirect" labor, with the latter category including "clerks, inspectors, tool crib
men, repair operators, shipping-room employees, truckmen, drivers, firemen, [and] watch
men," see NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, SUPPLEMENTAL BONUSES FOR
WAGE EARNERS, SUPERVISORS AND EXECUTIVES 53 (1927).
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The reported reason for the business community's concern is
telling:
Reuben C. Ball, secretary of the National Association of Hosiery
Manufacturers, said that in the event that these workers are covered
by the Wage and Hour Act, it may become necessary as a practical
matter to employ more workers in such classification. Some of them
may be working more than the maximum of forty-four hours provided
in the law, and in such a case their employers would be required to
pay them time and a half for any hours in excess of forty-four. It
would be cheaper, he pointed out, to employ additional workers at
regular rates than to pay the premium rates for overtime.312

What this reveals, of course, is that at least some members of the
business community understood that the logic of work-spreading
did in fact apply to those categories of employees that had been
frequently exempted from NRA hours regulations. Their position
was that even with the flexibility to pay an overtime premium to
avoid "doubling up," they would, in fact, find that the economics of
the situation called for hiring additional workers. To the extent the
NRA had been convinced otherwise in industry hearings, revised
business opinion seemed to suggest it had been wrong - and that a
purposive approach to exemptions that focused on work-spreading
might, upon further investigation, reveal that the upper-level ex
emptions made no sense. But the exemptions had now been en
acted into law by the FLSA. Administrators did not have the
option of concluding that the exemptions had been a mistake.
The business community's view was, of course, that a wide range
of white-collar workers should be exempted by the statute.
Andrews himself did much to fuel speculation in the business com
munity that he agreed. In September 1938, Andrews engaged in a
question-and-answer session after a speech to the Southern States
Industrial Council.313 He was asked whether the Division had yet
issued definitions of the upper-level exemptions. This was
Andrews's response:
No. I have had that in mind more than anything else . . . . I am very
sympathetic toward your problem there, because I know a superinten
dent is not a clock watcher, nor does he punch a time clock. Certainly
if he was the sort of fellow that you would take care of if he is sick or

312. Wage Law Evasion Seen in New Deal Plan, supra note 310, at 8:8.
313. This group later filed a petition to change the upper-level exemptions, which was
one of the events leading to the 1940 hearings discussed below. See Department of Labor,
Press Releases No. R-712 (Apr. 2, 1940) (National Archives, Record Group 155, Wage and
Hour Division [hereinafter NA/W&H]).
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knocked out, if you think enough of him for that, I think that really
indicates he is a part of the executive family.314
Andrews was described by

Business Week

early on in his adminis

tration as a "plain blunt man,"315 and he clearly was not embar
rassed to rely on the traditional status of white-collar jobs and
evoke the symbols of their exalted status. Upper-level workers
were traditionally treated with greater dignity and with a longer
term commitment from the employer. In return, the upper-level
worker was expected not to be a "clock watcher" or a "clock
puncher." The upper-level worker was a noncommodified worker:
his labor was total, not divisible into fungible hour-long bursts of
energy to be channeled into pre-set processes. Andrews's first and
clearest instinct was that the FLSA, if applied to such workers,
would demean them by recasting their labor as no different from
that of the "processed labor" that draws its very definition from the
clock.
Andrews was a good descriptivist, in the sense that he hit on an
image - that of the clock-watcher - that was so strong an icon
that it could be used in advertising. Consider the following

Busi

ness Week advertisement, which, as it happens, ran in the middle of
the magazine's big story on the FLSA.316 The advertisement is for
Remington Noiseless Typewriters.317 The ad depicts a standing fe
male secretary and a male boss seated behind his desk. The clock
on the wall shows that it is 5:05. The secretary is smiling and hand
ing her boss her finished work. The caption: "We no longer watch
the clock." To be a clock watcher was the quintessential character
istic of ordinary workers. The aim of good business management
was to get from your workers the kind of performance you expect
from non-clock-watchers, without having to pay for it.318 Without
the distinction between those who live by the clock (secretaries)
and those who do not (bosses) the advertisement would make no
sense.31 9
314. Press Releases, Transcript of the Record of the Question and Answer Period Follow
ing the Speech of Elmer F. Andrews . . . Before the Southern States Industrial Council,
Birmingham, Alabama 3 (Sept. 29, 1938) (NA/DOUW&H) (hereinafter Press Releases fol
lowing Speech of Elmer F. Andrews].

What's What in Wage-Hour Law, Bus. WK., Oct. 15, 1938, at 17.
WK., Oct. 15, 1938, at 20.
317. Id. Remington had a history of capturing cultural trends. For "Miss Remington" as
a cultural icon of the working woman of the period, see ZUNz, supra note 37, at 147.
318. See supra text accompanying notes 114-18 (discussing the Hawthorne experiments).
315.

316. Bus.

319. Note that office employees were traditionally salaried. The message is that a good
manager knows that unless he does something about it, his lower-level clericals - particu
larly the women among them
will act like clock-watchers despite their salaried status,
suggesting the downward movement in the cultural status of routine clerical work.
-
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Unlike Marshall, then, Andrews did not manifest leanings to
ward basing exemption decisions on the functional properties of
jobs. He saw class line-drawing as a common-sense enterprise, and
his descriptivist common sense was that of the business community.
Andrews's comfort with embedding the culture of the business
community into law did not, however, carry the day. The regula
tions themselves, which were drafted by Division staff320 and
promulgated on October 20,321 took a far harder line than that sig
naled by Andrews's conciliatory tone.

In

a move Landis would have approved, the regulations de

parted from the plain language of the statute. The statute lists "Ex
ecutive,

Administrative,

and

Professional"

employees

as

the

exempt categories of workers. The regulations defined only two ex
empt categories: "Executive and Administrative" (defined as a sin
gle category, with the term "Administrative" treated as a synonym
for "Executive"), and "Professional."322 The decision to write the
word "Administrative" out of the statute reflected both a desire on
the part of the drafters to keep the exemptions narrow and a con
cern with the administrability of the new term "Administrative," a
term with no

NRA track record from which to

learn.

The definition of the "Executive and Administrative" employee
was functionally oriented. Executives and administrators were re
quired to have the power to hire and fire; they must manage an
establishment or department; they must customarily direct the work
of other employees; they must exercise discretion; and they must do
substantially no work of a non-exempt nature.323

Wyzanski's

purchasing agent would not have qualified. As to professionals, the
regulations required that they have "educational training in a spe320. Drafting took place under the leadership of Rufus Poole. See, e.g, Minutes of Meet
ing 3 (July 28, 1938) (NA/DOIJPerkins Box 103, Wage & Hour, General) ("All members
were instructed to leave any suggestions upon administration with Mr. Poole."). Poole was a
1927 graduate of the University of Chicago Law School, did post-graduate work on legisla
tion under Dr. Ernest Freund, and was in private practice and in government in the Interior
Department before joining the Department of Labor as Associate Solicitor and then the
Wage and Hour Division as Assistant General Counsel. See Press Releases following Speech
of Elmer F. Andrews, supra note 314. He guided the FLSA through Congress, see PERKINS,
supra note 93, at 261, and also drafted the model state legislation discussed in the previous
section, see Memorandum from V.A. Zimmer to Frances Perkins (Sept. 20, 1938) (NAIDOLJ
Perkins Box 103). Poole impressed Perkins early on, and she later urged his promotion to
the Division's general counsel position. He was not promoted only because Andrews had
promised the position to someone else. See Memorandum from Frances Perkins to Elmer F.
Andrews (Apr. 29, 1939) (NA/DOIJPerkins Box 103, Wage & Hour Administration, An
drews); accord What's What in Wage-Hour Law, supra note 315, at 18.
321. 3 Fed. Reg. 2518 (Oct. 20, 1938).
322.
323.

Id.
See

id.
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cially organized body of knowledge," as distinguished from both "a
general academic education" and non-academic training.324 Profes
sionals' work needed to be "predominantly intellectual and varied
. . . as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical or physical
work."325 The regulations required professionals to be engaged in
the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment as to both the
manner and the time of performance, and their work needed to be
"of such a character that the output produced or the result accom
plished cannot be standardized in relation to a given period of
time."326 Professionals were also not permitted to do a "substantial
amount" of non-exempt work.
By distinguishing between lower-level and higher-level execu
tives and professionals, the regulations took an aggressively in
dependent stance. The regulations' requirement that professionals
actually be doing work that cannot be standardized by the clock
was the most clearly purposive element in the exemption regula
tions - at least insofar as non-standardization suggests lack of
amenability to work-spreading. Independence from industry was
manifest at the descriptive level in the very fact that employers had
to prove that particular employees actually possessed the status ac
coutrements of upper-level status (for example, supervisory author
ity, freedom from manual work, discretion). Yet in certain respects
the regulations were less sure of themselves. First, the statutory
minimum salary required to count as an "executive" was
week -

$5

$30

a

a week lower than the minimum that had been stated

under the NRA.327 Second, the regulations themselves announced
that any party could apply for a revision of the regulations, and that
"separate treatment for different industries and for different classes
of employees may be given consideration."328 It was as though the
Division intended little more by these regulations than to foster de
bate. Rufus Poole, the lawyer most involved in tbeir drafting, ex
plained

in

a

speech

that

the

"professionals"

category

was

"troublesome," but that all the definitions "were worked out in
conference with representatives of employers and employees."329
Furthermore, he revealed,
324.

Id.
Id.
326. Id.
327. See id.
328. Id.
325.

329. Press Release, Transcript of Address by Rufus G. Poole before the Associated In
dustries of New York at its Annual Meeting 11 (Nov. 18, 1938) (NNW&H Press Releases).

August 1998]

Class Line-Drawing

2297

Those who did not like our definition did not take the view that they
could write a better definition. There is a statutory duty on the Ad
ministrator to promulgate a definition. So we put out the best defini
tion we could. . . . And we said that any aggrieved person could
petition for a hearing to have the definition fixed up and if the Ad
ministrator found that there was justification in the petition, a hearing
would be held. We tried to be fair to everyone.330

Basically, then, the Division's "line" on the regulations was to stress
that they were a good-faith effort, and that the Division welcomed
requests for revisions. As Andrews, the professional engineer, said
in a later speech, the regulations "[are] not, in many ways, perfect,
but as in the case of automobiles, refrigerators, and radios, the fu
ture should bring many improvements. "331
Even before the regulations were issued, interest groups entered
into negotiations with the agency as to how they should be inter
preted. For example, the Newspaper Guild - finding itself back at
ground zero in the fight to avoid professional status - took the
position that no employees within its jurisdiction were "profession
als" for purposes of the Act. On October 15, only a few days before
the regulations were released, Andrews met with a delegation from
the Newspaper Guild that, inter alia, discussed "the reported efforts
of organized publishers to exclude editorial workers from benefits
of the act by having them de�lared 'professionals. "'332 The Guild
received assurances from Andrews that "Andrews' definition of
professional employees definitely excluded any newspaper worker
eligible to Guild membership from exemption. "333
Andrews was not at all at home in the world of his Division's
regulations. Andrews communicated to the business community
that he shared its unhappiness with the strictness of the exemptions
and made it clear that he continued to take the business commu
nity's views to heart. In mid-December, Andrews - true to the
language and spirit of his Southern Industrial Council speech said that "business men . . . see no reason why the men in the
higher-range of income should be classed with those who punch the
time clock. . . . They say that these men can go fishing when they
like and have other advantages."334 Andrews hinted that business
330.

Id.

331. Address to
Press Releases).
332. WSU/Guild,

the Illinois Manufacturers Association 2 (Nov.

25, 1938) (NA/W&H

Wage-Hour Talk Set With Andrews, GUILD REP., Oct. 15, 1938, at 1.
Supporting Guild in Barring Professional

333. WSU/Guild, Andrews Rulings Seen
Exemptions, GUILD REP., Nov. 1, 1938, at 1.
334.

May Bar Overtime for High Pay Group, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1938, at 4:2.
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objections may lead to a suggestion to Congress that employees be
classified by income - that a straight compensation test be substi
tuted for the functional "duties" tests in the regulations, so that all
salaried employees - all employees who "d[o] not have to punch a
time clock" - would be exempt if their incomes exceed the statu
tory minimum.335 The question, of course, was ·how high he would
set the required income. On that would turn whether Andrews was
in agreement with his regulation-drafting staff that only the higher
level employees within the "executive" or "professional" ranks
ought to be exempt from the FLSA.336
Andrews was ambivalent about whether the changes he sought
should be accomplished by legislative amendment or by regulation.
At first he thought he should proceed administratively, by holding
hearings and drafting revised regulations.337 But on March 4, 1939,
he announced that he was leaning toward proposing an amendment
to the FLSA to deal with the problem, and then requested a closed
door hearing before the House Labor Committee to consider a pos
sible amendment "that 'white collar' workers . . . paid salaries
above a certain level" would be exempt.338 Andrews must have
known that the legislative route was risky. Legislation had already
been introduced in the House to exempt all "clerical employees,
such as bookkeepers, stenographers, pay-roll clerks, auditors, cost
accountants, purchasing agents, statisticians, or other office help
regularly employed on a straight salary basis and given vacations
with pay" - a proposal that contained no salary minimum for the
nonexempt class.339 Andrews likely concluded, however, that the
constraints of the existing statutory language would not permit him
to abandon a functional analysis based on the job categories "exec
utive, administrative, and professional" in favor of a status-based
system reflecting the traditional notion of white-collar privilege,
shored up by a salary minimum.
The other vexing question was where to draw the salary line.
Andrews remained adamant that "the low-paid white-collar group"
335. See May Ease Wage Act on
Elmer F. Andrews).

Well-Paid Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1938, at 4:4 (quoting

336. Note that Andrews was not saying that income should be the sole determinant of
coverage. Only among white-collar or salaried workers - he switched back and forth would his proposed income test qualify employees for exemption.
337.

See 2 Wage & Hour Report {BNA); 3-4 {1940).

338. The discussions are described by Elmer F. Andrews, Address to Council for Social
Progress (Apr. 5, 1939) {NA/W&H, Press Releases).
339. H.R. 4363, 76th Cong. {1939) (introduced by Rep. Cox on Feb. 21, 1939);
S. 2022, 76th Cong. § 1 (1939) (introduced by Sen. Miller on Mar. 31, 1939).

see also
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needed statutory protection; they were deemed to be clock
watchers, Remington Noiseless Typewriters notwithstanding. But
at what pay level did the high-paid white-collar worker begin?
Vastly different numbers had been floated in discussions of a possi
ble salary-level cap on

FLSA

coverage. On December 14, 1938,

Andrews reported that in his travels, the amendment most fre
quently suggested to him by businessmen "was that salaried em
ployees guaranteed

$150

a week or more and who have vacations

with pay should be excluded from the [maximum-hours require
ments]."340 He reported a week later that in thinking of a cutoff he
was "talking about the worker with a guaranteed monthly wage of

$300 to $400 a month."341

In a divisional memorandum on the sub

ject, which appeared to have been developed in anticipation of An
drews's proposed statutory amendment in March 1939, the dollar
level was not specifically set; the memorandum said the number
should be between

$200 and $250 a month.

the division at the time suggested that "the

Data developed within

$200

exemption would

apply to about 5% of the male clerical workers but to less than one
half of one percent of the female clerical workers;" the $250 figure
would exempt less than one percent of male clericals and no female
clericals.342
Andrews finally proposed

$200

as the cutoff. In a letter to the

President, Andrews recommended that the FLSA be amended to
include "[a]n exemption of all employees receiving a guaranteed
monthly salary of

$200

(equivalent of

$2400

per year)."343 He

stated that the reason was "to· prevent evasion of the wage and hour
standards and also to avoid unnecessary hardship" - presumably
to employers.344 In discussions about the amendment, Andrews
was characteristically noncommittal about the figure, suggesting al
most immediately that $200 might be too low. He did, nonetheless,
fervently pursue his proposed $200 cut-off in Congress.
Andrews's reform bill was soon overshadowed by more sweep
ing reforms to both upper- and lower-level exemptions proposed by
340. May Bar Overtime for High Pay Group, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1938, at 4:4.
341. May Ease Wage Act on Well-Paid Jobs, N.Y.

TIMES, Dec. 23, 1938, at 4:4.

342. Memorandum on High Salaried Employees tbl.4 (National Archives, Records
Group 174, Department of Labor, Records of Assistant Secretaries, NC 58 Entry 43-44,
Records of Assistant -Secretary Charles McLaughlin, Box 9).
343. Letter from Elmer F. Andrews to President Roosevelt 1 (Mar. 14, 1939) (FDR/OF
3295, Wage & Hour Division, DOL, Box 1, 1939).
344. Id. He also noted that "[t]he Secretary of Labor has approved these amendments
which were prepared with the advice and counsel of Mr. Benjamin Cohen." Id. For a discus
sion of Cohen, see WHITE, supra note 152, at 177-80, 189-90.
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conservatives in Congress. Bills had been introduced that would
have exempted all clerical workers regardless of salary, along with
many other groups of employees. The most viable of all of these
bills, proposed by Rep. Barden, would have exempted all workers
receiving a guaranteed salary of

$150.

Andrews complained that

the Barden proposal went too far:
"[a] lower figure than $200 would undoubtedly exempt a considerable
number of salaried workers to whom the overtime benefits of the Act
should extend." Our studies indicate that employees in the salary
classification from $150 to $200 a month have as much need for pro
tection against long hours as any other class of workers. Further
more, if this class of workers may be worked an unlimited number of
hours without overtime compensation, the purpose of the bill to
spread employment in this group will be defeated.345

But what about workers whose salaries were over

$200

a month?

On what basis did he argue that those employees did not need the
protection of the statute? None appears, in his speech or in the
relevant archives. The studies to which he refers merely showed
the percentage of clerical workers falling within specific salary
ranges. Andrews did not propose any basis upon which to conclude
that the work of the top five percent of male clerical workers was
not susceptible to work-spreading. Despite a purposive vocabulary,
little of the purposive approach was present in Andrews's analysis.
Even as Andrews was opposing Barden's bill, he encountered
opposition to his own bill from organized labor. The Newspaper
Guild was the major source of opposition.346 The status of news
papermen, and in particular of reporters, had been a theme from
the beginning in the news coverage on Andrews's proposed salary
based exemption.347 That should not be surprising; reporters, after

all, were the ones doing the reporting. Andrews backed down as a
result of the Guild's opposition. Plain, blunt Andrews observed
that "organized labor has done such a swell job of fighting my battle
for me that I think it would be very unethical for me to press that
amendment if they are opposed to it."348
345. Letter from Elmer F. Andrews to Representative Mary T. Norton, Chairwoman,
House Committee on Labor 2 (July 15, 1939) (FDR/OF 3295, Wage & Hour Division, DOL,
Box 1, 1939 folder) (quoting Report of the Labor Committee on H.R. 5435).
346. See WSU/Guild, Andrews Bars Change ofHours Act, GUILD REP., Aug. 1, 1939, at 1.
347. See, e.g., Amendment, Seeks to Avoid Sweeping Floor Revisions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
16, 1939, at 7:4 (noting suggestions from Congress and the Labor Department "that 'white
collar' workers, which classification would include newspapermen and other groups paid sal
aries above a certain level" would be exempt).
348. WSU/Guild, Andrews Bars Change of Hours Act, GUILD

REP., Aug. 1, 1939.

Class Line-Drawing

August 1998]

2301

The Newspaper Guild's blockage of Andrews's white-collar
amendment might be the first time a white-collar union won a polit
ical battle - and it was a battle to block legislation aimed at valo
rizing the traditional white-collar claim to superior status. The
activism of the Newspaper Guild on this issue triggered coverage in
the popular business press of the post-Wagner Act organizing suc
cess among some white-collar unions, with the Newspaper Guild
described as "one of the most successful" among them.349 The liter
ature reflected an understanding of why it was possible for such
white-collar employees as reporters, teachers, and nurses to organ
ize, while it remained the case that the office staffs of factories were
unorganizable as a practical matter. "In the factory, the feeling that
the white collar is superior to the overall - that class prejudice on
which white-collar organization drives have frequently foundered in
the past - is apt to militate against a successful campaign."350 But
the same was not true of fields in which white-collar workers
predominate.351 The collar-color line was thus being portrayed in
the press as an inappropriate basis for understanding class hierar
chy in predominantly white-collar sectors of the economy, while, at
the same time, the business community and its congressional sup
porters continued to urge that collar-color should determine eligi
bility for overtime under the FLSA.
D.

First Regulatory Amendments (1940)

Once the Roosevelt Administration succeeded in defeating the
Barden Bill,352 the Administration's reform activity shifted from
the legislative to the administrative arena.353 The Wage and Hour
Division's 1939 Annual Report, published on January 8, 1940, re
ported that the Division had a number of studies under way that
might lead to recommendations for amendments, including a study
349. White Collar Unions on Their Way, Bus.

WK., Aug. 19, 1939, at 30.

350. Id. at 31.
351. See id.
352. The bill reared its head again in 1940, when as proposed, "[i]t would exempt all
employees, including manual workers, receiving a guaranteed monthly salary of $150 or
more." Letter from Frances Perkins to President Roosevelt {Apr. 16, 1940) (FDR/OF 3295,
Wage & Hour Division, DOL, Box 1, 1940 folder).
353. There was concern that the Barden Bill would be brought back. Another bill was
introduced by Rep. Kramer which would have exempted from the maximum hours provision
any employee - regardless of collar color or duties - who earned the equivalent of $200 a
month and was guaranteed employment for at least 40 hours a week. See H.R. 8624, 76th
Cong. {1940). Andrews's earlier $200/month proposal had pertained only to white-collar
workers.
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on "the effect of the law on higher-paid salaried employees."354 In
response to a January 9, 1940 letter from a businessman expressing
the view that "young men in an office or in a clerical capacity"
should not be subject to maximum hours requirements, Perkins
stated that "I think you will be interested to know that a committee
has just been appointed to study revision of the rules and defini
tions of the Wage and Hour Act."355 In early March, Perkins wrote
to Philip Fleming, Andrews's successor, that "before holding any
public hearings," it would be best for a departmental meeting to be
held "to arrange a tentative program. "356 At some point in this
process, industry groups began filing petitions to revise the regula
tions. Their proposed definitions differed from one another, but all
went in the direction of broadening the exemptions. Even the busi
ness press seemed skeptical about the breadth of some of the rec
ommended changes.357
The Wage and Hour Division's plan was to schedule separate
hearings for different industry groups, and the agency made clear
that it was open to considering the use of different definitions for
different industries. "There is such a wide variation in the work and
functions performed by executive, administrative and professional
employees in different industries, especially in the administrative
and professional classes, that . . . a definition for one of these classi
fications in one industry is not necessarily to be treated as a prece
dent in others."358 The first hearing was noticed in March 1940 and
held in April of that year, focusing on the Wholesale and Distribu
tive Trades. Next came Manufacturing and Extractive Trades in
June; and then the two fields which likely held the largest number
of white-collar workers, "Banking, Brokerage, Insurance, Financial
and Related Institutions" and "Publication, Communication, Public
Utility, Transportation, and Miscellaneous Industries" - both of
which were noticed in June and held in July.359
354. WAGE & HOUR DN., U.S. DEPT. OF LAB., FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMIN·
ISTRATOR OF THE WAGE AND HOUR DNISION FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1939, at 129
(1940).
355. Letter from Barcalo Manufacturing Co. to Frances Perkins (Jan. 9, 1940) and Fran·
ces Perkins's Response (Jan. 12, 1940) (NA/DOUPerkins, Box 168, Wage & Hour Division,
General 1940).
356. Memorandum (n.d.) (NA/DOUPerkins, Box 168, Wage & Hour Division, General
1940).
357. See Who's an Executive?, Bus. WK., Apr. 20, 1940, at 34.
358. Press Release from U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, No. R-712,
at 4 (Apr. 2, 1940) (NA/W&H, Press Releases).
359. United States Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, "Executive, Adminis
trative, Professional . . . Outside Salesman Redefined," Report and Recommendation of the
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On the eve of the first scheduled hearing, representatives of the
Newspaper Guild objected to the Division's plan to restrict testi
mony at each hearing to witnesses from the industries under consid
eration at the hearing. The Guild had apparently learned from the
NRA the tendency of early precedents to become templates. In
partial response to that objection, the Division decided to hold off
on recommending any regulatory changes until all the hearings
were complete.360
While these hearings were in progress, the House voted (by a
close vote) to open the FLSA for amendments.361 Barden once
again proposed exempting all employees earning "a guaranteed
monthly salary of $150 or more," and the President issued a state
ment in opposition to the amendments and in support of the FLSA.
The statement was exceedingly hesitant and measured, much in the
spirit of Poole's earlier defenses of the initial regulations:
The Wages and Hours Act is in an evolutionary stage where we are
learning by practical experience in the field as to whether and how it
should be amended. It is too early to form definite conclusions except
to note that on the whole the principle and objective are excellent and
have done much to stabilize wages and hours and bring wages up for
the lowest paid workers. It is being administered with discretion and
no substantial groups of employers have been damaged . . . . In view
of all the circumstances I think it would be a great mistake to adopt
the Barden amendments. By another year we shall know a great deal
more about the subject.362

There was here no overarching statement of a policy or purpose.
The best Roosevelt could say after seven years of intensive focus on
hours regulation was "give us another year to work it out."
Presiding Officer at Hearings Preliminary to Redefinition, Effective Oct. 24, 1940, at 1-2
[hereinafter Stein Report].
360. That decision was not entirely voluntary. Early in the process, the Newspaper Guild
- the union that had scuttled Andrews' legislative proposal - objected to the segregation of
the hearings by industry. Abraham Issennan of the Guild insisted on the right to testify at
the Wholesale and Distributive Trades hearing, arguing that his union needed to be there to
co=ent on "the question of linking up one or more of these definitions with monthly earn
ings of employees." As a result of Issennan's inquiry, the format of the hearings permitted
non-industry organizations to file briefs, but not to submit evidence at the hearings outside
their own industry. See Press Release from U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Divi
sion, No. R-712, supra note 358, at 3 (appending correspondence). Had the agency promul
gated any regulatory changes before all parties were heard, surely there would have been
major objections. By the time of the published Report and Reco=endation, Presiding Of
ficer Harold Stein reported that the division of hearings into industry groups was "purely for
administrative convenience." Stein Report, supra note 359, at 1.
361. See Telegram from S.T Early to President Roosevelt (Apr. 25, 1940) (FDR/OF 3295,
Wage & Hour Division, DOL, Box 1, 1940 folder).
362. FDR/OF 3295, Wage & Hour Division, Box 1, 1940 folder, Apr. 25, 1940.
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Ultimately, the Wage and Hour Division decided to promulgate
uniform amended regulations for all industry groups. The presiding
officer of the hearings, Harold Stein, heard
hearings, and received

180

127

witnesses at the

briefs, written statements, and memo

randa. The product of this process was a published and widely dis
seminated Report and Recommendation.363

Exempting all white-collar workers.

The most dramatic change

proposed by industry was to exempt all white-collar employees
from hours regulation.364 Industry spokesmen argued that "compli
ance with the act may lead employers to change many of their em
ployees from a weekly or monthly salary to a straight hourly pay
basis."365 In other words, by long-standing practice, white-collar
workers were paid on a salaried rather than an hourly basis, and
were not required to punch a time clock - a distinction that helped
sustain the ideological position that even the most routine white
collar work is of high social status. Once employers were required
to keep track of the hours of their non-exempt white-collar work
ers, employers argued, it would no longer make administrative
sense to keep them on the salaried payroll; as a result, their social
status would suffer.
Stein had a dual response to this argument, one purposive and
one descriptive.

On a purposive level, Stein presented evidence

that regulating the hours of white-collar workers had in fact suc
ceeded in shortening their hours and decreasing unemployment meaning that work-spreading worked for white-collar workers.366
He also denied that paying overtime to white-collar workers neces
sitated switching to an hourly wage. Stein argued that "[it] does not
appear why there should be a reluctance to make occasional or
even frequent overtime payments to salaried workers . . . . Extra
payments by way of bonuses have long been common and are not
considered inconsistent with salaried status."367 Here Stein failed
to see that bonuses to salaried workers were

not

traditionally based

on hours worked, and therefore did not turn salaried workers into
"clock-watchers" the way federal hours regulation did.
363. See Stein Report, supra note 359. The briefs and hearing transcripts seem no longer
to exist: neither the relevant collections in the National Archives or the Department of La
bor has them, nor do the majority business and labor archives I contacted.
364. See id. at 6.
365. Id. at 7.
366. See id.
367. Id. at 7-8.

August 1998]

Class Line-Drawing

2305

Another problem was also implicit in Stein's purposive response
to the proposed collar-color line. In defending the statutory deci
sion not to exempt all white-collar workers, Stein argued that
white-collar workers could benefit from the statute's work
spreading goals. But what if it could have been shown that the stat
ute's work-spreading goals also made good sense empirically for the
categories of workers the statute clearly exempts? If by paying sal
aried workers overtime "[l]iving conditions can be improved and
work spread even where wages are comparatively high,"3 68 and a
relatively well-paid clerical worker can praise the statute for reduc
ing long hours ("we . . . owe our leisure to the Wage-Hour Act"),
why are there upper-level exemptions at all?369 Why does the logic
of work-spreading and the preservation of leisure not apply across
the board? A purposive analyst operating within an administrative
agency must, at least to some degree, operate within the constraints
of the statutory scheme. If the statutory scheme does not itself
stand up to purposive analysis, the purposive analyst must either
ignore the statute - as the initial regulations did when it came to
interpreting the term "administrative employees" - or must justify
the conflict between empirical realities and their statutory represen
tation (or misrepresentation). It is perhaps for this reason that
Stein quickly abandoned the purposive approach and moved to de
scriptive justifications for his position.
Stein's descriptive response to industry's argument that the pay
ment of overtime would jeopardize the social status of white-collar
workers. He provided data supporting the emergent view that the
status of routine white-collar workers was in decline. He argued
that 49.4 percent of clerical workers were women - an argument
that, contrary to the business community's view, clerical work was
not high-status370; that vacations with pay were not universal; that
an "astonishingly large percentage of these workers" were paid low
wages; and that working conditions in white-collar work were often
unhealthful.371 Stein thus replaced the image of the white-collar
worker as the ambitious young man who volunteers to work unpaid
overtime in order to move up by studying his employer's business372
with the image of the female clerical worker working long hours in
368. Id. at 8.
369. See id.
370. See id. at 4. The status increase from feminization of the environment in white-collar
settings was never enough to make up for the status-lowering effect of a predominance of
women.
371. See id. at 9.
372. See id. at 7.
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a dead-end, unsafe job. Stein's point was that the law could not
ignore the substantial status rift that divides white-collar workers
from each other.
But the problem implicit in Stein's descriptive defense was that
it fueled the argument that the FLSA should only protect employ
ees who worked in low-wage jobs in exploitative conditions. This
was industry's view of the FLSA's goal, not the agency's. Undue
reliance by the agency on the plight of low-wage white-collar work
ers would tend to support industry proposals to exempt all white
collar workers earning over a certain (relatively low) salary - the
approach Andrews had abandoned under political pressure from
the Newspaper Guild.
Defining "administrative" employees. Stein observed that the
most frequent criticism of the original regulations was their failure
to promulgate separate definitions for the separate statutory terms
"executive" and "administrative."373 Stein rejected the notion that
the Administrator had a statutory obligation to provide separate
definitions, arguing on weak grounds that "'executive' and 'admin
istrative' are used synonymously in common speech and in court
decisions."374 He decided, however, that "the best conclusion" is
that the two terms ought to be defined separately.
He took a descriptive approach to defining the term "adminis
trative" by referring to its use in contemporary business practice.
The term "executive," he explained, "applies with particular apt
ness to persons who are commonly called 'bosses,"'375 but there is
another group of business employees to whom the term "adminis
trative" could apply.
In modern business there has been an increasing use of persons whose
authority is functional rather than departmental. Primarily they de
termine or affect policy or carry out major assignments rather than
give orders to individuals. Examples of this type of employee are ex-

373. Id. at 3.
374. That seems a weak point, given how rarely the word "administrative" was used in
wage and hour legislation, and given the presumed tendency of legislatures not to use redun
dant language in lists such as these. His authority was also weak. Stein relied on Saint v.
Allen, 126 So. 548 (La. 1930), a case in which the term is used to say that the state highway
department, an "administrative office," is in the executive branch of government, and which
quotes references to the "administrative, legislative, and judicial functions" of government,
as opposed to the usual "executive" functions. In In re Heafy, 285 N.Y.S. 188, 192 (1936), the
issue again is branches of government: "When a judge appoints a clerk, he does an adminis
trative or executive act, not a judicial act." These sources don't show an established practice
of using the terms interchangeably in the employment setting.
375. Stein Report, supra note 359, at 4.
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ecutive assistants, travelling inventory men, purchasing agents, tax ex
perts, and safety directors.376
After observing that a "large group". of these employees are not
"executives" in the narrow sense, Stein concluded that "it does no
violence to the common understanding of the words to apply 'exec
utive' to the person who is a boss over men and to apply 'adminis
trative' to the person who establishes or affects or carries out policy
but who has little or no authority over the specific actions of other
individuals. "377

A sign of Stein's discomfort with the new "administrative" cate
gory is that fact that he offered no purposive justification for the
special treatment of "administrative" employees. Stein did not ex
plain why it would not be worthwhile to use an overtime premium
to encourage employers to hire as many purchasing agents or tax
experts as are necessary to get the job done in forty hours per week;
he offered no evidence that unemployment was significantly lower
among administrative employees than among routine white-collar
workers. Given the newness of the "administrative" category - its
absence in occupational statistics and in the

NRA codes - the em

pirical data necessary to launch a purposive analysis of the category
would have been sorely lacking in any event.
Instead, Stein's approach to this category of employees was de
scriptive. Stein's assumption seems to have been that the adminis
trative employee deserves to be on the "exempt" side of the line
because "administrative" employees were recognized as more akin
in status to executives and professionals than to ordinary white
collar workers. As confirmation, Stein noted that "in many busi
nesses the weekly pay roll is characteristically the pay roll for the
production, maintenance, and clerical workers, while the monthly
pay roll is characteristically the pay roll for the company officials,
executives, and administrative employees:"378 The message implicit
in the "administrative" definition was that there existed a culturally
recognized status distinction between factory and back office, or be
tween staff work and line work, or between production and nonpro
duction functions, that warranted the drawing of an exemption line.
The problem, however, was that many businesses used the salaried/
hourly distinction to separate all white-collar from all blue-collar

376. Id.
377. Id. at 4-5. Later in the report, though, the description is no more specific than "per
sons performing a variety of miscellaneous but important functions in business." Id. at 24.
378. Id. at 33.
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workers. Why was payroll practice dispositive here, if it was ig
nored when it came to lower-level white-collar workers?
Precisely because the concept of the "administrator" was rela
tively new, Stein recognized that it would be difficult to tell the dif
ference between a "bona fide" administrator and "a mere cog in a
large industrial wheel."379 Job titles would not suffice, Stein con
cluded, because depending on the size and nature of the business,
people with the same job title - he gave the examples of "claims
agent," "statistician," and "personnel director" - do vastly differ
ent types and levels of work.380 But beyond the requirement that
the work be nonmanual in nature and that it require the exercise of
discretion, Stein's definition had few specifics.381 Because of defini
tional uncertainty, Stein's operational definition of "administrator"
relied upon a high salary minimum as the "principa[l] " safeguard
against abuse:382 a salary minimum of $200 per month, as opposed
to the $120 per month minimum for executives. Stein made every
effort to be empirically rigorous in setting the minimum salary level
for administrators. But the data available to him pointed to differ
ent answers, and in the end the best he could offer was a compro
mise solution.383
379. Id. at 25.
380. See id. at 24-25. Stein says elsewhere that "[t]itles can be had cheaply and are of no
determinative value." Id. at 25.
381. Subcategories of the definition exempted workers who "regularly and directly as
sis[t]" administrative employees, so long as their work is sufficiently discretionary, thereby
covering the executive secretary who is primarily valued for "her ability to distinguish be
tween callers at the office and to carry out other special and important duties"; there was an
exemption for employees whose discretionary work is "directly related to management poli
cies" and another for heads of "functional departments" where the function of the depart
ment is "directly related to general business operations." Id. at 27.
382. See id. at 26.
383. The only data available to him on "administrative" salaries came from the Federal
Personnel Classification Board, which distinguished between "clerks" and "administrators"
and provided data for federal employees in both categories. According to these data, which
were already nine years out of date and failed to reflect intervening pay increases, "in Gov
ernment practice the turning point between the clerk and the administrative official" was on
average $2700 per year ($225 a month). Stein Report, supra note 359, at 31 & n.106. Stein
feared, however, that in low-paying regions of the country, administrative employees would
have far lower salaries than those paid by the federal government. See id. at 32. The alterna
tive approach was to look at national average salaries of non-exempt white-collar occupa
tions and set the minimum salary for "administrative" status above their level. In the interest
of this kind of calculation, the Wage and Hour Division sponsored a study of clerical em
ployee salaries. The study showed that 5% of stenographers earned over $1,800 a year ($150
a month) but only 1 % earned over $2,400 a year ($200 a month). See id. at 31. Looking at
bookkeepers, "one of the most routine of all the normal business operations," id. at 32, only
8% of them earned more than $200 a month, while almost 50% of accountants and auditors
(groups that Stein wanted to exempt) made over $200 a month. But Stein offered no expla
nation why the salary minimum should be set at a level at which only 50% of the accountants
and auditors in the United States would qualify for exemption. Stein's experience was that
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Aside from the arbitrariness of the salary minimum, the weak
definition combined with a salary minimum provides little defense
against the claim that all white-collar workers earning over that sal
ary minimum should be exempt. If the emergent concept of the
"administrative employee" has so little specific content, why should
such important policy consequences be made to turn on it? Why,
instead, should the government not leave it to the market to iden
tify the most important, highest-status white-collar jobs simply by
setting levels of compensation for them? Absent a better purposive
grounding, the treatment of administrative employees was inevita
bly incoherent.

Defining professional employees.

The main criticism of the orig

inal regulations' treatment of "professional" employees was their
failure to include employees in "the more modem professions, in
the quasiprofessions and in artistic callings," who cannot be classed
as either executive or administrative, but who are commonly
thought to be akin to executive or administrative employees in so
cial status.384 Stein noted that "profession" or "professional" were
not yet precise cultural terms; he pointed out that in "common
speech," the term is "sometimes used humorously so as to apply to
every occupation that man undertakes."385 Again, then, the prob
lem was how to pin down an emergent cultural phenomenon in le
gally administrable terms - how to "draw a line beyond which the
term 'professional' may not be extended. "386
The proposed amended regulations distinguished between the
"artistic" and the "learned" professions, applying some uniform re
quirements to all professionals and some distinct requirements to
each category. Thus, for example, the uniform part of the regula
tion required that the work of the professional be " [p]redominantly
intellectual and varied in character as opposed to routine."387 The
problem with this requirement was that many occupations tradi
tionally viewed as "professions" did not meet it. What about the
chemist who performs the same operation time and again, or the
doctor who does twenty physical exams and performs the same tests
absent regional adjustments, no salary cutoff could serve as a good substitute for a meaning
definition of the category "administrative employees."
384. See id. at 34; see also, e.g., REsEARCH COMMITTEE ON S OCIAL TRENDS, supra note
63, at 301 (noting "[i]ntemal changes in the professional group," including the steady growth
of some of the older professions and the rapid expansion of newer ones, such as "[d]esigners,
draftsmen, and inventors" and the new "profession of librarian").
385. Stein Report, supra note 359, at 34.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 33.
ful
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and procedures at each - or, on the artistic side, the actor who
performs the same role in a long-running Broadway play for two
years? The answer Stein gave is that "the work of the true profes
sional is inherently varied even though similar outward actions may
be performed."388 But would the agency be capable of recognizing
work outside the well-established traditional professions that only

appeared to

be routine? Or was this flexibility intended to operate

as a one-way ratchet, as an assurance that no occupation tradition
ally viewed as a profession would be ousted from the category?
Stein also compromised on the relationship of the professional's
work to the clock, the aspect of the definition with the greatest pur
posive implications. The original version of the regulation provided
both that professional work must involve "the consistent exercise of
discretion and judgment both as to the manner and time of per
formance" and that the professional employee's results or output
"cannot be standardized in relation to a given period of time. "389
Stein agreed to drop the first time requirement, because "a doctor
or a lawyer or any other typical professional employee must fre
quently keep perfectly regular office hours or hours in court and
cannot perform his work at will."39° He did not see similar difficul
ties with the second time requirement. But the difficulties existed.
If a lawyer works in court, then why is the day in court not a stan
dardized unit of output? Or, for the doctor, why is the fifteen
minute office visit not a standardized unit of output? Stein did not
address this, although his underlying assumption was most likely
that the lawyer or doctor spends many hours in preparation for
each increment of time spent in contact with the client. But, for all
that preparation, the doctor does not get paid unless he interacts
with the patient, and the preparation is amortized in the fee. The
doctor is compensated for the office visit, not for the cure, and doc
tors who have lighter caseloads work fewer hours. Therefore, re
turning to purposive thinking for a moment, if doctors were not
permitted to work as many hours, there would be room in the econ
omy for more doctors. The belief that the professional's work re
lates to time in a nonstandardized way was, and is, important on a
cultural level. But even in the 1930s, it was possible to see an ele388. Stein Report, supra note 359, at 36. Another example was Stein's agreement to
delete from the uniform definition of "professional" the requirement that the professional's
work not be "subject to active direction and supervision," because he saw that some "recog
nized professional occupations" would not qualify as professions if the requirement re
mained. See id. at 36-37.
389. Id. at 37.
390. Id.
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ment of standardization in professional life - particularly for pro
fessionals working in-house in corporations under the control of
bureaucratic work organization. Here again, Stein ignored the pos
sibility that the assumptions behind both the status superiority of
the professional and the inappropriateness of work-spreading poli
cies to professionals were being undermined in emerging social
practice.
One of Stein's innovations was the creation of the category of
the "artistic professions."

"Artistic" work was defined as being

"original and creative" and the product of "invention, imagination,
or talent."391 Again, Stein started with and expanded upon the con
sensus he thought existed in the culture - that, for example, visual
artists and musicians are "artists" rather than craftsmen. But why is
a musician who plays the same charts in a dance band week after
week an artist? Could that musician be distinguished from the sym
phony orchestra musician who plays the same symphonies year af
ter year? As before, it seemed as though the statutory criteria were
not to be used to oust "traditional" arts, but only to evaluate new
ones. Thus, Stein said that it is "not believed" that animators are
"creative," while it is believed that photographers are392 - with no
distinctions drawn among types 9f animators or types of photogra
phers.

Journalists

and

writers

also

presented

categorization

problems. Stein suggested that only the "persons holding the more
responsible and better-paid positions in the editorial departments
of newspapers or in advertising agencies" would qualify for the ex
emption.393 But Stein did not explain why only the minority of re
porters depend on "invention, imagination, or talent," while all
musicians, painters, and actors do, regardless of how aesthetically
tawdry or repetitive or unchallenging their work.
Stein was not prepared to fashion a definition of the profes
sional that would deal with all the obvious problems of categoriza
tion. Instead, he turned once again to a salary minimum, for all
professions except law and medicine. This reflects the fact that,
whether on purposive or descriptivist terms, Stein's careful analysis
could not yield a definition of "professional" work that would stand
on its own as the basis for an exemption.

Defining executive employees.

Turning to the definition of "ex

ecutive" employees, Stein's project was to determine what makes

391. Id. at 41.
392. See id.
393. Id.
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for a "true executive" in light of changes in modern industrial prac
tice. Because "the function of hiring is frequently delegated to a
personnel department or director," Stein determined that the regu
lations could no longer require executives to have the authority to
hire.394 But he found it "difficult to see how anyone, whether high
or low in the hierarchy of management, can be considered as em
ployed in a bona fide executive capacity" if that person does not at
least have the power to

recommend

hiring or firing.395 To Stein,

executives were "bosses," and a boss who had no power over the
job tenure of his employees hardly seemed a boss at all. Yet a
reader of contemporaneous personnel literature could easily envi
sion the centralization of all hiring and firing recommendations
through the use of standardized testing techniques. Again, Stein's
descriptivist reading of emerging cultural trends might have been
too conservative - a conservatism perhaps necessitated by his
need to defend a status-based statutory line between "executives"
and other employees.
Similarly, Stein determined that a bona fide executive must be
in charge of a "department or recognized subdivision thereof." It
was not sufficient for an employee to "supervise miscellaneous
groups of employees not constituting a customarily recognized de
partment or subdepartment of an establishment. "396 His reasons
related solely to status. "It would seem improper to give as impos
ing a title as 'executive' to a person who supervises a collection of
men performing a job, or a series of jobs, but whose responsibilities
do not include the kind of permanent status that is properly associ
ated with the management of a recognized department."397 "Fun
damentally and properly" a line must be drawn at "the supervision
of a unit with a permanent status and function."398 Stein insisted on
this even though he recognized the growing practice in large depart
ments of distributing "the supervision . . . among two or three em
ployees, conceivably among more."399 He did not explain why
divided authority in an established department was necessarily of
higher status than undivided authority over a series of flexibly or
ganized workgroups.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.

See id. at 12.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 12.
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As for the use of a salary minimum, Stein found that "[t]here
was . . . surprisingly wide agreement that a salary qualification" is
an "index to the 'bona fide' . . . executive character [of the employ
ment] . . . . The basis of this agreement is easily explained. The term
'executive' implies a certain prestige, status, and importance." If
they are to be denied overtime pay, "[i]t must be assumed that they
enjoy compensatory privileges and this assumption will clearly fail

if they are not paid a salary substantially higher" than the minimum
wage. "[T]he best single test of the employer's good faith in attrib
uting importance to the employee's services is the amount he pays
for them."40°
When it came to deciding the appropriate salary level, Stein's
initial inclination was to maintain "an adequate differentiation be
tween the salary normally earned by a worker for a standard work
week who is employed as a craftsman or machine operator or
tender and the salary of a person whose exemption is sought as an
executive."401 But the salary level he chose

-

$120 a month - fell

far short of his stated goals because "the weekly earnings of a
skilled craftsman who does no supervising work" were on the
rise.402 Stein came to hold the view that even in the absence of a
substantial salary differential, executive work would retain its high
status because it had non-wage "compensating advantages": "au
thority over people, a privilege generally considered desirable to
possess," greater opportunity for promotion, paid vacation and sick
leave, and greater job security during slow periods.403 But Stein
failed to see the trend that many non-executive "salaried" workers
received paid vacation and sick leave, that lower-level supervisors
were closed out of promotions by the growing preference for plac
ing college men in managerial jobs, and that many skilled workers
with union representation were catching up with their bosses on the
"comparative advantages" of employee benefits and layoff protec
tion. His approach was descriptive, but his cultural antennae were
weak. By assuming the comparative advantages without requiring
employers to prove on a case-by-case basis both that these benefits
were given to "executives" and that they were not given to ordinary
workers, Stein failed to detect the trends that were undermining
lower-level executives' claims to high status.
400. Id. at 19.
401. Id. at 20.
402. Id. at 21.
403. See id. at 21-22.
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Possibly because Stein recognized that he had failed to mount
an adequate descriptivist justification for the executive exemption,
he also attempted a purposive defense. He asserted that an over
time penalty for executives "would not usually have any considera
ble effect in spreading employment because in many instances the
executive's work cannot be shared."404 But this contradicted his
earlier observation that supervisory authority was often shared. He
also asserted that executive work was less responsive to work
spreading incentives

than was

administrative

or professional

work.405 But he did not explain why, for example, the work of a
company's chief :financial officer (an "administrative" position) is
any more divisible than the work of its head of human resources (an
"executive" position). The purposive justification for the executive
exemption was offered almost as an afterthought and with little
care.
In sum, Stein's report was a serious effort to justify the Divi
sion's position following weeks of arduous hearings. Only because
of its seriousness and high quality does it serve as a useful basis for
examining the different approaches to class line-drawing and their
consequences. The strength of Stein's descriptive approach is that
he did achieve sufficient independence to resist reversion to an old
and increasingly contested consensus on the high status of all white
collar work. In that sense, the report and regulations took a stance
against the dominant views of the business community and thereby
advanced public debate on the changing class order. But the weak
ness of Stein's approach is that absent the capacity to do independ
ent empirical work, the descriptive approach is only as good as the
quality of the government's cultural antennae. It is not easy to de
tect the emergence of new cultural understandings. Stein was quick
to recognize new claims of high status by groups in society. He was
far slower to recognize that social transformations were threatening
the long-term ability of many traditional "executives" and "profes
sionals" to sustain their existing claims of high social status.
Given the obviously time-consuming nature of the hearing pro
cess, the descriptive approach has another problem. When the so
cial order is in flux, accurate descriptive maps can become
inaccurate in short order. It is difficult to imagine frequent enough
amendments to keep pace with the shifting distribution of supervi
sory authority, discretion, intellectuality, and bureaucratic control
404. Id. at 22.
405. See id.
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within the American labor market. Within certain tolerances, these

changes are not a problem; case-by-case adjudication under existing
standards can resolve some of these issues. But more fundamental

changes require rethinking the entire scheme - and that is difficult

to accomplish when the relevant evidence is of a cultural nature and
is therefore difficult to gather and interpret.

All in all, the public would have been better served had Stein

been able to use a purposive approach. Had there been a commit

ment to purposive analysis, the Wage and Hour Division would

have collected data to determine whether unemployment was a

problem among certain types of executives, professionals, and ad

ministrators. Changes in the regulatory scheme could have been

made on a pilot basis, if necessary, to determine whether in fact the
employers of upper-level employees would respond to hours limita

tions by spreading work.406 Because the Division's decisions would

have been so clearly based on a set of technical and quantitative

judgments, they would have had far less impact on public concep

tions of the changing class hierarchy than would explicitly cultural
determinations by government agencies as to who is above whom in
a universal status hierarchy.

The problem with a purposive approach would have been, and

would now be, that the lessons to be 1eamed from the data might
push beyond the limits of the agency's authority. As we have seen,

the FLSA itself was not the product of careful purposive analysis.

The Division might have revealed, had it used a purposive ap

proach, that there was no justification under a work-spreading the
ory for any exemption for executives, professionals, and

administrators. What, then, could it have done, except appeal to

the Department to sponsor legislation to repeal the exemptions or

begin to articulate a new set of rationales for the statute and its
exemptions and hope to prevail in the courts?

CONCLUSION

It was no small feat for New Deal government actors to resist

industry efforts to saddle maximum hours laws with an anachronis

tic model of contemporaneous class structure - one in which the
lines of relative privilege were drawn at the collar-color line. To

406. This is the claim the Newspaper Guild made in its criticism of the new rules: "Bas
ing definitions on salary earnings appears to us to ignore one of the stated purposes of the
FLSA, to spread employment, something which can be done . . . by limiting hours in the
higher brackets as in the lower." WSU/Guild, Pasche Assails Redefinitions in Hours Law,
GUILD REP., Nov. 1, 1940, at 1.
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that extent, government actors successfully resisted embedding in
the law an already-contestable orthodoxy of universal white-collar
privilege that was coming under attack in both labor-union practice
and in the technology of the bureaucratization of work. This is the
value of a descriptive approach to class line-drawing, when it is
done with a healthy measure of independence.
The upper-level exemption regulations are under attack today
in large part because it is the

virtue

of sophisticated descriptivist

approaches that they do not always comport with what powerful
private interests put forward as "common sense." The regulations
reflect that by the late 1930s the highest-level executives, adminis
trators, and professionals drew their high social status from their
role as the engineers of the industrial process; the lower-level mem
bers of their ranks were, like ordinary workers, being engineered by
it. The upper-level exemption regulations, in sum, were predicated
on an understanding that if an upper-level line must be drawn, it
needed to be drawn

within the ranks

of those who were viewed as

professionals, executives, and administrators. That understanding
is as appropriate today as it was in the 1930s, and it is no more
popular with the business community today than it was in the 1930s.
It should not be abandoned.
Over the years, the regulations have been subject to demands
for simplification. To the extent those demands have been heeded,
the result has been a movement away from precisely the aspects of
the agency's interpretations that were the most sensitive to emerg
ing cultural trends. The creation in 1947 of an "upset test" - a
higher salary level at which duties will no longer be closely scruti
nized - has tended to place undue emphasis on income, while at
the same time not diminishing the general view that being "ex
empt" means working in a job that has high social status. The "up
set test" has also held the Wage and Hour Division hostage to
successful Congressional efforts to thwart the increases in the upset
salary levels necessary to reflect not only inflation, but also the in
creasing earnings inequalities between upper-level and lower-level
white-collar workers.
As the upset salary levels have become less realistic bases for
drawing class lines, entirely too much emphasis has been placed on
the aspect of the regulations we have discussed the least: the re
quirement that exempt employees be paid on a "salary basis." The
salary-basis test provides, inter alia, that exempt employees who
work on a particular day cannot be docked for hours not worked on
that day. Its philosophy is tied to the claim that the work of true
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upper-level employees is non-commodified, that it cannot be sub
jected to the time clock. Recall Andrews saying "they can go fish
ing when they want to." But the trend that began in the 1920s and
1930s of imposing bureaucratic control on all forms of work means
that employers have come to see

all of their

employees as working

subject to the clock. Employers for years have been unprepared to
allow all but their highest upper-level employees to take advantage
of the :flexibility that was customarily one of the "comparative ad
vantages" of upper-level status. That is why employers object to
being robbed of their ability to dock their upper-level workers' pay
for partial-day absences.
Perhaps the salary-basis test can be used to reverse this incur
sion into the privileges of upper-level status. But it is not the job of
descriptivist government actors to resist cultural trends. If in fact
business practice has succeeded in eroding this traditional accoutre
ment of upper-level status, such that we as a culture now readily
accept the notion that upper-level employees file time reports and
have :fluctuating paychecks, then a descriptivist Wage and Hour Di
vision must eventually yield. If it does not, then its actions appear
arbitrary - a sure sign that it has lost whatever legitimacy comes
from being able to claim that the law's conception of class has its
basis in the culture. This is another limitation, then, of the descrip
tivist approach.
One might ask, why is the business community able to imple
ment its own view of upper-level employment if what it has chosen
to do is rendered illegal by the FLSA? The government, after all,
does not merely promulgate images of class. It promulgates regula
tions with all the force of law. The answer, of course, is that to the
extent the law is enforced, it does provide a meaningful check on
the ability of business to deviate from the government's view of the
true indicia of upper-level status. But the FLSA is, like so many
laws, underenforced. And the enforcement of the upper-level ex
emptions requires individual employees to come forward and de
mand that they no longer be categorized as exempt - a change that
is still experienced as a status loss. The Newspaper Guild remains
in the vanguard in its willingness to take that position, but many
white-collar workers cling fiercely to their claims to high status.
Let me close this discussion of the limits of the descriptivist ap
proach with a true story. While I was writing this Article, a former
star student of mine called to ask what she needed to do to enter
the law-teaching market. This was a student who had been very
anxious to get a quick start on her career as a management-side
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labor lawyer in a large firm. When I asked her why she was un
happy in practice, part of her reason for wanting to leave was the
long hours she was working. We then turned to talking about the
teaching market, and - after disclosing that her hours would not
necessarily get any shorter - I asked her whether she had in mind
a possible topic for a "job talk" or a first article. She expressed
interest, to my delight, in the white-collar exemptions to the FLSA.
I asked her what position she would take, and she started to express
her outrage at the thought that highly paid, high-status profession
als and executives would ever expect to be paid overtime for their
long hours of work. I pointed out to her that the theory behind the
overtime premium was work-spreading and reminded her that she
was about to leave law practice because of the long hours (which
quie.ted her sense of outrage a bit).
I then asked my former student whether she'd given any
thought to why lawyers are asked to work such long hours. Specifi
cally, I asked her whether she thought it had to be this way,
whether the nature of the work made it impossible to hire more
lawyers at lower pay and allow them to work fewer hours. She an
swered (to my surprise, given her initial viewpoint) that the "it has
to be this way" argument was utterly absurd. Without saying more,
I encouraged her interest in the FLSA and in teaching. And I came
away all the more convinced that as members of an elite which is
clinging to its own elevated status, we cannot be trusted accurately
to assess our own status demise. Descriptivism is attractive, but it
asks more of government actors than their own biases permit them
to deliver. It is far easier to see past those biases when the ques
tions that are being asked are purposive - when they are self
consciously tailored to meet specific statutory goals.
The FLSA is long due for a purposive overhaul.

If work

spreading remains the goal of the statute, there is grave reason to
doubt that a time-and-a-half overtime premium is large enough to
serve as a work-spreading incentive.407 I doubt that the framers of
the FLSA would have ever imagined workers striking to avoid be
ing forced to work excessive hours at the time-and-a-half rate.40s
They did not anticipate that the high costs of employee training and
of non-wage employee benefits such as health and pension plans
would raise the costs of hiring additional workers to the point at
407. For a critical review of proposed legislation to increase the overtime premium, see
RoNALD G. EHRENBERG & PAUL L. SCHUMANN, LoNGER HouRs OR MoRE Joss? AN JN.
VESTIGATION OF AMENDING HOURS LEGISLATION TO CREATE EMPLOYMENT 133-37 (1982).
408. See, e.g., Five Big Strikes: Issues, Outcomes, NEWSDAY, Aug. 20, 1997, at A37.
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which a time-and-a-half premium is the far cheaper choice for many
employers. In that light, and in light of the growing tendency of
employers to use part-timers and/or independent contractors to
meet their labor needs, the FLSA as currently constituted may no
longer be able to meet work-spreading goals.
Ifwe are prepared to create a meaningful work-spreading incen
tive, the question of whether upper-level workers should be exempt
should be reconsidered in its entirety. At least some "ordinary"
work is regaining the exercise of autonomy and discretion through
flexible specialization and cooperative management.409

At the

same time, the well-publicized wave of layoffs of executive, admin
istrative, and professional employees through corporate downsizing
suggests that the use of "best practice" management techniques to
control the work of upper-level employees is, to borrow a phrase,
once again "taking the starch out of' upper-level white collar work
ers.410 There is good reason to suspect, then, that the trend of con
vergence in the work structure and working conditions of upper
level and ordinary workers continues apace. The assumption that
upper-level work is (and is uniquely) noncommodified and
nondivisible deserves to be freshly reexamined.411
Finally, it is time to consider whether the FLSA should be
shifted off of its work-spreading foundation and explicitly moved
onto alternative moorings - for example, the protection, for

all

workers, of leisure or of their right to function simultaneously as
workers, parents, and citizens.412 It is, in short, time to genuinely
409. Again, however, "best practice" is slower to disseminate in the world than in the
literature. See, e.g., Paul Osterman, How Common is Workplace Transformation and Who
Adopts It? Internal Labor Market Innovations, 47 INous. & LAB. REL. REv. 173 (1994).
410. Examples of journalistic and popular responses to white-collar downsizing in the
1990s abound. See, e.g., More and More, Joblessness Wears a Business Suit, Bus. WK., Feb.
28, 1994, at 22; White Collar Wasteland, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 28, 1993, at 42.
There are likewise numerous claims within the business community that white-collar down
sizing is necessary for economic growth, see, e.g., Edwin A. Fmn, Jr., White-Collar Bloat,
FORBES, Oct. 17, 1988, at 34; Thane Peterson, Can Corporate America Get Out from Under
its Overhead?, Bus. WK., May 18, 1992, at 102, and that the trend will be towards the erasure
of "the rigid distinction between white- and blue-collar workers," see Richard Rosecrance,
Can We Make White-Collar Workers More Productive?, USA TODAY: THE MAGAZINE OF
THE AMERICAN SCENE, Sept. 1, 1991, at 37.
411. It might also be worth reconsidering other assumptions about the extent to which
the responses of blue-collar and white-collar wages and working conditions to economic vari
ables are similar. See, e.g., David G. Blanchflower & Andrew J. Oswald, The Determination
of White-Collar Pay, 42 OXFORD EcoNoMic PAPERS 356 (1990) (examining British data).
412. An advantage of the purposive approach is that governmental definitions of social
problems, once identified, can be changed. "[S]erious attention to a given definition is an
outcome of significance, as it legitimates some strands of political argument, mobilizes some
participants, and invites people to see public issues differently. In its multiple roles, problem
definition constitutes a source of both stability and flexibility in the policy process." Janet A.
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rethink the FLSA and its upper-level exemptions, not merely to
"simplify" them or remake them to maximize employer "flexibil
ity."413 As Hugh Johnson said at the cotton textile hearings, the
government has the power to require employers to change their
personnel practices to meet the public policy goals of government
programs. When government goals change, it is legitimate for gov
ernment demands on private actors to change as well.414
In rethinking the FLSA from a purposive standpoint, we must
be cognizant of the fact that revising the FLSA will require a new
wave of class line-drawing.

Whether motivated by a descriptivist

or a purposive rationale, overtime exemptions send working people
powerful messages about their class position - a message that is
reiterated with every paycheck. True, purposive government regu
lation does not set out to map or to alter the class system or even to
send any particular messages about class. But the messages we re
ceive are not necessarily the ones the sender sent. The class struc
ture of contemporary American society is at least as uncertain and
contested as it was in the pre-New Deal period. Any government
action that draws lines on the basis of class-like criteria - income,
occupation, education level, and so forth - is likely to have a sig
nificant effect on how we experience and debate the issue of class.
Adopting a purposive approach thus does not get the govern
ment off of the cultural hook. The purposive legislature or agency
must maintain a high level of cultural awareness in the course of
program design and implementation. This means that someone in a
position of authority must take on the job of understanding how the
government's regulatory scheme replicates or challenges existing
cultural assumptions, and the extent to which it puts the govern
ment on one or another side in ongoing cultural debates. Where
possible, these cultural insights should be taken into account in pro
gram design - for example, by avoiding drawing controversial lines
that are of limited programmatic efficacy. More often, the govern
ment will not be able to avoid controversy. In such cases, the gov
ernment must do everything it can to make clear to the regulated
community that its classification scheme is "correct" only for the
limited purposes for which it was designed. It is no news that the
Weiss, The Powers ofProblem Definition: The Case of Government Papenvork, 22 POLY. Sci.
97, 118 (1989).
413. Here I allude to the proposed introduction of compensatory time under the Fair
Labor Standards Act. See Working Families Flexibility Act, H.R. 1, 105th Cong. (1997).
414. An aggressive approach will, however, require a hefty budget for education and en·
forcement - something the Wage and Hour Division and the NRA have sorely lacked.
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government needs to be vigilant about the unintended conse
quences of government programs. It may be news that sometimes
those consequences are cultural. The purposive approach therefore
must not be culture-blind. When done right, it is culturally aware,
and for that reason adopts a posture of cultural self-restraint and
political self-disclosure. The time has come to give it a try.

